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Security Sector Reform and Governance (SSR/G) processes in West Africa have been 
ongoing for about two decades now in societies in post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding or 
statebuilding phases of transition. These security reform interventions have largely followed a pro-
Western or liberal peace approach and thus considered as foreign and facilitating neo-imperialist 
tendencies which does not promote change and transformation within the security and 
development nexus. It also focuses more on the ‘hard’ side of security and governance reforms 
rather than complementing this with the ‘soft’ aspects reflected mainly in acquiring the right 
security cultures which entail shared values, norms and customs for the desired transformation 
needed.   
This study, therefore, argues for re-conceptualising the SSR/SSG approach by focusing 
more on the endogenous security context which explores why culture matters in SSR/SSG and 
whether acquiring the right security culture, that is shared norms, values and standards for safety 
and well-being, could minimise the complexity and facilitate the acceptance and effectiveness of 
security sector governance in the comparative cases of Ghana and Nigeria.   
The methodology for this research was based on the qualitative research method, given the 
exploratory nature of the study which focuses mainly on human behaviour, shared values, norms 
and principles with the tendency of bias and subjective interpretation. It adopted the critical 
theorist approach for the research, while using the grounded theory as a means to establishing the 
theoretical proposition for the study within the comparative case study strategy.   
It concludes that shared norms and values on safety, protection and freedom from fear, 
influence the acceptance and commitment towards security sector reform and governance efforts, 
hence imbibing the appropriate security cultural values, norms and practices by both state and sub-
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state actor groups, would ensure the needed change and transformation towards successful 
statebuilding processes in West Africa. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Background to the Study  
Security, peace and development constitute vital concepts that have transcended and 
straddled both Cold War and Post-Cold War ideologies and conventions. These concepts have 
assumed critical and useful dimensions in addressing the needs and concerns of both state and 
non-state, or rather, sub-state actor groups. Though different and varied in their definitions, they 
are related, interconnected and mutually reinforcing in facilitating the safety and survival of the 
state and its people. There is, however, the need to preserve and consolidate the existence as well 
as address the needs of these actors by responding to their common threats.  
Interestingly, many states in Africa that are responsible for creating a safe and secure 
environment for undertaking development activities have not been able to fulfill this obligation. 
The inability of African states, as sovereign entities, to guarantee security, peace and 
development within their territorial confines, stems largely from a lack of political will. This is 
compounded by structural factors such as weakened, dysfunctional and resource-constrained 
security sector and a governance architecture that is unable to effectively and efficiently respond 
to threats that undermine the safety and existence of the state and the individual (AU Common 
African Defence and Security Policy - CADSP, and Cawthra 2008).   
In designing responses to insecurity through a regime-centred rather than people-centred 
approach, security institutions in Africa have often become a threat to the very citizens they are 
supposed to protect. Marginalisation of the populace in decision-making and sharing of the 
wealth of the state, bad governance practices, conflicts, unconstitutional changes in government 
and transnational organised criminal activities have further exacerbated this problem. These 
developments have led to progressive destabilisation and insecurity in these states owing to 
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dissatisfaction among citizens or resident populations and security forces (Berdal and Malone 
2000).   
The civil wars experienced particularly in the Mano River Union (MRU) sub-region, 
including Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire and, to an extent, the destabilisation in Guinea, 
coupled with calls for transition in dictatorships and authoritarian-led regimes, including Ghana 
and Nigeria, among others, exemplified the dissent of the governed and the need for change in 
these countries (Clapham 1998, Reno 7-19, Hoffman 2011 and Collier and Hoeffler 2005). 
Security forces, mainly the police and the military, were used under dictatorship regimes and in 
civil wars to brutalise and abuse the populace, thereby wreaking havoc on their lives and 
properties.  In addition, sub-state security forces, including private security companies, liberation 
armies, guerillas and rebel or mercenary groups, were also used in civil wars across the region in 
a similar context (Clapham 1998 and African Security Review Vol. 17 no. 2).   
The violence and abuses meted out on citizens in these countries took place amidst the 
lack of or questionable good governance practices. Oversight of the security sector by civilian 
actors, including national legislature and civil society organizations in respective fields, were 
almost non-existent at the outbreak and/or during the civil wars and brutal dictatorships (IPU and 
DCAF 2003, and Bryden and Fluri 2003). Thus, issues of security sector reform/management, 
institutional reforms, and governance of the security sector linked to development issues, among 
others, became eminent.  
In response to these developments, which more or less mirrored the end of the Cold War 
era and the assumption of post-Cold War dynamics and imperatives, the urgent need for reform 
in the areas of democratic governance and aligning development programmes towards the needs 
of the people became a conditionality from external actors or donors who tied the provision of 
aid to these conditionalities. The issue of security and development also came to the fore, in the 
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context of a mutually reinforcing dynamics of a secure environment, creating the necessary 
conditions for pursuing the development agenda, which in turn reinforces and guarantees the 
state and human security agenda. The call for Security Sector Development (SSD) focused on 
giving more attention to poverty reduction in a safe and secure environment, rather than 
emphasis on increased military budget expenditure and promoting regime security issues 
(Brzoska 2003).  
Ensuring a careful balance between state and people’s security, thus, became a challenge, 
necessitating the emphasis on addressing issues of bad governance practices, including 
corruption, nepotism and clientelism, through the upholding of good governance and democratic 
principles on issues of freedom of speech, transparency and accountability, human rights and the 
rule of law, among others (Harbeson and Rothchild 2008). Hence, aligning security/development 
priorities to the needs of the citizenry and issues of civilian control and oversight of the security 
sector came to the fore.  
The Security Sector Reform (SSR) agenda subsequently emerged in response to some of 
these dynamics, where states in need of aid for development were required to reduce their 
military or defence budget expenditures to about 4% of their national budget requirements, and 
tone down excesses of abuse on their citizens (Bryden, N’Diaye and Olonisakin 2008: 9). The 
SSR concept, subsequently, gained significant attention in the late 1990s, evolving towards 
ensuring professional, operationally effective and accountable state security agencies, having 
effective civilian management and oversight bodies. The continuous evolution of the nascent 
concept, which was quite successfully implemented in South Africa after the end of the 
Apartheid regime, and its lack of effectiveness in practice, owing to different cultural contexts 
and characteristics, as well as poor or weak governance practices, led to the call for Security  
Sector Transformation (SST), particularly within the African setting. 
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The SST concept is perceived as having the tendency to reinforce the Security Sector 
Governance (SSG) element of the SSR concept. The SST concept focused more on changing 
values, norms and imbibing principles within the security culture of state security institutions and 
agencies that will enhance the effectiveness of the implementation of the SSR concept (Bryden, 
and Olonisakin 2008 3-29).   
This is expected to translate into well-managed, vibrant, effective and efficient security 
sector, with reorganised or restructured processes and mechanisms, as well as reoriented security 
actors in the sector. Though these initiatives have specific objectives or set targets, they are 
basically required, in the context of human security, to work towards ensuring a well-managed 
and operationally effective security sector which is efficient in identifying threats to the state and 
the individual, securitising or determining what constitutes these threats, and responding in a 
timely and appropriate manner to address them.  
Ghana and Nigeria were chosen as case study countries to explore how security culture 
influences the governance of the security sector and the acceptance of security sector reform 
initiatives. The rationale for the case selection includes the following factors. To begin with, 
Ghana, a lower middle income country with an estimated population of 29.6 million as of 2018 
and a GDP rate of 8.0% (World Bank in Ghana, 25 March 2019), has shown remarkable progress  
over the past two decades by being among the fastest growing economy in the world in 2011 
(Daily Graphic cited on myjoyonline.com 2011; Euler Hermes 2011: 3), and also among the top 
ten fastest growing economies in the world in 2012 with Nigeria and five other African countries 
(The Sun cited on myjoyonline.com 2012). In 2014 the country recorded 2.6% GDP translated 
into US$48.7 billion (Ghana Statistical Services 2014). Its discovery of oil in 2007 and 
production in commercial quantities in 2010 facilitated its growth in addition to revenues from its 
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other commodities, including Gold, Diamond, Cocoa, Bauxite and Manganese, as well as the 
growth of its service industry (Yennu 2018: 18).   
The World Bank indicated its major strides towards democracy in a multi-party system in 
which its judiciary has demonstrated significant level of independence from the other two 
branches of government. In addition, it has consistently ranked in the top three countries in 
Africa for freedom of speech, a strong broadcast media with radio as the medium with the 
greatest reach (World Bank in Ghana, 25 March 2019). Its economy still remains buoyant despite 
complaints about lack of social impact from current economic successes recorded and its 
currency depreciation against the US Dollar, as well as upsurge in crime in recent years across 
the country.  
Nigeria, on the other hand, is also a lower middle income country with a GDP of 1.9% in  
2018 and a population of about 197 million. Prior to this, the West Africa hegemon recorded a 
GDP growth rate of 5.94% which constitutes US$522.64 billion in 2014 (World Bank cited in 
the Trading Economics 2014; and Nigeria National Bureau Statistics 2014: 4). It is, arguably, the 
continent’s largest economy in competition with South Africa. The country’s economy has 
performed relatively better compared to its past under dictatorship and authoritarian regimes in 
the 1970s and 1980s, though its economy depends heavily on mineral oil resources. The 
economy, however, currently faces a “lost decade” without economic reforms through 
diversification as its economic growth stagnates based on its excessive dependence on oil, 
constituting 90% of its foreign currency earnings and two-thirds of government income (Soto 
and Renner at Bloomberg.com, 12 February 2019).   
The country, considered as multi-ethnic and culturally diverse society, had six 
consecutive elections since its return to democracy in 1999 after a long period of military rule as 
also in the case of Ghana (World Bank in Nigeria, 9 April 2019). However, crime in the country 
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is on the increase, particularly terrorist activities in its north-eastern parts, making lives of 
residents difficult. The successes and failures chalked with regard to the macro-economic 
indicators in these two countries, therefore, present an interesting scenario for lessons to be 
learned, particularly within the context of peace, security and development.  
Secondly, both countries have gone and continue to go through democratic transitions in 
the same region with similar governance trajectories, characterised by civil war, in the case of 
Nigeria, past military dictatorships and coups d’état, and religious and ethnic conflicts among 
others. Nevertheless, they have remained relatively stable in the region for over a decade until 
recently when Nigeria started experiencing problems with the terrorist group ‘Boko Haram’.  
Additionally, both countries have some differences, particularly, in their historical 
backgrounds, size, security threats, and conflict management mechanisms among other things. 
They have also embarked on SSR processes, but with varying degree of success, and still face 
challenges of SSG in several respects. For example, through the instrumentality of policy ‘think-
tanks’ and other Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), the Government of Ghana attempted a 
reform of its security sector in the areas of intensifying civil-police and civil-military relations, 
given negative perceptions generated by the activities of past military regime under the 
Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) led by former President Jerry John Rawlings, 
through human rights abuses. SSR initiatives were, therefore, organised, including preparatory 
dialogue sessions for orientation for officials of government, members of the legislature, selected 
security agencies and members of civil society in the country. Security Sector Management 
(SSM) programmes were also organised for both civilian and military personnel from the 
Ministry of Defence. These efforts were complemented by both traditional and modern security 
mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts.  
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Though some progress have been made in the past decade, owing to stability and 
upholding good governance practices in the country, comprehensive SSR is yet to be achieved. 
Also, the knowledge of the concept of SSG is known within limited circles of expertise, anti-
change elements, especially within government institutions and security agencies, pose 
unnecessary interferences to good governance and reform within the sector. There are, however, 
positive security sector reform lessons to be learned, demonstrated by the peace and stability the 
country has enjoyed over the past two decades.  
In the case of Nigeria, Abiodun (2000) argues that security sector management since 
Nigeria’s independence was tied to the politics of governance and to activities of civil societies, 
encompassing elements of both strategic and human security, and involves questions of 
development and conflict management. Abiodun, however, premised the stability of the country 
on how well the security apparatus was managed, and whether it was up to the task of skillfully 
addressing the ethnic, social, economic and political tensions in the country. The recent terrorist 
activities of the ‘Boko Haram’ – who are against western education and calling for the 
establishment of the ‘Sharia’ in Nigeria – have not helped matters either.  
A case study of the two countries would, therefore, serve as useful scenarios for testing 
the performance of SSG agendas in societies in transition towards statebuilding in West Africa.  
1.2 Problem Statement 
Governance, as mentioned earlier, constitutes a critical component in the general re-
organisation of the security sector, either in post-conflict or transitional societies. The term 
governance here is used to connote structures, processes and mechanisms through which the 
security sector is subjected to democratic control such that the needs of both the individual and 
the state are identified and addressed in a peaceful, safe and secure environment which has 
respect for the rule of law (Bryden and Hänggi 2005). Another interesting definition of enterprise 
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governance by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) and the Information Systems 
Audit and Control Association (ISACA) states the notion of a set of responsibilities and practices 
exercised by a controlling and an executive management body, with the goal of providing 
strategic direction, ensuring that objectives are achieved, ascertaining that risks or threats are 
managed properly and verifying that the organization’s resources are used responsibly (IFAC 04 
in Allen and Mellon 2007: 2).   
But as has been rightly identified by Bryden, Ndiaye and Olonisakin (2008: 12) under the 
challenges of security sector governance in West Africa, security governance as a concept is 
difficult to implement in practice. Some of the reasons for this situation include years of 
autocratic rule and its entrenched regime security interests, security sector governance perceived 
as a condition for donor assistance, the exclusion or marginalisation of sub-state actors in the 
security governance process, the Anglophone and Francophone linguistic divide, as well as weak 
institutional mechanisms or arrangements for governance of the sector. Other additional factors 
include the ignorance about the SSR/G concept and the lack of requisite capacity to implement 
SSG among others.  
Thus, the SSR concept continues to evolve with new challenges. These challenges 
comprise a lack of in-depth knowledge of how it is accepted or received in countries of 
implementation. A lack of clearly defined benefits to be derived by both state and sub-state 
actors through the externally-imposed Western agenda around SSR complicates the interaction 
between traditional security values and norms which conflict with locally defined, traditional or 
informal and human security concepts in the African context.  
As a result, a more detailed study of the subject matter is required to enhance security 
sector governance and for that matter SSR processes in West Africa. And in order to ensure the 
acceptance and effective implementation of the concept, more attention also needs to be given to 
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the notion of security culture and its impact on SSG, which goes beyond merely exercising 
oversight functions and ensuring accountability, to embracing the collective definition of security 
and the SSG concept, securitisation and minimisation of common prioritised threats, 
understanding security as a service to be delivered to both state and sub-state actors, and which 
also requires active engagement by actors comprising security providers, managers and recipients 
in the security sector.   
Bryden, Ndiaye and Olonisakin underscored the significance of an attitudinal shift by the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in terms of values and norms since 
the 1990s by insisting on the intrinsic relationship between security and political good 
governance. This is reflected in the adoption, by ECOWAS, of a number of binding instruments 
related to peace, security and development that provides an important framework for SSR 
activities at the national level (Bryden, Ndiaye and Olonisakin 2008: 11). In a similar vein, 
Bryden and Olonisakin (2010: 3-20) in their work on SST called for a uniquely African 
dimension to the SSR agenda which could be found in the need to shift radically structural 
conditions that underpin the governance of the security sector (Bryden and Olonisakin 3-20). 
This call provides a basis for transformation, through norms and values, within national and 
regional settings with greater emphasis on actors and institutions.  
In doing this, however, the crucial aspects of ‘security culture’, and its tendency to 
address issues of complexity, acceptance and effectiveness of security governance processes in 
West Africa, has largely being left untouched. Security culture is used here to connote shared 
beliefs, values, norms, practices and principles on prevention, minimisation, management or 
resolution of threats and fears within a group, community or a country. Allen and Mellon 
asserted that governance and management of security are most effective when they are systemic, 
which implies woven into the very culture and fabric of organizational - and by extension state - 
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behaviours and actions. In this regard, they define culture as the predominant, shared attitudes, 
values, goals, behaviours and practices that characterize the functioning of a group or 
organisation, and for that matter a state.  
Culture thereby creates and sustains connections among policies, processes, people and 
performance (Allen and Mellon 2007).  
1.3 Aims and Scope of Research  
With the emergence of the human security concept, which advocates for a people-centred 
approach to addressing security needs rather than a regime or state-centred approach, the security 
concept has broadened in scope and dimension as regards issues being securitised as threats, and 
by whom (Buzan 1991, Wyn Jones 1999; Booth 2005). Food, environment, health, political, 
economic and social issues, among others, have come to the fore as issues of concern to the 
citizens of a country and major stakeholders, comprising both state and sub-state actors including 
civil society, and these actors are required to play active roles in decision-making, management 
and oversight processes that seek to respond to concerns or needs expressed in the issues 
identified. That said, it has been observed that the notion of values and norms, reflected in the 
security culture of states – which is more geared toward regime security – play dominant roles, 
and mostly negatively, in security governance in West Africa. In most cases, sub-state security 
actors are excluded from decision-making processes rather than promoting their welfare and the 
security interest of the state (OSIWA 6 and IDRC 1-13).  
This study, therefore, seeks to explore the role of security culture and its influence on 
SSG and transformation with respect to three core analytical concepts. These include complexity 
(institutional and human dynamics and requirements), acceptance (recognition or legitimacy or 
actors and their roles) and effectiveness (with regard to performance of actors to achieve stated 
objectives, goals or results). In particular, it will examine how the complementary roles of 
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indigenous security actors, based on their security culture, can either influence or undermine the 
promotion of strong, credible and democratic security sector institutions, mechanisms and 
governance processes towards enhanced SSR/SSG practices in West Africa. It will, therefore, be 
guided by the following research question: ‘How has security culture affected the complexity of, 
and facilitated the acceptance and effectiveness of security sector governance in the comparative 
cases of Ghana and Nigeria?’ 
In doing this, the study will focus on SSG practices in Ghana and Nigeria respectively, 
representing transitional societies in West Africa, and unravel the extent to which security culture 
influences have either facilitated the acceptance and implementation of security sector reform 
programmes and enhanced governance in the sector or led to resistance or hindrance of same. 
The relationships and roles of state and sub-state security actors in the security governance 
process would be looked at, and the extent to which that has translated into the effectiveness of 
security institutions and agencies on the ground.  
The evolution of the SSR concept and programmes which brings out a reconfiguration in 
addressing security challenges confronting not only the state but sub-state actors within the 
territorial confines of that state, and implications of securitisation of threats based on both 
notions of traditional and human security would equally be the focus of this study.   
1.4 Overall Objectives of the Study  
The SSR concept is increasing in significance on the African continent as a prerequisite 
for socioeconomic growth and development given the widespread instability and violence across 
the continent. The West African region, in a similar vein, has engaged the concept at both 
national and regional levels, albeit with differences in commitment to reform and acceptance of 
the concept in general. And as governments and peoples in Africa struggle to ensure a good 
balance between the traditional and human security concepts in the minimisation of threats, 
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efforts are required to deepen the understanding of these concepts to facilitate its acceptance and 
application.  
The overall objectives of the study are, thus, as follows:  
• To explore ways of enhancing SSG for effective SSR processes in transitional societies in 
West Africa;  
• To identify ways of promoting effective and efficient security institutions and agencies in 
delivering services that meet the needs of the people;  
• To promote collective decision-making processes through inclusive identification of 
threats to state and sub-state actor groups;  
• To explain and address the needs of both state and sub-state actors as a conflict 
prevention measure towards consolidation of peace and security; and  
• Contextualise the SSR concept within transitional societies for easy acceptance and 
application.  
1.5 Rationale of the Study  
SSG initiatives are still evolving at the conceptual and the implementation levels and, in 
many instances, the sensitive nature of issues within the sector, which impact on national 
sovereignty and security of the state and its people, pose great challenges to the acceptance of 
security sector reform or governance programmes. Hence, the need arises for a more in-depth 
analysis of the security sector governance concept and related security culture practices of the 
state and that of its indigenes or traditional authorities, in order to make the concept more 
acceptable and implementable. This would provide the enabling environment for embarking on 
development activities that benefit both the state and its people.  
Additionally, the success of any given security sector initiative or reform must embrace 
the ‘governance’ element within the sector, which affords the opportunity for all stakeholders to 
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collectively identify, securitize and decide appropriate intervention measures and mechanisms for 
addressing needs and concerns. It also sees this approach as capable of facilitating national 
ownership and sustainability of security sector programmes.   
Finally, maintaining a good balance between state and people-centred approaches to 
addressing security needs in a country, with recourse to the rule of law, would equally guarantee 
the minimisation of threats, and ensure freedom from fear and wants.  
1.6 Clarification of Concepts   
From the sections enumerated above, certain key concepts require consideration and 
clarification, given their varied interpretations and understanding.   
1.6.1 Security 
Security means different things to different people and actors beyond freedom from fear 
and want as the concept has shifted focus from the state as the prime or only actor in 
international relations with strategic interest and legal standing to that of non-state or sub-state 
actors (Buzan 1991, Booth 2005; and Baldwin 1997: 5-26). This brings to the fore current 
emphasis on human or people-centred security rather than regime, traditional or state security. 
This study, therefore, identifies with the human security concept but equally attaches significant 
level of importance to guaranteeing the security of the state, as that is essential in ensuring the 
state’s judicious use and monopoly over power in order to guarantee its sovereignty and create 
the appropriate environment for stability, peace and development.  
1.6.2 Security Culture  
Culture basically reflects a way of life of a people and their shared beliefs informed by 
norms, values, traditions and customs. Culture has been defined as the learned and shared 
behaviour of a community of interacting human beings (Useem & Useem 1963: 169). It is also 
viewed as “… consisting primarily of the symbolic, ideational, and intangible aspects of human 
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societies” (Banks and McGee Banks 2010:8).  The issue of culture has increasingly gained 
significant attention given its centrality to human conduct and behaviour. Culture, however, has 
both positive and negative attributes and this is further complicated by the issue of relativism.  
Notwithstanding, globally accepted principles, norms and practices provide options for 
change. The idea of change would only take place when problems, usually attributed to negative 
human behaviours and their shared ways of thinking and acting, are influenced towards a 
contextual and globally accepted shared positive values, norms or standards in behavioural 
conduct (Wood 2004; Hills 2012).   
Hence in the context of security culture, where a shared sense of safety and protection as 
well as freedom from fear, threats and wants come to the fore, behaviours of either state or sub-
state actors must not only conform to acceptable standards and norms but must equally be 
contextualised, having endogenous cultural considerations in mind for effectiveness. Security 
culture, in this regard, is defined as shared beliefs of a group, a community, institutions, 
organisations or a state among others, that guide efforts towards prevention, management and 
resolution of conflicts, freedom from threats, and acquisition of basic needs towards existence 
and survival. Security cultural dynamics, as a result, brings to the fore issues of complexity, 
acceptance and effectiveness.  
This study which focuses mainly on security sector reform, governance and 
transformation, holds the view that in undertaking successful SSR, such issues about complexity 
(institutional and human dynamics and requirements), acceptance (recognition or legitimacy or 
actors and their roles) and effectiveness (with regard to performance of actors to achieve stated 






Governance in its broadest sense, conceives a polity with structures and mechanisms for 
its political, security, socio-economic and cultural organisation towards delivering the needs of 
the people and/or the state. It is also perceived as structures and processes used by social 
organisations, be it a family, corporate business or an international institution, to steer itself 
either through centralised control or self-regulation (Bryden and Hänggi 2005: 7; and Rosenau 
2000: 181-190). The concept has become contentious over the years given its initial 
interpretation by mainly state actors on preserving regimes in power rather than satisfying the 
needs of both the state and its people.   
Emphasis however shifted towards broadening the concept to embrace all actors and their 
practices with notions of inclusivity in decision-making, upholding the rule of law and human 
rights standards, encouraging transparency and accountability, and engendering equal rights, 
particularly on the gender front, as well as observing the respect for freedom of speech and 
expression among others (UNDP 2010 :14). The culture of dictatorships and authoritarianism 
have in the past made it impossible for the observance of these standards and principles, but for 
justice, equality, progress and development, these standards or norms and values have become 
the areas of focus in changing entrenched behaviours towards transformation, growth and 
development of the state and its people.  
1.6.4 Complexity and Acceptance  
Complexity which focuses on diverse institutional and human dynamics and requirements 
needs further attention with regard to mapping the actors in the sector and clarification of their 
roles in an attempt to minimise the complex security terrain and activities required of it. 
Acceptance requires not only mapping and knowing these actors but getting the appropriate 
16 
 
recognition, legitimacy or authority for collaboration and effective performance, which makes it 
possible for needs-based responses to security needs.  
1.6.5 SSR/SSG and Related Concepts  
Reforming the security and justice sectors (SSR) have focused mainly on changes 
designed to allow relevant existing security sector institutions to function better in delivering 
effective and efficient security services in a country (Wulf 2004; Ball and Brzoska 2002; UNDP  
Human Development Report 1994: 3, 22-40). This term focused broadly on all actors and 
institutions in the three branches of government to include the executive, legislature and 
judiciary, as well as civil society participation. It eventually emerged as the generally-used 
terminology for other variants which included security sector reorganization, reorientation, 
restructuring, management and development (African Union Policy Framework on SSR 2013: 56; 
OECD 2007).   
These terms are used to reflect desired or designed changes to correct human rights 
abuses of citizens of a country by civilian and/or military governments through security agencies, 
as well as the preservation of these governments or regimes in power. The idea was, therefore, to 
reorganise or restructure the roles, functions and relations of actors and institutions within the 
security system, reorient the actors towards democratic goals, objectives and expectations in the 
sector, and build capacities through effectively managing their activities as a way of creating the 
conducive environment to facilitate stability and development in the country. SSD, as mentioned 
earlier, essentially focused on giving more attention to poverty reduction in a safe and secure 
environment, rather than emphasis on increased military budget expenditure and promoting 
regime security issues (Bendix and Stanley 2008:13; Wulf 2004).  
SSG also became essential as management of the actors focused more on operational and 
tactical levels of engagement rather than the strategic level where civilian institutions or 
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organisation, including members of the executive, legislature, judiciary and civil society actors 
needed to exercise control over security agencies, and also engage in collective decision-making 
to ensure appropriate and enhanced security service delivery to the state and its people through 
policies and strategies. This entails exercising legitimate political authority by various 
stakeholders over and application of democratic principles to the security sector (DCAF 2015: 2). 
SSG, in this sense, in not perceived as an end in itself, but as a means to an end (dos Santos and 
da Silva2012: 206 -220; and Schroeder et al 2014: 214-230). 
Beyond the notion of reform and governance came the concept of SST which basically 
required changes in behaviour and conduct in adopting the right approaches to responding to 
security threats or needs. The concept of theory of change emphasises the need to effect changes 
with regard to negative behaviours as the cause of problems in the security sector towards 
probable or possible positive outcomes. This is premised on the proposition that behaviours are 
informed by cultural traits which have both positive and negative elements to them (Funnell & 
Rogers 2011: 149-196; Roduner & Schläppi 2008: 12-16; Ambrose & Roduner 2009:1-4; Earl et 
al 2001: 1-137). It involves changing negative values, norms and customs, while imbibing or 
adopting principles within the security culture of state security institutions and agencies that will 
enhance the effectiveness of the implementation of the SSR concept (Bryden and Olonisakin  
(2010: 3-20). 
1.6.6. Hybridity 
Hybridity seeks to shift the teleological thinking or approach from western-dominated 
theories or concepts to focusing more on home-grown or indigenous socio-political formations 
capable of providing the needs of both the state and its people. It focuses on the strength and 
resilience of indigenous institutions or “community life of societies” based largely on their 
cultures in governance rather than emphasis on state weakness or fragility as a basis for 
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maintenance of peace and sustainable development (Boege et al 2009: 13-21, Ekeh 1975: 91- 
112). Boege et al argue that   
“[in] hybrid political orders, diverse and competing authority 
structures, sets of rules, logics of order, and claims to power 
coexist, overlap, interact and intertwine, combining elements of 
introduced Western models of governance and elements 
stemming from local indigenous traditions of governance and 
politics, with further influences exerted by the forces of 
globalization and associated societal fragmentation (in various 
forms: ethnic, tribal, religious). In this environment, the “state” 
has no privileged monopolistic position as the only agency 
providing security, welfare, and representation; it has to share 
authority, legitimacy, and capacity with other institutions”.  
 
While this concept rightly places emphasis on the recognition of both formal and informal 
actors, and their respective authorities, legitimacies and capacities, it also clearly unveils a gamut 
of actors, structures, philosophies and logics, power dynamics and varied norms, values, 
practices and influences (Mac Ginty 2011; Millar 2014; Lawrence 2017). The complexity of such 
a terrain is therefore not in doubt. This diversity has partly contributed to the resistance to change 
or challenges faced in the area of SSR/SSG.  
Again, the tendency however exists for romanticising the concept of hybridity as 
traditional institutions are perceived to be resilient, filling gaps left by state institutions, have 
wide coverage and direct linkage with grassroots, and complement as well as share legitimacy 
with state institutions (Bagayoko et al 2016:4). Hence in seeking to explore the potentials of how 
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state and sub-state security systems overlap, inter-relate and inter-penetrate at complex levels, 
care must also be taken not to overlook the challenges posed by the traditional, informal or 
indigenous security systems as issues of gerontocracy, authoritarianism, chauvinism and obsolete 
traditional practices, among others, undermine the rights of citizens in the communities 
(Bagayoko et al 2016: 7; Meagher 2012: 1073-1101; Logan 2008:1).  
In its application, hybridism must be perceived in a contextual sense rather than through a 
translational approach. This is because it entails different entities, elements or belief systems 
working together to achieve a particular goal but in a particular context, and in this sense, the 
African context. This is essential because donor or partner support and assistance is mostly based 
on conditionalities which include accepting aid or grants inclusive of technical expertise, ideas, 
norms, principles and values, whether or not applicable or acceptable to the recipient country or 
state. Hence, ‘contextual hybridity or hybridism’ is used to qualify hybrid arrangements in the 
positive sense of facilitating acceptable partnerships, support or intervention in the pan-Africanist 
or Afrocentric sense, while not necessarily compromising generally acceptable or global 
standards (Chaana 2002; Podder 2013; Jackson 2018). ‘Translational hybridity or hybridism’, on 
the other hand, would refer to super-imposition or reinforcing Eurocentric or imperialist norms or 
standards that may not be necessarily suitable within the African context (Barrinha & Rosa 
2013). 
 1.7 Theoretical Framework  
Perceptions of reality, based on its ontological and epistemological components, form the 
basis of philosophical assumptions which inform and guide research with regard to probing 
research problems and finding solutions to them (Lenzer 1998; Guba and Lincoln 1994; Kuhn 
1996). This study was, thus, guided by the critical theory and its related ideological positions,  
taking into consideration its critical, contentious, evolutionary and transformational attributes 
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which paved way for exploring probable solutions to the research problem, and coming up with a 
theoretical proposition to guide further research in the field under study (Wyn Jones 1999; Booth 
2005, Fierke, 2009). This paradigm “as the basic belief system or worldview”, guided the research 
and investigations carried out, not only in choices of method but in ontologically and 
epistemologically fundamental ways” (Guba and Lincoln 1994: 105).  
This approach to the research provided the latitude for an exploratory or qualitative study 
into possible influences of security culture in the governance of the security sector, making it 
possible to discover, disprove and reinforce new ideas, beliefs or widely held views on the 
security reform and governance concepts, and its acceptability or otherwise in effectively 
meeting security needs of the people in the two country case studies of choice, that is Ghana and 
Nigeria.   
The grounded theory approach was then used to establish the theoretical proposition of 
this research, based on the unpredictable and evolving nature of culture, its dynamics and 
relations to governance processes in West Africa. Details of the theories employed for 
investigation and analysis of findings from the field work are elaborated in sections 3.2.1 and 3.8 
respectively of the study.  
1.8 Research Methodology  
This section briefly introduces the research design and methodology discussed in details 
in Chapter 3 of the study. Crotty (1998) considers a research methodology as a strategy or plan of 
action that shapes choices and use of particular methods, and in turn links them to desired 
outcomes, while Kothari (2004: 4) defines it as a way of systematically solving a research 
problem. It involves systematic steps taken to solve a research problem, based on a defined logic 
(Saunders et al 2009: 5). It, therefore, defined the approach to the research undertaken in the 
field, and methods of data collection and analysis, as well as presentation of findings.   
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The research approach as identified in the previous section was based mainly on 
qualitative research as it relates essentially to human behaviour and conduct. Qualitative research 
deals with the world of lived experience where individual belief and action are seen to intersect 
with culture (Denzin and Lincoln 2011: 2). As a multi-method approach to research (Thomas 
2003: 1), it combines several research strategies, including case studies, ethnography, 
phenomenology, grounded theory, biographical, historical and participatory research strategies 
(Denzin and Lincoln 2011: xii).  
The comparative case study strategy was used to gather data in Ghana and Nigeria. The 
case study strategy involves undertaking “an empirical inquiry about a contemporary 
phenomenon… set within its real-world context – especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” Yin (2009a:18). Both countries were, therefore, 
visited to find out possible security culture influences on effective SSG. This afforded the 
opportunity to understand the behavior of actors in the security sector and their approach to 
security governance, informed by their respective cultures. It also made it possible to make 
inferences towards a more acceptable and enhanced security governance of the sector.   
Interviews in the form of unstructured interviews were undertaken with no logical or 
structured questions, but were based on initial general questions which served as a starting point 
for further ones. (Gill et al 2008). These interviews were conducted with relevant government 
and civil society actors, including security experts and traditional leaders within the epistemic 
communities of culture, security and governance. The interviews were done together with self-
administered questionnaires presented to respondents by the researcher or a person in an official 
capacity (Burcu 2000: 2). The open-ended questions gave room for respondents to answer 
questions without any influence from the researcher (Reja et al 2003: 161; Foddy 1993: 127).  
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Focus Group Discussions were also organised to explore or generate new or a range of 
ideas on a subject or research area (Simkiss et al 2014: 202-203). In this group, “collective 
conversations” were held with focus on collective activities (Liamputtong 2011: 3), based on 
which information was obtained from participants on their beliefs and perception about the 
research question (Simkiss et al 2014:203; Gill et al 2008: 293). The groups generally comprised 
an average of six to eight individuals.   
The focus group discussions were held mainly with traditional leaders in Ghana who were 
very much open to this form of discussion in the northern and southern parts of the country in 
two region capitals, namely Sunyani in the Brong Ahafo Region and Abutia Kloe in the Volta 
Region, on what constitutes security, governance and probable positive cultural influences to 
enhance these concepts. This helped gather more detailed information, clarify issues, refine 
observations made, contrast diverse views, as well as help triangulate research findings.  
With regard to data sources, data was gathered from primary and secondary sources. The 
primary sources were mainly from official documents from government ministries and security 
agencies, as well as newspaper articles and available journals with first-hand information on the 
subject. Secondary sources of data came from published or unpublished articles in various books, 
journals, newspapers, numerous libraries and bookshops in Ghana and Nigeria, and the internet.  
This methodology was employed in order to ensure that the right participants in this 
research were identified, and appropriate research methods were adopted to gather, interpret and 
analyse data collected towards answering the research question as precisely as possible.  
1.9 Organisation of Research  
Chapter 1 of this research introduces the study by giving insights into what the study is about, 
its overall objectives and importance, how it is conducted and how it is organised. It specifically 
brings into focus attempts at undertaking security sector reform in Africa, its challenges and the 
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need for transformation in the sector. It establishes the research problem and highlights ways of 
addressing it by bringing to the fore possible security culture influences or non-influence on SSG 
in West Africa and how to enhance governance in the sector.  
Chapter 2 generally reviews the literature by taking a look at the works involved in the 
development and evolution of the concept and limitations associated with it in the pursuit of its 
goals and objectives in the broader context of statebuilding across the globe and, particularly, in 
Africa. While doing this, it clarifies the relationships between the three major concepts of 
security, governance and culture, and highlights the important attributes of security culture and 
its possible influences on SSG towards the transformation of the security sector. This establishes 
the conceptual framework for the research and provides the key research question and enabling 
objectives for the study.  
Chapter 3 formulates the research design and methodology by specifically establishing 
the philosophical basis for the research, the research approach and strategy, as well as methods 
for data collection, analysis and triangulation of findings. It gives emphasis to the qualitative 
approach and case study strategy in undertaking the research.  
Chapter 4 captures the evolution of security culture in West Africa from the pre-colonial 
to colonial and post-colonial times, and establishes security culture influences from the 
external/formal and indigenous/informal on governance of the security sector and statebuilding 
processes in West Africa. It looks specifically at the challenges, progress and prospects in this 
direction as a prelude to specifically exploring developments within the case study countries of 
Ghana and Nigeria.  
Chapters 5 and 6 then focuses on findings and initial analysis of data gathered from the 
field research in both countries of Ghana and Nigeria by looking at the conceptions and 
perceptions about security culture and SSG, early attempts at and formalisation of SSR/SSG, 
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responses to security threats and challenges, and options for enhancing governance of the sector 
to meet security needs of the state and the people.   
Chapter 7 undertakes the comparative analysis of both studies under issues of complexity 
and acceptance by looking at ways in which security culture influences facilitate the 
understanding and willingness to accept the SSR/SSG concept, and how to derive its maximum 
impact based on identified intervening factors or ideals. It also explored relationships between 
and among the actors at the horizontal, vertical and other levels, while drawing similarities and 
differences with regard to best practices towards effective governance of the sector. The analysis 
and inferences laid the basis for triangulation of the research which further informed the 
theoretical proposition. The chapter then concludes the study by summarising the research report 
on findings and makes recommendations towards addressing persistent security challenges in 








CHAPTER 2  
REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK  
2.1 Introduction  
Countries in transition or in the post-conflict phase of recovery often undertake a range of 
institutional reforms, such as SSR, to restructure, reorganize and streamline organisational and 
institutional structures and processes for quality service delivery.   
The concept in a broader sense is defined as:   
…another term used to describe the transformation of the 
‘security system’ – which includes all the actors, their roles, 
responsibilities and actions – working together to manage and 
operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with 
democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and 
thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework (OECD  
DAC Guidelines and Reference Series 2005: 20).  
SSR efforts attempt to reorient security actors in their behaviour and attitude based on standard 
principles and guidelines. In all these efforts, regulation, oversight and accountability are 
important in achieving stated goals and set objectives, and relate closely to issues of governance. 
Governance of the security sector provides the avenue for regulation, oversight, transparency and 
accountability, as well as decision-making towards meeting security needs of the state and its 
people. Doing this effectively would require paying close attention to the actors, both state and 
sub-state actors, involved in the security governance process, and understanding their varied 
security culture backgrounds, and its possible influences on making SSG more effective. A good 
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comprehension of cultures could, equally, facilitate a transformation of complex, technical and 
limited SSR processes that feed much more into broader statebuilding goals.  
Culture, as is well known, evolves over time (Gupta et al 2002: 16), and in order to 
adequately explore cultural influences on security decision-making or the governance of the 
security sector, there must be a good comprehension of the security cultural landscape through 
gaining an in-depth knowledge of general cultural traits and dynamics (Gupta et al 2002: 16-27). 
Culture plays an important role in national and international politics as well as in national 
strategic and human security considerations. It facilitates the adoption of acceptable cultural 
practices and approaches in addressing future security concerns. Therefore, inquiring into 
whether and why culture matters in understanding, accepting and making the concept of security 
sector governance more effective can serve as an added opportunity to address the softer issues 
of SSR which are often overlooked or relegated in current reform efforts (Murray 2009: 204205).  
In this thesis, possible ways of engendering an appropriate mix of indigenous and 
acquired security cultures in security sector governance is explored using the case studies of 
Ghana and Nigeria, and by extension the ECOWAS region. The need for the transformation of a 
complex security sector, particularly in transitional or new democracies in Africa that are rooted 
in an established security culture of authoritarian rule, common to the region under study, would 
require a radical shift in structural conditions which make security governance largely irrelevant 
in some African societies (Nathan, 2004: 2; Bryden and Olonisakin 2010: 4).  
In doing this effectively, the thesis aligns with the social democracy ideology which 
depicts a governance system in which power resides in the people in the control of the economy 
and government. There is also freedom, equality and inclusivity, and no one dominates. 
Democratic principles are equally extended from the political to the economic and social realms 
(Przeworski 1985: 7). This ideology embraces both socialist and capitalist ideals to the extent that 
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the welfare of citizens, with regard to addressing inequalities and ensuring universal basic rights, 
among others, are promoted as a means of legitimising governance in democracies. In essence, 
positive social conditions underpin the legitimacy of democracies in which strong institutions are 
complemented by civic participation and accountability.  
The two extremes of socialism and capitalism are thus nuanced by accommodating social 
and liberal ideals in a progressive manner towards development, with the status or welfare of 
citizens in mind. Social democracy, thus, provides a hybrid context for tapping positive values of 
both ideological systems in which political, security and socio-economic indicators, among others, 
must reflect social impact towards sustaining legitimacy, efficacy and stability of a state (Meyer & 
Hinchman 2007: 1-230; ).  
The aim of this literature review is to, first and foremost, depict works undertaken in the 
area of SSR/SSG and security culture, assess whether they have contributed to the change or 
transformation being pursued through SSR/SSG goals and objectives, and identify existing gaps 
to be filled. Based on this, the thesis explored areas for the needed change and transformation 
thereby moving a struggling and almost stagnant SSR agenda closer towards its objectives. This 
helped to frame an appropriate research question and specific objectives to guide the proposed 
research towards making an original contribution to knowledge in the selected field of study. It 
focused on SSG in transitional societies that are post-authoritarian in nature, and working 
towards embracing and consolidating democratic tenets.  
The chapter is organised as follows. It begins by exploring issues of statebuilding, 
security and governance by looking at the inter-connectedness of these concepts and their 
mutually reinforcing nature. The second aspect focuses on the different types of external actors, 
their roles and inputs in building security of the state and its people in societies undergoing 
military or security-related statebuilding interventions. SSR and SSG concepts are then 
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subsequently reviewed within the European and African context by exploring the range of 
activities undertaken in the field of security by actors and the impact of these activities on the 
transformation of the security sector. Some guiding principles are then considered as standards 
and the basis for influencing behavioural changes and attitudes which can make security sector 
governance more effective.  
The fourth section which focuses on addressing limitations of earlier works on SSR/SSG, 
reviews literature on security culture and its transformative role in the security sector based on 
probable influences on governance of the security sector. It assess the extent and impact of these 
works on implementation of SSR/SSG, while demonstrating the dearth of literature and its 
limited scope of application within the western world and in Africa, and thus creating the option 
to probe the subject further. Based on these findings, it develops an original conceptual 
framework to guide this research where the notion of complexity, encapsulated in the SSR/SSG 
concepts, the actors, and the nature of activities to be undertaken within the security sector, is 
highlighted, and possible avenues explored to facilitate the acceptance and effectiveness of SSG 
through probable influences of security culture. This framework provides a conceptual model or 
guide for undertaking the research in the West African region by exploring possible ways of 
enhancing SSG. Finally, the key research question is derived from the above review and is 
supported by enabling objectives for undertaking the research in the final part.  
2.2 Statebuilding, Security and Governance   
A state is perceived as a person of international law, having a permanent population, a 
defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. As the 
sole person or legal entity under international law, states are considered as sovereign and equal in 
the pursuit of their national interest or the conduct of international relations (Montevideo 
Convention 1933: 3-4). These characteristics are equally reflected in the Westphalian construct 
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of a state in which the principles of sovereignty, self-determination, legal equality and non-
intervention apply in the conduct of State relations.   
Notwithstanding, recent developments in the international system, particularly after the 
end of the Cold War, have questioned the status and rights of states as sole legal persons, entities 
or actors with sovereign powers and monopoly over the use of force within and outside of their 
territorial confines (Bellal et al 2011; 47-79; Brooks 2005: 675; Rubinton 1992: 475-494). Some 
of these developments include the outbreak of intra-state conflicts and terrorism – waged by sub-
state actors against the state; issues of human rights and human security, environmental concerns; 
and an evolving globalised world among other things. These developments, in turn, have raised 
questions as to what an ideal form of state is or should be, particularly in the context of post-
conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding processes, as well as the need for reform in 
authoritarian states or transitional societies, or even the so-called stable democracies (Fukuyama 
2004: 17-31; Richmond 2013: 299-315; Podder 2014: 1616 -1617; and Jackson 2009).  
2.2.1 Statebuilding 
Statebuilding in the post-Cold War era has been central in efforts to problematise or 
securitise issues and find solutions to them. Statebuilding, for instance, remains a major focus in 
attempts at addressing threats posed by weak states, including issues of terrorism, drug 
trafficking, crime and international criminal networks, and refugees (Chandler 2010: 4). In a 
similar vein, solutions to problems of insecurity, poverty and the general lack of progress are 
pursued through statebuilding processes (Ghani and Lockhart 2008: 4 cited in Chandler 2010: 5).  
Statebuilding in general, entails the creation of new governmental institutions while 
strengthening the existing ones (Fukuyama 2004: 17). Also, von Bogdandy et al (2005: 583) 
considers statebuilding as “the establishment, re-establishment, and strengthening of public 
structures in a given territory capable of delivering public goods”. It could also be conceived as 
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“overcoming institutional blockages, or changing the ‘rules of the game’, through turning bad 
governance into good governance” (Chandler 2010: 6). From a home-grown, national and whole-
of-government approach, statebuilding is also perceived as “an endogenous process to enhance 
capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by state-society relations” (OECD 2008d 
cited in OECD 2011: 20). Other factors are also brought to bear in statebuilding processes as 
emphasis is placed on the need for improved living conditions, structural reforms and the 
integration of political systems (Hippler 2005 cited in Jackson 2009: 3).   
The term presupposes a weakened or a failed state that requires rebuilding through 
strengthened institutions and structures (Fukuyama 2004: 17-31; von Bogdandy et al 2005: 581 
586). Commonly identified indicators for state weakness which leads to state failure include 
“disharmony between communities, inability to control borders and the entirety of the territory, a 
growth of criminal violence, corrupt institutions, and a decaying infrastructure” (von Bogdandy 
et al 2005: 581). The idea of limiting or cutting back state intervention through the ‘Washington 
Consensus’ approach is also seen to have contributed to weakened states, especially in 
developing countries across the world, owing to weakened state capacity and institutions to 
provide public goods and services (Fukuyama 2004: 20).  
 Hence in rebuilding, emphasis is placed on liberal tendencies in which limited state 
intervention is proposed, complemented by strong and effective institutions (Fukuyama 2004: 
23), state monopoly over the legitimate use of force, and a legitimate government recognised by 
the people in a democratic dispensation (von Bogdandy et al 2005: 584).   
In the field of security, statebuilding activities are undertaken through the establishment 
of security sectors in accordance with democratic norms, good governance, and the call for 
civilian control of the sector, accountability, transparency and observance of the rule of law, 
(Schroeder et al 2013: 382). What is however essential in statebuilding processes, and which is 
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often overlooked, is the “cultural change in terms of how people relate to that state as well as 
how people conduct everyday business” (Jackson 2009: 4). 
Institutions and legitimacy of central authorities, therefore, play major roles in building a 
state as it forms a critical link between statebuilding and nation-building, and its success is 
mainly defined by external intervention and its possible impact on socio-political cohesion. Local 
ownership, recognition and perceptions, informed by cultural norms, values and practices remain 
vital to the process (Lemay-Hébert 2009: 21-45). The ideals or ‘procedural benchmarks’ of 
transparency, accountability, democracy, good governance and the rule of law, among others, is 
generally believed to follow the western historical model that provides core functions for 
addressing challenges in weak and fragile states (Podder 2014: 1616; Richmond 2013:300). 
External intervention in contemporary times is however “entirely antithetical to 
indigenous and traditional practices, [with critics] regarding them as unaccountable, opaque and 
contradictory to the ‘enlightened’ intentions of liberal peace and internationally sponsored post-
war reconstruction efforts” (see Fanthorpe 2005: 27-49 cited in Mac Ginty2008: 139). While the 
fact remains that the temptation exists to romanticise ‘indigenous’ and ‘traditional’ peace-
making, peacebuilding or statebuilding processes, this approach has offered credible and 
sustainable solutions to problems in post-conflict and transitional societies (Mac Ginty 2008: 139 
-163).  
Liberal peace is defined by Mac Ginty (2008: 143) as “the concept, condition, and 
practice whereby leading states, international organisations and international financial 
institutions promote their version of peace through peace support interventions, control of 
international financial architecture, support for state sovereignty and the international status 
quo”. This concept also referred to as ‘Western peace’ is largely perceived as facilitating ‘neo-
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imperialist tendencies’, thereby minimising the space or opportunity for traditional and 
indigenous approaches to peacebuilding or statebuilding (Mac Ginty 2008: 140).  
The tendency of equating Western societies with the ideal type of a society, and by 
extension the ideal form of a state, has undermined and denied developing countries, or the so-
called third-world countries, the opportunity of adopting progressive indigenous cultural and 
ethnic norms, values and traditions towards statebuilding, security and governance (Ake 2012: 1- 
3).   
The practice of transferring resources, people, technology and strong institutions to 
developing countries has remained the preoccupation of some scholars and development 
practitioners, to the detriment of encouraging or promoting the adoption and improvement of 
indigenous and cultural-specific forms of such ideals for growth and development (Fukuyama  
2004: 17). This practice has raised concerns over the role of external actors in statebuilding 
(Scott 2007: 6). Fundamental questions have been raised on whether the values and institutions 
of the liberal West are indeed universal, given the difficulty of achieving these goals in many 
societies – mainly in third-world countries, and the negative impact of not growing these 
societies based on indigenous, home-grown values or cultures (Ake 2012: 3).  
These practices promote the ‘one size fits all’ approach to issues of statebuilding, 
security, and governance among others, leading to complications and resentment, given the 
imposition of complex and, sometimes, different Western concepts on the so-called developing 
or less developed countries. Developing or less developed countries are used here to refer to “the 
lowest stages in the developmental criterion” Ake (2012: 2), or a country in which the population 
lives on far less income than the population in industrialised countries (World Bank 2012). As it 
stands, the conflict spectrum and trajectory of peacemaking, peacekeeping, post-conflict 
reconstruction and peacebuilding, as well as statebuilding processes, have largely been informed 
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by Western theories and donor interventions based on “[a] distinctive feature of Western social 
science in its classical [sense]…[and] this tendency to equate the society that ought to be with the 
one that actually exists” (Ake 2012: 3).   
Rather than perceive the so-called developed countries based on Western state models as 
ideal states or societies that are to be emulated by developing countries in achieving conflict 
prevention, security, development and good governance, emphasis must begin to shift more 
towards governance models and systems within the endogenous context, drawing on the 
progressive attributes of social order and resilience within communities, and based on 
complementary institutions on the ground (Boege et al 2009: 14). Adopting this approach could 
create possible avenues to begin to set realistic attainable goals for so-called ‘weak’ or ‘fragile’ 
states that might require adopting sustainable indigenous measures recognised and accepted by 
citizens in building a resilient state or society (OECD 2011: 21; and Lemay-Hébert and Mathieu 
2014: 232-251).  
Indeed, state fragility remains a contested concept with varied definitions. However, the 
major attributes characterising a fragile state include state collapse or state failure, which 
connotes the inability of a state to perform its basic function in the areas of territorial integrity, 
monopoly over the use of force, and development functions among other things (UNECA Report 
2012). These states are, therefore, generally perceived as threats to its neighbours and the wider 
international community as it has development and security challenges, and as a result creating 
the avenue for development policies and development assistance from donor countries and 
multilateral donor organisations (Boege 2009: 13).  
This state of affairs in post-conflict societies is not much different from what pertains in 
transitional societies and stable democracies, except for the fact that it is much easier to influence 
post-conflict countries into accepting reforms and reconstruction activities compared with the 
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transitional societies holding on to relics of colonial dynamics and traits, where issues of power, 
regime security and authoritarian rule prevail and take priority over human security concerns. In 
drawing lessons for the future, however, approaches to statebuilding, security and governance 
require a rethink, and the need to adopt and mainstream transformative approaches in which 
hybrid forms of progressive traditional and modern practices would inform theories and policies 
(Mac Ginty 2008: 139 -163; and Podder 2013: 353-380).  
2.2.2. Security 
Security has evolved in recent times from its traditional, technical sense of focusing 
mainly on the needs of the state – termed as “traditional or regime security” – to the needs of the 
people within the state, but more importantly ensuring a more balanced and nuanced approach to 
meeting the needs of both the state and its people (Buzan 1991, Booth 1999). Kofi Annan (2000) 
defined security from the human security perspective as “Freedom from want, freedom from fear, 
and freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment”. These freedoms are 
construed as the inter-related building blocks of human and national security. This definition is of 
prime importance, given the tendency of limiting the capacity of or rolling back the state as part 
of donor conditions for reform and assistance, as reflected in the “Washington Consensus” 
(Fukuyama 2004: 20; Williamson 1994: 26-27).  
Security of the state and the human being is, therefore, of prime importance, and 
broadened to cover not only the absence of violence, but issues of human rights, good 
governance, access to education and health care, and making opportunities and choices available 
for the individual to fulfill his or her potential (UNDP Human Development Report 1994: 3, 22-
40; Annan 2000; and Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007).  
The major policy requirement by donor countries for limiting state intervention in the 
economy and cutting down defence budgets and military expenditure of authoritarian states in the 
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late 1980s and early years of the post-Cold War era, based on liberal democratic or capitalist 
ideals, eventually weakened States’ capacity to maintain monopoly over the use of force, 
maintain sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as its regulatory powers in a liberalised 
economy (see Omitoogun 2003; 126; and Omitoogun and Hutchful 2006: 1-9).  
Thus, despite efforts to enforce a minimalist state, liberalise economies of developing 
countries, promote human rights and human security among other things, these measures proved 
rather difficult for these states that lacked the institutional capacity and the wherewithal to tread 
the path of developed countries. The result, therefore, has been the emergence of weak, fragile, 
patrimonial, shadow or collapsed states and warlord economies, threatened by intra-state 
conflicts, and worsened by the emergence of acts of terrorism, transnational crime, piracy and 
other societal ills (Scott 2007: 10). Issues of corruption, neo-patrimonial relations, nepotism and 
the general lack of good democratic governance worsened the already precarious situation.  
Hence the necessity for revisiting the predominant notion of a minimalist state, and 
reinforcing the need for a more balanced approach, within the social democracy context, to state 
and human security based on the principles of democratic governance, the rule of law, 
accountability, respect for human rights and building democratic institutions of state to 
implement policy decisions that favour the needs of state and sub-state actors (Large and Sisk: 1-
211).  
Current security threats to peace, stability and development including, conflicts, 
terrorism, transnational crimes and environmental degradation, have necessitated the need for 
reforms in both post-conflict and transitional societies to effectively address challenges posed by 
these threats. Broader reform approaches are, however, required given the multi-faceted nature of 
threats to both the state and its people. Hence the need to link SSR efforts to statebuilding goals 
and objectives, which presents the opportunity to explore a much more comprehensive way of 
36 
 
addressing security issues from a broader perspective, rather than a limited, technical and narrow 
approach to SSR (Jackson 2009: 1).   
This approach feeds into the human security debate that encompasses a broad range of 
issues, but with the emphasis on accommodating the interest of the individual or people in 
addition to that of the state. SSR contributes to statebuilding by building the integrity of the 
security system, establish or promote its legitimacy, and promote the governance of the sector 
through citizen participation, in order to transform the sector towards respecting the security 
needs of both the state and its people (Weigand 2013: 18; Patel 2010). In ensuring this is done, 
governance serves as the critical element in providing guidance and direction through policies 
informed by the contribution of all stakeholders, including both state and sub-state actors. Hence, 
the need to revisit the critical element of SSG in an attempt to facilitate SSR efforts.  
2.2.3 Governance 
Governance refers mainly to the structures and processes put in place to enable a set of 
public and private actors coordinate their different needs and interests by way of making and 
implementing binding policies (Bryden and Hänggi 2005: 7; and Krahmann 2003). It could also 
be perceived as structures and processes used by social organisations, be it a family, corporate 
business or an international institution, to steer itself either through centralised control or self-
regulation (Bryden and Hänggi 2005: 7; and Rosenau 2000: 181 - 190). The United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) perceived governance mainly through the economic, political 
and administrative lens, in which authority is exercised at all levels, including security, in 
managing a country’s affairs (UNDP 1997).   
The UN, thus, adopted a holistic approach to governance which encapsulates issues of 
human security. Over a decade after, and through years of practice, the UNDP has given more 
emphasis to not only governance but good governance practices. This is reflected in its definition 
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to comprise the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which power is exercised, 
decisions made on issues of public concern, and citizens articulation of their interests, exercise of 
legal rights, meeting of obligations, and their ability to mediate their differences (UNDP 2010 
:14).   
The efficiency and effectiveness of institutions and the rule of law is emphasised in this 
regard towards achieving what has been termed over the years as ‘good governance’. On the side 
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), its approach to good governance places more 
emphasis on the prevention of corruption and putting in measures to ensure transparency and 
accountability in public expenditure in an attempt to implement national policies.   
From the African governance perspective, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation considers 
governance as public goods and services that every citizen is entitled to from the state, and the 
state having a responsibility to deliver these goods (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2015). The elements 
of governance comprise four major categories: safety and rule of law; participation and human 
rights; sustainable economic opportunity; and human development. The first category on safety 
and rule of law, which remains very relevant to this study, is sub-divided into rule of law, 
accountability, personal safety and national security. The uniqueness of this definition lies in its 
emphasis of security as a service to be demanded by citizens from government, and the 
responsibility of government to provide this service. This equally provides avenues for 
partnership in the demand and supply of security as a public service.   
Prior to all these ‘western’ definitions, traditional or indigenous systems of governance 
existed, with similar governance structures, mechanisms and customary or by-laws that guided 
human relations and day-to-day activities in society. Differences however observed between the 
indigenous and the modern governance systems are that while the modern forms of government 
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opted for common standards in a globalised world, that of the indigenous system was more 
localised and only expanded where there were issues of commonality (Hlawnching 2006: 4).  
Notwithstanding, the indigenous system preferred a participatory and inclusive decision-making 
process based on consensus-building.  
The goal here is to create a platform where the state engenders contributions from its 
stakeholders, including its resident population and partners, towards identifying and addressing 
security needs and threats. The state or government and international partners’ respect for and 
recognition of different actors involved in the security governance process, especially civil 
society, would be essential in enhancing security governance efforts. It would also promote or 
encourage an integration of both home-grown solutions and progressive partner proposals and 
support in efforts to address security needs, challenges and threats (UN SSR/ORL/DPKO 2012: 
1-52).  This, in turn, could provide the pedestal for imbibing the principles of national leadership 
and local ownership of security sector reform processes towards effective implementation.  
If this approach to governance is adopted, the probability exists for minimising the 
complexity of externally imposed policies and programmes, through the adoption and 
implementation of hybrid traditional and modern systems of security and governance. The 
acceptance of security sector reform might then become easier, thereby enhancing the process. 
SSG in this sense should not, however, be perceived as an end in itself, but as a means to an end 
(dos Santos and da Silva2012: 206 -220; and Schroeder et al 2014: 214-230). 
2.2.4 The Need for Change and Transformation of the Security Sector 
Change and transformation of the security sector has occupied current SSR and SSG 
debates, but a focus on the how has either been limited or lacking in the literature. The attainment 
of this goal would require a reconsideration of the softer issues of culture, specifically security 
culture including values, norms or standards and customs, and its probable influences on the 
39 
 
governance of the security sector. This has become necessary in the quest for building 
endogenous capacities, local ownership and contextualising security sector reform efforts, in the 
quest to reduce its complexity, encourage its acceptability and address both state and human 
security needs in future SSR programmes. Change is linked to human behaviour or attitudes 
which contribute to management, oversight and use of resources to address security threats to the 
state and the people, hence the need to consider actors and troubleshoot their roles towards 
effective security sector reform, governance and statebuilding. 
2.3 External Actors and their Roles in Building State Security  
2.3.1 Contending Ideologies for Security and Development of the State in the Cold War Era 
An ideal state, otherwise known as telos, is that state which is free from want and fear, and 
which provides or creates the environment for meeting the needs of its people, (Ake 2012: 3). 
Eurocentric teleologism or teleological thinking perceives society as moving through stages of 
development; that is from a less desirable state to a more desirable one (Ake 2012: 1).   
Interestingly, however, all if not most of the states in the international system had two 
major contending ideologies of communism and capitalism, during the Cold War period, to guide 
their development trajectory towards an ideal state. These contending ideologies had major 
impact on developing countries as they identified with either the ‘left’ as in communism or the 
‘right’ as in capitalism, and even the non-aligned in the ‘middle’ in their attempt to become 
developed countries.  
 These relations facilitated imperialism and colonialism in which building a state was 
modeled mainly on Western ideals and standards rather than contextualising the growth process 
of developing countries, based on their indigenous exigencies, including cultural norms and 
values. Hence, Western norms and values were more or less imposed on colonised states and, 
40 
 
thus, became the standard for measuring themselves on the development criterion (Lemay Hebert 
2009: 21-45).   
These ideals, though positive in some respect, were foreign and difficult to accept. Again, 
the neo-patrimonial kind of relations made possible issues of patronage through clientelism, 
nepotism and corruption among others (Erdman and Engel 2006; Scott 2007: 5; and OECD 2009: 
6-31). The imperialist and extremis nature of these contending ideologies thus requires adopting 
not only workable but contextual or relevant ideologies to guide governance and development 
policies towards safety and survival of state and sub-state actors. This informs the leaning 
towards the social democracy model or ideology for people participation and accountability in 
ensuring local ownership and local content of policies and programmes. 
2.3.2. Post-Cold War Realities and the Need for Security and Governance Reforms and   
          Recovery 
 
 The Cold War realities, including its systemic imperatives, exposed all the suppressed 
flaws under colonialism in the post-Cold War era, captured sometimes as bad governance 
practices (see Zack-Williams et al 2002; and Mohan and Zack-Williams 2004). New challenges 
emerged in the international system, the major one being threat to international peace and 
security, including violent intra-state conflicts (Chandler and Sisk 2013: xix). A new era of 
reforms emerged in the 1990s, aimed at reducing too much concentration of power in the state, 
and empowering citizens to contribute towards addressing their individual and collective needs 
within the state.   
 Hence issues of human security, democracy, good governance, economic and human 
development, as well as human rights and the rule of law, became more reinforced. This created 
the needed space for ensuring that the needs of both the state and sub-state actor groups are 
sufficiently addressed (OECD 2008: 15). Issues of neo-colonialism, racism, apartheid and 
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intrastate conflicts became matters of great concern in Africa and elsewhere, while Central and 
Eastern European countries that separated from the Soviet bloc sought for post-Cold War 
reconstruction and recovery.  
The authoritarian nature of the state within the socialist context, characterised by military 
dictatorships and one-party rule and its concurrent abuse of power, mainly through its security 
institutions like the police, the military and intelligence agencies, led to major discussions within 
international community, mainly among donors and development actors, on how to address these 
challenges amidst evolving strategic and critical security studies debate for a shift of emphasis 
from regime security to that of human security. Issues of security, democracy and development 
were prominent around this time (Bryden et al 2008: 3; Booth 1999; Buzan: 1991).  
2.3.3 Missed Opportunities for Contextual Security Sector Reforms and Change 
Rebuilding the state in the post-Cold War era provided the appropriate opportunity to get 
things right, but rather, neocolonialism preserved the old order. The opportunity for developing 
countries to undergo self-assessment and self-realisation, and adopt hybrid forms of indigenous 
traditional and modern values in their growth process was largely missed.  
 About a decade ago, both the European Commission and the Council came to the 
agreement of avoiding a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to governance reforms in developing 
countries, but to rather adopt ‘conventional tools’ for governance reforms where ‘effective 
partnerships’ are anticipated, and targeted approaches in post-conflict situations or where 
‘difficult partnerships’ were anticipated (European Commission 2003: 3 cited in Hout 2013: 3).  
In addition to this was the adoption of an ‘incentive-based approach’ in its relations with 
the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Countries (European Commission 2006b: 1 cited in 
Hout 2013: 3-4).  
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 In all these approaches, though good governance is adopted as an ideal and universal 
principle in governing a state, based on different or specific needs of developing countries, these 
countries are not necessarily consulted and given the opportunity to contribute to how a 
‘template’ could effectively address their needs in their reform efforts. Rather, partnerships and 
relations in reforms, even in the area of security and governance, are based on introducing 
templates to suit a particular context, based on conditionalities or incentives. SSR is, therefore, 
forced on states by external actors in either rebuilding war-torn societies or as a basis for fiscal 
reform or both (Hutchful and Fayemi 2006). It is in this general context that SSR and SSG 
programmes were undertaken through external actor partnerships in post-conflict recovery and 
reconstruction, peacebuilding or statebuilding contexts.  
2.3.4 Evolution and Coverage of the SSR Concept 
The origin of security sector reform has not been specifically identified from a particular 
source, but has remained contested among various schools of thought. SSR, for instance, is 
perceived to have emerged in Europe and as such “SSR is European” (Albrecht et al 2010: 75). 
SSR is, however, generally accepted to have emerged in the early 1990s in response to demands 
within the development or donor community for developing countries and, more specifically, 
authoritarian states to embrace democratic, as well as principles of, good governance and 
economic development as a basis for accessing development assistance.   
The practice and development of the concept have evolved over the years from defence 
reviews to post-Cold War reconstruction activities and civil-military relations programmes in 
Africa, and Eastern and Central Europe among others. SSR could, therefore, be perceived as an 
attempt to codify previous attempts at reforming or restructuring the security sector. This also 
reinforces the perception of undertaking SSR programmes in piecemeal. The call for reforms 
equally straddled the political and development nexus, as all need to be present to effectively 
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address security concerns of both the state and its citizens in the context of human security. SSR, 
in a developmental context, is an externally or donor-driven process which may be used as an 
incentive or political condition for the provision of development assistance (Hänggi 2004: 6).   
Initial efforts at operationalising the concept in both transitional societies and post-
conflict countries were technical in nature, limited in scope and targeted specifically at boosting 
the economy, while cutting down on military expenditure. In transitional societies, SSR 
programmes focused mainly on defence reviews and reform of security institutions and agencies, 
and the democratic control of armed forces, which eventually culminated in the bid to improve 
civil-military relations. Security institutions, including defence, police and, to some extent, 
intelligence agencies, were the focus of these reform efforts in Africa, particularly South Africa 
(Williams 2003: 206-222), and to an extent Ghana (Hutchful 1997). Major concerns of Western 
donors in the Euro-Atlantic region were on addressing issues of civil-military relations, and the 
democratic control of armed forces in post-communist states of Central and Eastern Europe 
(Born et al 2002).  
The concept of civil-military relations “encompass the entire spectrum of relations among 
government, society and the armed forces” (Mychajlyszyn and Von Riekhoff 2004: 3). The 
concept entails the de-politicisation of the military, and the subordination of the military to 
legitimate civilian authority, representing the expressed will of the people (Mychajlyszyn and 
Von Riekhoff 2004: 3). Under this concept, unconstitutional changes in government is frowned 
upon, as coups d’état are seen as destabilising, and truncates the process of good democratic 
governance. The civilians also have a responsibility to desist from influencing or involving their 
military counterparts in an attempt to resolve their political disputes (Mychajlyszyn and Von 
Riekhoff 2004; Schmitter 1996: xii).  
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The general approach to SSR in the Euro-Atlantic region, therefore, followed the policy 
transfer mechanism in which the international community or donors defined a set of 
characteristics and standards for what constitutes the democratic control of armed forces, as well 
as a clear idea of what constitutes effective security sector reform (Forster 2002: 15-19). All 
these reform efforts contributed in diverse ways to restructuring the security sector of these 
Eastern European and former Soviet Union countries.  
In the post-conflict context, the brutal civil wars that plagued the Mano River Union sub-
region and, indeed, the region and continent at large (Clapham 1998), reinforced the need to 
ensure stability and provide a secure and safe environment for political, economic and social 
development. Provisions were, therefore, made for SSR in peace agreements through the 
instrumentality of donors and guarantors of these peace accords (Hutchful 2009).   
The SSR provisions, more or less, served as a pre-condition for ensuring stability in the 
post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding context. The provisions entailed a restructuring of 
the security sector in order to avoid past mistakes through the implementation of Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), mine control and control of small arms and light 
weapons. Other provisions also focused on the disbanding, restructuring and the establishment of 
new security forces and services, including the police, the military and other paramilitary security 
agencies. Transitional justice issues relating to Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC) 
processes also became issues of concern, necessitating the reconstruction or re-organisation of 
the security sector (Bryden and Hänggi 2005: 12-16).  
Early attempts at SSR, particularly in transitional societies, neglected the broader issues 
of democratic oversight and accountability, but SSG gained more significance during the 
rebuilding war-torn societies (Ball 2001). The SSG concept focused mainly on partnerships 
between and among identified national actors within the Executive, Legislature, Judiciary and 
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Civil Society, and international counterparts in ensuring appropriate security service delivery and 
accountability, geared mainly towards minimising human rights abuses, and creating a safe and 
secure environment for the citizens. (Krahmann2003: 5-26).  
The SSR agenda in post-authoritarian regimes or post-conflict settings require a basic re-
organisation, restructuring or transformation of security institutions, processes and oversight 
mechanisms within a democratic, accountable and responsive context for an effective and 
efficient service delivery. The governance element of SSR is essential in ensuring that the right 
issues of security concern, related to both the state and sub-state actors, are identified and 
collectively securitised, with adequate participation of security referents, towards addressing 
identified security threats. Additionally, the activities of the sector must be subjected to closer 
scrutiny, given the legitimate monopoly and control over the use of force by state and its security 
institutions and agencies. This is necessary to avoid excesses and abuse of force, and to also 
ensure that adequate resources and welfare of legitimate security actors in the field are 
guaranteed towards effective performance and delivery.  
2.3.5 External Actor Partnerships in Security Governance 
Governance, like security, could be applied to various contexts and issue areas. The 
concept has been applied to different levels or geographic spaces, to different types of 
constellations of actors (corporate governance, private governance, multi-level governance), and 
to normative concepts (good governance). It has also been used to analyse different issue areas 
such as economic, environmental, health, human rights, as well as security governance (Bryden 
and Hänggi 2005).   
In a similar context, the concept also has both horizontal and vertical dimensions with 
regard to security referents and processes (Karns and Mingst 2005:15-20, 211-248 cited in 
Bryden and Hänggi 2005: 7). The horizontal dimension refers to state relations with multiplicity 
46 
 
of sub-state actors, such as international organisations and private actors, ranging from non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) to multinational corporations (MNCs), to epistemic 
communities and even armed groups. On the other hand, the vertical dimensions signal the 
growing interaction of these actors at various territorial levels – sub-national, national and 
international levels.  
Figure 2.1  
Levels of Relationship or Interaction of Security Actors in Governance of the Security 
Sector  
 
Source: Author, 2019  
This classification provides an ideal context for the practice of SSG, given the 
multiplicity of actors at various levels, and with different needs, roles and responsibilities. Thus, 
security governance provides an analytical perspective which helps to capture complex 
governing mechanisms in a given issue-area characterised by a constellation of different types of 
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 2.3.6 The Missing Element of Security Culture Influences in the Transformation of the   
           Security Sector 
 
In a nutshell, while SSR provides the avenue for reform and transformation of the 
security sector, with specific emphasis on restructuring the security institutions to perform and 
deliver effectively, SSG lays emphasis on the provision of oversight and demanding transparency 
and accountability from these security institutions and agencies by civilian authorities, including 
the national legislature, the judiciary and civil society organisations.   
So the role of external actors in the SSR and SSG processes are essential for rendering 
support, technical advice and guidance to developing countries based on best practices of the 
SSR and SSG concepts but, in doing this, the key principles of SSR which equally apply to SSG 
must guide such policy decisions. Several institutions or organisations have identified standard 
principles in undertaking SSR, including the OECD (DAC Handbook on SSR 2007), the United 
Nations (UN Secretary-General’s Report 2008), and the African Union (AU Policy Framework 
on SSR 2008).  
That of the African Union highlights specific principles that capture the values and 
norms, as well as reflect the traditions of the peoples of the African continent. Some of these 
principles include African solidarity; SSR and regional integration; national vision and 
parameters for external support for SSR; context-specific SSR; and the engagement of informal 
and customary security providers and traditional justice actors. These complement the generally 
accepted principles of national ownership, national responsibility and national commitment, SSR 
as part of broader democratization and reform process, good governance, gender, and 
coordination of SSR assistance among others (AU Policy Framework on SSR 2013: 16a - j).  
These principles demand specific roles and responsibilities from national and external 
actors in their partnership of undertaking SSR and SSG. Emphasis is, however, placed on 
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external actors supporting a nationally-defined vision or support the development of such a 
vision. This, in addition to security culture considerations, has remained the missing element in 
the SSR and SSG efforts to fix the security sector. ‘Soft’ reforms requiring behavioural or 
attitudinal changes based on observing values, norms and principles would require a 
consideration of security culture influences in the change and transformation of the security 
sector. This issue has received limited or rather no attention all for which this thesis seeks to 
address. 
Given that this thesis focuses on the SSG in transitional societies from authoritarian to 
democratic rule, using Ghana and Nigeria as case studies, the call for adopting a broader 
approach to SSG becomes vital and timely if any major impact is to be felt in the transformation 
of the security sector and other relevant or complementary sectors related to governance and 
development of these countries. It, therefore, becomes necessary to mainstream SSG processes 
into the statebuilding process that affords the whole-of-government approach in addressing 
specific human security needs in a country. This approach becomes even more pertinent in states 
considered as ‘weak’ or ‘fragile’ and threatened by conflict as a result of bad governance 
practices, and which requires some level of resilience to ensure stability and peace.  
2.4 Security Culture and SSG: An Analytical Framework on Complexity, Acceptance                 
       and Effectiveness   
 
 Cultural norms and values are brought to bear in the performance of roles, functions or 
responsibilities of the numerous actors in the SSG process.  The fusion of different cultures of 
security actors, both external and internal and even among the core security sector actors and 
their counterparts in the civilian management and oversight bodies, could influence the 
acceptance of and practice within SSG processes and its effectiveness, particularly in the area of 
change management and transformation of the sector.   
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 In effect, understanding the impact of culture, be it political, security, strategic or others, 
which relates to the shared values, norms, behaviour and practices that influence policy decision-
making and practices in the governance of the security sector, could play a major role in 
leadership, local ownership and sustainability of SSR programmes in a country. Bryden and 
Olonisakin (2010: 6) argue that “[a] central plank of the transformation discourse is the need to 
alter the culture and character of security actors”. This section is, therefore, devoted to a closer 
scrutiny of the subject.  
2.4.1 What is Culture and Security Culture?  
Culture informs and permeates all facets of human faculties and activities. It also 
distinguishes identities thereby highlighting similarities or differences. It offers opportunities for 
diversity but also creates the possibilities for conflict, chaos, wars and disagreements. Huntington 
(1993: 22-49; Huntington 1996) in looking at clash of civilisation and the remaking of a new 
world order minced no words in hypothesising that the fundamental source of conflict in this new 
world order would be culture rather than ideological or economic factors.  
So culture does play a role or count in making a difference and, as a result, requires 
managing differences based on cultural sensitivity and cultural awareness (Harrison and 
Huntington 2000; Moran et al 2007). This is of much significance given that culture, which 
informs behavioural practices, is relative and, thus, necessitates one being more tentative and less 
absolute if one is to guarantee positive human interactions. Culture, therefore, matters (Harrison 
and Huntington 2001). This thesis, thus, seeks to delve a bit deeper to establish why culture 
matters in security sector reform and governance, taking into consideration issues of complexity, 
acceptance and effectiveness. 
Culture has been defined in several ways and, depending on issues under consideration, 
operational definitions are applied in the discourse towards achieving specific goals and 
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objectives. For instance, culture has been defined as the learned and shared behaviour of a 
community of interacting human beings (Useem & Useem 1963: 169). Others have also defined 
culture as the shared patterns of behaviours and interactions, cognitive constructs, and affective 
understanding that are learned through a process of socialisation (Centre for Advance Research 
and Language Acquisition 2014). These shared patterns identify the members of a cultural group 
while also distinguishing those of another group.  
While these definitions focus on shared patterns of behaviour and cognitive construct, as 
well as drawing distinctions among different cultures, Banks and McGee Banks (2010:8) also 
viewed culture as “… consisting primarily of the symbolic, ideational, and intangible aspects of 
human societies”. Culture, in this sense, goes beyond the artifacts, tools, or other tangible cultural 
elements. The emphasis lies on how members of a group interpret, use, and perceive these 
artifacts and other intangible elements. Values, symbols, interpretations, and perspectives are, 
therefore, the elements that distinguish a particular group from another in modernised societies, 
and not necessarily the material objects and other tangible aspects of human societies (Kuper 
1999 cited in Banks and McGee Banks 2010:8). People within a culture usually interpret the 
meaning of symbols, artifacts, and behaviours in the same or in similar ways (Banks, Banks and 
McGee 2010: 8). This underscores the “soft” part of culture, which is more or less invisible, but 
which influences behavioural patterns or the way of life of a group of people (Murray 2009).  
In the peace and conflict transformation context, culture could also be construed as the 
shared knowledge and schemes created by a set of people for perceiving, interpreting, expressing 
and responding to the social realities around them (Lederach 1995: 9). This reinforces the 
flexible and adaptable nature of culture towards existing behavioural patterns, trends and 
challenges. The interplay of realism, culture and grand strategy, and its influence on power, 
equally presents a contextual definition of culture viewed as any set of interlocking beliefs and 
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assumptions that are held collectively, by a given group, and passed on through socialization 
(Dueck 2005: 200). But for the purpose of this study, however, and in the context of the 
evolution of cultures and the need for reform, re-organisation or transformation, an operational 
definition of culture would be adopted based on the various definitions reviewed above.   
Deriving from the  above definitions, culture is perceived as or expressed through the 
centrality of shared beliefs, attitudes, norms, values, principles and symbols of an institution, 
group, or community, which is learned, inherited or acquired through a process of socialisation 
(including security, political and economic interactions, among others) towards one's existence. 
Based on the above definition of culture, security culture is defined as shared beliefs of a group, a 
community, institutions, organisations or a state among others, that guide efforts towards 
prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, freedom from threats, and acquisition of 
basic needs towards existence and survival. Thus, in the study and analysis of the influences and 
impact of security culture on security sector governance, the central theme that emerges reflects 
the defining roles of belief or belief systems and their influence on behaviour which guarantees 
safety, survival and existence.   
2.4.2 The SSR/SSG ‘Hiccups’ and the Transformative Role of Security Culture  
The literature is replete with notions of security culture and its impact on territorial 
integrity, security referents, organisations, how issues are securitised or not securitised, and 
responses to threats among other things. This is however not the case in the area of security 
sector reform and security sector governance processes. The realist and the idealist ideologies 
have largely informed security cultures in international relations either in the pursuit of war or 
peace respectively, and either as a means to an end or an end in itself (Waltz 2001; Keohane 
1984; Nye 2020). Causes of insecurity and threats have been explored, ranging from man and the 
state as agents of this insecurity to society and the state system, while these same referents have 
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also remained targets in the midst of conflicts and symmetrical or asymmetrical wars either on 
the domestic or international fronts (Waltz 2001; Kirchner & Sperling 2010). With the expansion 
of security agendas and re-conceptualisation of security, guaranteeing the security needs of states 
and peoples have become paramount as a basis for peace and stability. Hence the beliefs and 
practices of these security referents have a major role to play in collectively achieving this 
objective. 
This will require changes and transformation mainly through security culture influences 
on effective security sector governance from endogenous (Afrocentric) and exogenous 
(Eurocentric) angles, and beyond the Eurocentric Westphalia and post-Westphalian systems 
(Kirchner & Sperling 2010). Reason being that the definition and securitisation of issues differ in 
geo-political and geo-strategic contexts and undertaking security sector reforms would require 
effective and suitable security sector governance that can only be made possible through 
minimising the complexity of the SSR/SSG concept in order to facilitate its acceptance and 
effective implementation within the African context.  
This becomes necessary as the modern and traditional systems or institutions run parallel 
to each other in Africa with a conglomeration of actors with different belief systems, hence 
requiring a contextual hybrid approach to securitising and responding to issues rather than a 
translational hybrid approach. This means SSR/SSG must be implemented by having in mind and 
reinforcing a positive or acceptable endogenous cultural norms and values, as well as its already 
existing security systems, juxtaposed those of the formal or modern ones rather than 
superimposing western views and concepts in oblivion to the traditional ones as is usually the 
practice (Donais 2008: 1-275). 
Security culture as a variable for transformation or change is generally dependent on 
reviewing and discarding wrong beliefs, behaviour or practices of individuals, groups or states 
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and taking on or adapting new positive ones as a way of facilitating good policies and inclusive 
decision-making and management with the view to delivering required security good or need. 
This is largely reflexive in nature as people’s beliefs or practices impact society and vice versa, 
just as that of states impact supranational bodies or organisations and vice-versa (Waltz 2001: 3-
6; Williams; Barrinha and Rosa 2013: 101-115).  
The complexity of security culture dynamics, including security culture differences and 
sub-cultures, require a good or at least fairly minimal understanding of security concepts, 
discourses and practices by security actors or stakeholders in a relative context, be it at the 
national or regional levels, for desired impact. Security culture also manifests in specific norms 
and practices based on ideas informing shared beliefs on issues of safety and survival which is, in 
turn, expressed in shared discourses and subsequently in habitual practices (Williams and Haacke 
2008: 129; Neumann and Heikka 2005: 5-23). Indeed, these ideas, norms, values and principles 
are reflected in legal instruments and policies of regional and continental organisations like the 
ECOWAS and the European Union. They usually reflect a mix of strategic and human security 
concerns in contemporary times, though with increasing emphasis on the latter.  
The ideas, norms and principles that constitute the embryonic security culture of 
ECOWAS, for instance, have evolved historically from colonial to post-colonial, as well as from 
strategic or traditional security concerns to embrace human security in which the economic, 
social development and the security of peoples and states are inextricably linked (Jaye 2008: 
151-168). This assertion is reinforced in the 2008 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework 
(ECPF) which calls for the transformation of the regional body from an 'ECOWAS of States' to 
an 'ECOWAS of Peoples', seeking to resolve the tensions between sovereignty and supra-
nationality, and between regime security and human security, but eventually resolved 
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progressively in favour of both supra-nationality and human security respectively (ECOWAS 
Conflict Prevention Framework 2008: 9).  
The ECOWAS Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform and Governance adopted in 
Dakar, Senegal, on 4th June, 2016 does not only anchor its SSR&G efforts on its regional shared 
cultures, values and national ownership indicated in its preamble, but equally considered the lack 
of the culture of governance as part of many challenges faced by the security sector in West 
Africa. It rightly recognizes democratic governance and human security as being at the core of 
ECOWAS’s community strategy for the provision of security as a public good, as an essential 
service, and a vital component for achieving sustainable development. The regional body is also 
not oblivious of the fact that profound changes are required in adopting a new security approach, 
which does not only combine both Westphalia and post-Westphalia approaches to SSR&G but 
endogenous or informal security norms and values, in order to achieve successful democratic 
governance and security sector reforms at national and regional levels (Falk 2002: 311-352; 
Kreuder-Sonnen & Zangl 2015: 568-594).  
This approach to security culture provides options for revisiting obsolete, dated or 
unacceptable beliefs and practices in order to undertake reforms, change or transformation. 
Similarly, distinct security cultures at the regional level would influence behavioural patterns 
through different interpretations of international norms. Regional security institutions may, 
therefore, interpret humanitarian challenges, for example, differently and adopt different 
interventions measures to these challenges (Acharya 2004; and Ladnier 2003 cited in Williams 
and Haacke 2008: 129).  
In the European Union context, Barrinha and Rosa (2013) revisited security and strategic 
culture by generally acknowledging the diarchy of its strategic and critical security studies 
approach. This Western approach placed more emphasis on the post-positivist and reflexivist 
55 
 
approaches to security. This presents an interesting perspective of European security culture in 
terms of its conceptualisation and operationalisation, except for its translational attributes rather 
than the recent ideational construction or approach, which may be suitable within European 
context other than elsewhere. As a result, the need for consolidating the European security 
culture debate within a reflexivist, discursive approach to the study of security became more 
prominent (Barrinha and Rosa 2013: 101-115; Keohane 1988: 381-386; Williams 2007; 
Bickerton, Irondelle, and Menon 2011:49(1), 1–21; and Merlingen 2011:49(1), 149–169). A 
classic example is demonstrated in the case study of Portugal as an important smaller member 
state of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), adopting EU's regional security policies in 
addressing security issues at the national level, thereby consolidation European security culture.   
This approach deepens the understanding of security-related concepts, discourses and 
practices, mainly at the national and regional levels, by drawing heavily on the impact of regional 
security institutions, as regards their security culture, on that of the strategic culture of member 
states and vice-versa, through the reflexivist’s perspective using the translation approach.  
From the above scenario, it could be argued that critical security studies have influenced 
or contributed to the development of a critical approach to the study of European security (see 
Krause and Williams 1997: 10-11), while the use of translation and discourse have equally 
buttressed the reflexivist’s approach to European security culture. This notwithstanding, 
substantial grounds are left to be covered with regard to the concept of security culture and 
governance. The focus has been mainly on issues of security culture and its interpretation 
between regional/security organisations, i.e. EU and NATO, and member states such as Portugal, 
on issues of security-related concepts and the roles of these institutions in international security. 
The focus on issues of security sector governance and the role of culture in ensuring its 
effectiveness is, thus, limited. 
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Kirchner and Sperling (2010) partly admitted this by underscoring the relatively 
unexplored and underdeveloped conceptual and empirical linkage between national security 
culture and the preferred form of security governance. And in looking at this linkage, he arrived 
at four categories of security governance on which national security culture has an impact. They 
include assurance (which relates to intervention in post-conflict); prevention (pre-conflict 
intervention); protection (ensuring internal security); and compellence (military intervention) at 
the domestic level. On the external front, he looks at barriers and opportunities for collective 
action among major powers in the protection of global and regional security governance among 
10 major powerful states within Europe, North America and the Asia-Pacific (Kirchner and 
Sperling 2010: 1). 
From the above examples cited of ECOWAS and the EU, it becomes quite evident that 
security cultures have influences on securitisation of issues and policy-decision making. The 
context and approaches are, however, quite different and varied. ECOWAS draws quite heavily 
on ideation and discursive approaches in its security culture at the regional level, while issues of 
policy transfer, translation and reflexive approaches to security issues in member states does not 
necessarily seem a priority as compared to the European case; hence its emphasis on regional 
integration. Additionally, ECOWAS’s regional norms, values and standards do influence 
member states’ behavioral patterns in terms of responses to security challenges in the region, say 
on principles of non-indifference or zero tolerance for unconstitutional changes of government, 
and, thus, have a tendency to influence and transform regional security approaches in terms of 
strategic and human security amidst regional security complexes.  
Options, thus, exist in adopting hybrid security cultures suitable to a specific context, in 
an attempt to transform and promote progressive changes in the two regions and within its 
member states. In doing this, however, indigenous cultural traits must not be glossed over for a 
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supposedly ideal or superimposed exogenous security cultures. The thesis, in seeking to achieve 
a greater impact of SSR and SSG on security needs of both the states and its people, would 
therefore align its priorities to a critical security approach in which positive hybrid forms of 
informal and formal security cultures must be adapted to achieve desired goals and objectives. 
This deviates from the largely dominant Westphalia and post-Westphalia security approaches 
which straddle both state and human security approaches to meeting security needs, but with 
greater emphasis on liberal peace approaches rather than a contextual hybridity approach to 
issues. This contextual hybridism is necessary for resilience and sustainability of inclusive 
security agendas and longer term growth and development prospects. 
2.4.3 Probable Influences of Security Culture on Governance of the Security Sector  
To ensure or effect change and transformation through cultural influences within the 
security sector, beliefs, norms and values of a people, group or community, must be subjected to 
a closer scrutiny in order to achieve the expected change or transformation. In the context of 
broadening and deepening the debate on critical security studies, where post-positivist and 
reflexivist ideologies reinforce the notion of idealism, democratic norms and values find 
expression in issues of human security rather than those of traditional or regime security. Hence, 
cultural influences and the need for cultural change within the broad field of security governance 
is expressed through the enhancement of democratic values within, across and outside of the state 
sphere, rather than limiting the discourse to an institutional context (Wood 2004:31–48).  
 Wood (2004) highlights possibilities of effecting changes in the governance of security, 
using policing reform as a good example. She saw policing as creating an enabling environment 
for taking on sensibilities of other nodes (actors and processes) to maintain or improve their 
positions in the security field, through cultural transformation at the "field" (structures) or 
“habitus” (practical disposition). This ideal is perceived in the context of balancing the "defining 
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capacity to exercise coercion" with service-oriented or community policing (Wood 2004: 31; also 
see Brodgen and Shearing 1993; Shearing 1995; Janet Chan 2001; and Bourdieu 
&Wacquant1992). By inference, other actors could draw parallels, given the transformative 
element of culture in making governance more acceptable and effective. But that said, "shifting 
from state-centred to a plural or nodal conception of governance" cannot be over-emphasised, as 
well as the need to “pay more attention to the opportunities for transformation within the broader 
field of security governance" (Wood 2004: 32), which this research seeks to accomplish.  
In similar instances, possibilities exist for imbibing a globalised security culture through 
the hybrid model (Hills 2012). This may occur on the international stage, specifically through 
policing at the international stage, based mainly on the practices of the United Nations Police 
(UNPOL) in a post-conflict peacebuilding context. An instructive case focuses on the practices 
of the Nigerian police in UNPOL missions vis-a-vis its internal policing practices. The findings 
in this research revealed instances in which elite decision makers construct, exercise, and validate 
adaptive forms of security knowledge best described as hybrid (Hills 2012: 92).   
A globalising security culture in the field of policing are learnt through democratic 
policing norms and practices, both taught and acquired through pre-deployment training and 
experiences gained in field missions. The globalising security culture is, nevertheless, considered 
as being "outweighed by domestic concerns" in the case of Nigeria (Hill 2012: 91). It is, 
therefore, obvious that public police around the world share certain occupational commonalities, 
but this does not necessarily represent a globalising security culture (Hills 2012: 91-106). This 
interesting study, thus, provides a hybrid system of security culture in which the globalising 
security culture is construed as being "accommodated" or "manipulated" to suit specific goals 
and objectives within a specific space which is the international scene. These ‘democratic’ 
policing values and norms are, however, relegated to the background within the domestic setting 
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where a more brutal and aggressive policing is adopted to contain internal crimes and civil 
disturbances. As Hills so aptly concluded: “... although certain international norms appear to 
modify police behavior through temporary and localised processes of socialisation, they do so for 
instrumental, rather than intrinsic reasons” (Hill 2012: 93).  
It presents an interesting parallel for this thesis, given the hybrid nature of cultures, its 
accommodation or acceptance within specific contexts, and adaptation or, rather, manipulation to 
suit specific ends (Boege et al 2009: 13-21; and Mac Ginty 2008: 139-159). Hence, the need to 
explore the specific role of culture, and, for that matter, security culture, whether acquired or 
indigenous, in ensuring its acceptance and adaptation, in case of external cultural practices, 
towards effective security governance practices in West Africa. The thesis would advocate more 
for "intrinsic" cultural-related practices that effectively combine relevant African traditional 
security cultural practices with that of the Western-acquired or accommodated ones, rather than 
the "cosmetic" or “instrumental” security culture-related practices in order to enhance 
transformation in security governance practices in West Africa and elsewhere.  
The case of non-state policing comes to mind, where the state’s capacity to provide 
efficient and effective policing, particularly in Africa, is severely constrained by low police to 
civilian ratios (Harrendorf et al 2000: 115), lack of adequate resources, and negative behavioural 
patterns or tendencies. The international statistics on crime and justice indicates that Africa, 
together with Canada, the USA, South Asia and Oceania, is among the regions with lower levels 
of police personnel. Africa specifically has 200 police officers to a population of 100,000 
(Harrendorf et al 2000: 115).  
In addition, policing is seen to be undergoing rapid change in the face of democratisation, 
the commercialisation of security, and conflicts that disrupt policing services among others 
(Baker 2010). This inability of the police to perform adequate protection has reinforced the need 
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for a complementary but regulated non-state policing that includes private security companies 
and community collectives, providing everyday policing at the local/community level (Baker 
2010: 27-32). The community collectives, in these partnership roles, bring their knowledge of the 
environment and cultural tendencies to bear on community policing in the localities towards 
social protection.  
The ongoing reforms in Afghanistan which focuses on various security actors, including 
the Afghan national army and police, the judiciary, prisons, the security intelligence elements, as 
well as the performance of the civilian oversight mechanisms in the SSR process, also presents 
an interesting dimension to SSR efforts. Of particular interest is the overview of the post-Taliban 
status of the security sector in Afghanistan, the skewed or uneven international funding leading 
to uneven reforms, and the limited impact of Western security models on the whole security 
sector reform effort Murray (2009: 187-208; also see Sedra 2007: 7-12, 15-21).   
SSR in Afghanistan has been slow and unsteady, fraught with obstacles based on the 
superimposition of new ideas on what is still a tribal society in which local social structures, 
customs and loyalties are stronger than national laws and institutions. Additionally, security 
governance practices and the development of governance mechanisms have not been consistent 
or effective, while democratic principles have also not taken root as expected (Murray 2009: 188; 
Ayub et al 2009; and Sedra 2013: 371-387).   
These shortfalls could have been avoided if donors were to take into consideration the 
historical, cultural and religious context of South Asia, and draw on reform models from this 
region (Murray 2009), as well as contextualise hybrid models that would at least complement 
formal or state democratic institutions, and avoid ‘spoiler’ behaviour or activity (Bose and 
Motwani 2014: 416).  ‘Software’ changes in culture, values and behaviour, as well as the respect 
of democratic principles, would have gradually emerged, compared to ‘hardware’ changes based 
61 
 
on Western security models of reform, including re-equipping, rebuilding and training  (Murray 
2009:187-188; and Sedra 2013: 371-374). This could have, ultimately, proved more effective for 
the future of Afghan security sector reform than what the present reform phase allows (Murray 
2009: 187). Thus, Murray (2009:193) holds the opinion that “the courage of Afghan soldiers is 
not in question, but their support for an abstract notion of ‘national government’ may still prove 
to be weaker than their loyalty to tribe and village, once international support is withdrawn”.   
The neglect of the civilian and independent oversight of the security sector institutions 
have equally created a serious gap in the reform effort, as a multiplicity of oversight mechanisms 
was considered as more likely to ensure transparency of the sector than internal scrutiny or by an 
external agency (Murray 2009: 204; Mac Ginty 2010: 577-598).  
In as much as Murray characterised the SSR process in Afghanistan as mechanistic, 
technical and lacking vision, and calls for complementary changes in culture and values, as well 
as in the attitudes and behaviour of institutions and their personnel, she also acknowledged that 
this ‘software’ reform would require more imagination, patience and sensitivity. In addition, 
behavioural and attitudinal changes are “less tangible and harder to achieve”, and ignoring them 
in essence create the wrong impression to the international community that SSR has been 
completed, without pursuing the reform to its optimal conclusion (Murray 2009: 204- 205).  
In this regard, therefore, the regionalisation of SSR approaches is considered as crucial in 
facilitating the sustainability of SSR in Afghanistan, as well as acquiring an indigenous and 
South Asian character, since “Western principles adopted for their value and universality would 
likely attain more legitimacy in Afghanistan if they were seen as reflecting South Asian values 
too” (Murray 2009 ; 206).   
This approach to SSR and its crucial element of SSG remains instructive in many respects 
to this thesis, given the emphasis on complementarities between ‘hardware’ and ‘software’ 
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changes in SSR/SSG processes. What remains to be done, nonetheless, is to interrogate the 
‘software’ aspects of behavioural and attitudinal changes which are less tangible and difficult to 
achieve. This ‘software’ reform would require more imagination, patience and sensitivity (Murray 
2009: 205). Cognisance would equally be taken of dilemmas posed by negative or obsolete 
traditional customary practices, including clientelism, corruption, human rights abuses and social 
exclusion, in attempts at incorporating customary and traditional forms of authority into security 
governance and statebuilding reforms (Podder 2014: 1627).  
2.5 The Conceptual Framework  
2.5.1 Security Culture and the Notion of Complexity, Acceptance and Effectiveness in               
        Security Governance  
 
In undertaking reforms within the security sector that seeks to protect the state and its 
people from fear and want, three major issues arise for consideration. The first relates to 
understanding the security sector or system itself and how it functions in addressing identified 
security concerns. An idea or knowledge of what exits then facilitates identifying bottlenecks that 
ought to be addressed to enable the system function effectively. This will entail identifying 
components of the entire security system and how these components ought to work together to 
efficiently and effectively deliver security needs of the state and its people (Stroh 2015: 1-91). 
The components in this case would mainly comprise the structure or institutions, the actors and 
the processes that facilitate the functioning of the system.  
The second issue worth considering would be the management of activities within the 
sector and oversight roles to ensure that components within the security system function 
adequately. This issue relates mainly to the relevant actors in the system, their respective cultures 
and interests, and the platform of interaction needed to manage, coordinate and make decisions in 
a comprehensive and coherent manner. Here, the softer issues of security culture and its possible 
influences on making the right policy decisions acceptable to most if not all in meeting identified 
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security needs is of essence. This aspect of reform, as pointed out earlier, is difficult to achieve 
and often ignored or neglected, as it relates to different values, norms and principles already 
acquired and difficult to change where the need arises.   
The third but not least of considerations is how all these efforts fit into the larger 
statebuilding process in which weak or fragile states require reforms that builds resilience 
through leadership, ownership and sustainable development programmes. In this third element 
leadership remains crucial to the success of SSG, as the lack of political will could stifle efforts 
in this regard. The Global Leadership and Organisational Behavioural Effectiveness (GLOBE) 
Study of 62 societies on the issue of culture, leadership, and organisations demonstrates possible 
cultural influences in enhancing SSG processes (House et al 2004). Indeed, cultural differences 
exhibit complexities of relations between individuals or groups, as the higher the differences, the 
more complex the relationship. Cultural similarities, however, help understand the evolutionary 
process of cultural development.   
Cultural clusters equally provide useful ways of exploring cultural similarities (House et 
al 2002: 1). In the GLOBE Study, the examination of national cultures are based on the 
following factors: a) performance orientation; future orientation; assertiveness, power distance; 
humane orientation; institutional collectivism; in-group collectivism; uncertainty avoidance; and 
gender egalitarianism (House et al 2002: 3). The impact of culture on leadership styles have not 
been disputed, as has been acknowledged in several researches undertaken, leading to the notion 
that cultural traditions, values, ideologies and norms create as much or even more differences 
between societies, compared to structural factors (House, et al 2002: 3; Lammers and Hickson, 
1979: 10).   
The central theoretical proposition of the GLOBE Study states that “attributes and entities 
that distinguish a given culture from other cultures are predictive of the practices of organisations 
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and leader attributes and behaviours that are most frequently enacted, acceptable, and effective in 
that culture” (House 2002:8). Societal cultural values and practices affect what leaders do (House 
2002: 8; House et al 1997: 535 – 625), while leadership, in turn, affects organisational form, 
culture and practices (House, et al 2002:8; Bass 1985; Schein 1992; and Yukl 1994). On the 
other hand, organisational culture and practices are found to equally affect what leaders do by 
altering their behaviours and leadership styles (House et al 2002: 8; Schein 1992; Trice and 
Beyer 1984; and Lombardo 1983).   
These mutually reinforcing relationships present the dynamics or possibilities of 
influencing changes in leadership styles and group or organisational behaviours based on 
nationally accepted social norms, values and traditions. The GLOBE study, therefore, presents 
the options of exploring further, possible means of cultural influences on behavioural and 
attitudinal changes, generally acceptable in society, and serving as a means of improving 
effective governance in various sectors of the economy of a country. Of particular importance to 
this study, however, is coming up with a theoretical proposition on appropriate culture and 
leadership dynamics capable of changing or transforming security sector governance in the 
countries under consideration and beyond towards meeting the security needs of the state and its 
people.  
In all these discussions, however, it is pertinent to reinforce the fact that security reform 
efforts towards peacebuilding and statebuilding goals must take cognisance of people’s cultural 
heritage, particularly at the grassroots, as this provide a credible foundation for equitable and 
sustainable peace and development. Cultural heritage in this regard must reflect cultural strengths 
that help guarantee a freedom from fear and want, and that facilitate desired changes in social 
and economic conditions (Kleymeyer 1994). 
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The scenario above reflects a complex security sector or system, derived from an SSR 
concept perceived to be foreign and imposed, and requiring an interaction of numerous security 
actors, with civilian and military backgrounds, and with different security cultures. This security 
system is confronted with security and governance challenges which necessitate a transformation 
within the sector, particularly in transitional or new democracies, based on established security 
cultures under authoritarian rule (Nathan 2004: 2), and the probable need to adopt hybrid or 
diverse security cultures under democratic dispensation to address human security concerns.   
This complex security system also has multiple security actors who perform different roles and 
functions, and might require ‘software’ changes to unproductive and entrenched behaviour, 
attitudes, norms, values and principles, in order to complement that of the ‘hardware’ changes 






Classification of Security Sector Actors 
                                          Security Sector and Actors  
Core Security Actors  Armed Forces, Police Service, Gendarmeries, Paramilitary Forces, Presidential 
Guards, Customs Authorities, and reserve or local security units (including Civil  
Defence Forces, National Guards and Militias)  
Management and  
Oversight Bodies  
The Executive, National Security Advisory Bodies, Legislative and Legislative  
Select Committees, Ministries of Defence, Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs, 
Customary and Traditional Authorities, Financial Management Bodies (Finance  
Ministries, Budget Officers, Financial Audit and Planning Units), and Civil Society  
Organisations (Civilian Review Boards and Public Complaints Commissions)  
Justice and Rule of Law  Judiciary and Justice Ministries, Prisons, Criminal Investigation and Prosecution 
Services, Human Rights Commissions and Ombudsmen, and Customary and  
Traditional Justice Systems   
Non-Statutory Security  
Forces  
Liberation Armies, Guerrilla armies, Private Security Companies, Political Party 
Militias  
 
External Security  
 Actors  
Development Partners - DFID, SIDA, CIDA, USAID, UNDP  
Regional Bodies - Regional Economic Communities (RECs), African Union,             
European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), WACSOF, 
ECOSOCC, ASSN, WANEP etc.  
Global - United Nations, Global Consortium on Security Transformation (GCST)    
Source: Adapted from OECD DAC Handbook, 2007 p.22, and author’s own research. 
Table 2.1 above classifies security actors that have a stake in the security and justice 
sector. These actors include all the institutions, groups, organisations and individuals playing 
diverse roles in the provision of security and justice or undermining same. It is pertinent, from 
the numerous security actors identified above, to define some essential elements in the 
governance of the sector. These include ‘who’ (security referents/actors), ‘what’ (roles and 
responsibilities), ‘how’ (processes involved in effective delivery of security services) and 
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‘means’ (expertise, capacity and resources). Of equal importance are the different cultural traits 
of these actors, and how that impacts on their collaboration towards the management, oversight, 
and control of the sector, as well as ensuring an efficient and effective delivery of balanced 
security needs of both state and sub-state actors.  
 Thus, a right or optimal mix within this security system with different components is 
required to facilitate the transformation of the system into a coherent and acceptable whole. 
Security culture, therefore, remains essential in facilitating the process of SSG, particularly as the 
various components – representing the actors, the institutions and processes – must function 
adequately in order to ensure the success of the whole security system.  
 Culture becomes relevant in explaining and understanding the complexity of the security 
sector and, thus, requires cultural awareness to facilitate the acceptance of a hybrid security 
system, and the effectiveness of security governance as a means to addressing security threats, 
and meeting security needs of the state and its people. Hybridity in this case refers to a “dialectic 
co-existence of forms of socio-political organisation that have their roots in both non-state 
indigenous societal structures and introduced state structures” (Boege et al 2009: 17). Hybridity 
is also used cautiously; not as another catch-word to subsume realistic indigenous programmes 
under prescriptive western models which become more ‘instrumental’ rather than ‘intrinsic’ and 






Diagram Depicting the Conceptual Framework of the Security Sector and Governance and 




Source: Author, 2019  
Figure 2.1 illustrates a complex security system, comprising multiple state and sub-state 
security actors with different cultures, roles and responsibilities, including security sector 
management, oversight and delivery of services.   
 In the area of security sector governance, there are both horizontal and vertical levels of 
governance structures at national and international levels which provide the platform for these 
security actors to possibly interact and align their interests towards a properly managed, 
controlled and effective security sector.  
The task in this complex security terrain, therefore, is to explore the possible ways and 
means of reinforcing, realigning, streamlining, and adopting security cultures through creating 
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effecting change and transformation within the sector.  This becomes necessary as cultural 
differences have the tendency to maximise complexity of security sector governance, while 
cultural similarities could minimise same. This approach could eventually lead to an acceptance 
of the SSG concept, based on recognition of indigenous traditions, values and practices, towards 
broader statebuilding goals in transitional societies or established democracies.  
2.5.2 Region in Focus - Enhancing Security Sector Governance in West Africa  
The West African region has gone through numerous security challenges during and after 
the end of the Cold War. The region had to contend with the outbreak of numerous coups d’état, 
intra-state conflicts, bad governance practices which undermined democratic governance in 
respective member states, transnational crime – including the trafficking of small arms and light 
weapons (SALW), drugs and human beings – and terrorism among others (for more details, see 
Beckitt and Bakrania 2010: 2; UNODC 2013). These security challenges have undermined both 
national and human security, predisposing ECOWAS Member States to fragility, abuse of human 
rights, death and displacement of huge populations. With these developments, Bryden et al 
(2008: 14) argue that  
[t]here is clearly a case to be made for a transformation of the way 
security sector is governed in West Africa. States are in various 
stages of transition and while some have opportunities for a process 
of reform others provide little or no room for such development.  
 The call from donors and other international partners for the practice of democracy and good 
governance, respect for human rights, transparency and accountability and the respect for the rule 
of law, among other tenets, have over the past two decades created awareness in the region, 
leading to the intensification of efforts to uphold such principles. The increasing recognition of 
the individual and his or her need as against emphasis on the state has equally engendered a 
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vociferous civil society that demands the respect of such ideals by regimes in power in the 
current democratic dispensation.  
The regional body, ECOWAS, has also made efforts in drafting numerous policy 
documents and legal frameworks to regulate activities of member states and their responsibility 
towards their citizens in governance and security of the region, as well as maintain a peaceful 
region. Some of these documents include the 1999 ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the 
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace and Security; the 2001 
Protocol A/SPI/12/01 on Democracy and Good Governance Supplementary to the Protocol 
Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and 
Security; the 2008 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF); and the 2016 ECOWAS 
Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform and Governance.   
The ECPF, for instance, underscores the need to guarantee human security which, it 
anticipates, would create the necessary conditions to eliminate pervasive threats to people’s and 
individual rights, their livelihoods, safety, and life. The protection of human and democratic 
rights, as well as the promotion of human development meant to ensure freedom from fear and 
want is equally highlighted. Also, as part of it strategic vision, ECOWAS member states bear the 
primary responsibility of transforming the region from an ‘ECOWAS of States’ into an 
‘ECOWAS of the Peoples’.  
Structures have also been created to facilitate democratic governance in the region. Some 
of these include an ECOWAS Parliament, an ECOWAS Court and a West African Civil Society 
Forum (WACSOF). These structures together with the organizational set up of ECOWAS, 
including its Mediation and Security Council, its Council of Elders and an ECOWAS Standby 
Force (ESF), present an appropriate framework and platform to institutionalise security 
governance in the region. Obviously, the regional body is making significant progress, but a lot 
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more remains to be done in respective member states to complement regional efforts in this 
direction, if democracy, peace and sustainable development are to be achieved.  
Some key considerations must be made in enhancing SSG in West Africa. These include 
translating the emphasis on an ‘ECOWAS of the Peoples’ into specific roles to be played by sub-
state actors in SSG processes in the region, based on their expertise, culture and custom; 
mainstreaming gender roles in SSG; ensuring democratic control and accountability in the 
region, which could lead to the building of trust among government institutions, security services 
and citizens; and encouraging equal partnerships between governments and external actors based 
on the recognition of the leadership, national vision, ownership and participation of local actors 
in the process (ASSN/DCAF Workshop Report 2010: 5-6). As is well acknowledged “[an 
imposition of] reform models can never lead to effective and lasting results; that a participatory 
process requires dialogue; and that local ownership is the foundation of any possible  progress in  
SSR” (ASSN/DCAF Workshop Report 2010: 5-6). 
From the above, it can be deduced that the recognition of diverse histories and 
experiences within the region, coupled with regional values, norms or standards would be crucial 
in institutionalising security sector governance practices in the ECOWAS region.  
2.6 Key Research Question  
The three major types of research questions usually addressed in the field of social 
science include the descriptive; exploratory; and evaluation questions (Shavelson and Townes 
2002: 99-106; Yin 2012: 4-5). Descriptive questions focus on what is happening or has 
happened, while that of the exploratory looks more at the how or the why something happened or 
is happening with little control over events but possibilities of facilitating change or 
transformation. That of evaluation considers the how and the why in assessing a given situation.  
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A review of the literature above indicates the evolving nature of culture, or more 
specifically security culture, as it gains ground in the whole strategic and critical security debate. 
The emphasis, however, is to focus more on positive or progressive endogenous security culture 
which is complementary to the acceptable formal and globalised security cultures, with the 
tendency to transform and bring positive changes in security sector reform and governance 
initiatives. Calls for such changes in the security sector have been made in the context of respect 
for democratic principles and changes in behaviour and attitude, based on a careful balance 
between formal and informal models of reform.   
More importantly, major gaps exist and require an inquiry to unravel the role of culture 
and its probable transformative elements in bringing about changes in the governance of the 
security sector. Various issues come to the fore in this direction. Key among these issues is 
facilitating complementary changes in the culture and values as well as attitudes and behaviour 
of security personnel, and the institutions and agencies they work for (Murray 2009: 204-205).   
Essentially, understanding security culture and cultural changes as a whole within the  
broad field of security governance becomes pertinent, while finding possible ways of enhancing 
democratic values within, across and outside of the state sphere, rather than limiting the 
discourse to an institutional context (Wood 2004: 31 – 48). For these changes to be effective, 
they would also require to be more ‘intrinsic’ rather than ‘instrumental’ (Hill 2012: 93).  
This major void or a lacuna in the literature requires more detailed analysis, hence an 
exploratory research question guided the thesis as follows: ‘How has security culture affected the 
complexity of, and facilitated the acceptance and effectiveness of security sector governance in 
the comparative cases of Ghana and Nigeria?’ 
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It is expected that this research question will guide the study towards making useful 
findings that goes to either reinforce the research objectives or bring up different results for 
further research in future.  
2.7 Enabling Objectives  
The central theme of this research, as mentioned earlier, is to explore progressive 
endogenous and exogenous security cultural influences on the effective governance of the 
security sector in West Africa, taking a look at the comparative case studies of Ghana and 
Nigeria. The objective for undertaking this research is to generally enhance SSG in West Africa. 
This would only happen if the SSG concept is well understood by all stakeholders, and 
indigenous cultural norms, values and practices accommodated in the SSR process. The enabling 
objectives of this research are therefore:  
(a) To promote the recognition, appreciation and respect for the cultural context 
based on existing norms and values, as these have the tendency to facilitate the 
acceptance and commitment towards a sustainable democratic governance of the 
security sector;   
(b) To establish the interconnectedness and clarify the dynamics between the major 
concepts of culture, security and governance, and possibly contextualise the 
interplay of these concepts  in security reform efforts towards eventual resilience 
and sustainability in the statebuilding process;  
(c) To highlight both appropriate and inappropriate security cultural practices that 
either  undermine or promote good governance practices in undertaking SSG in  
societies in transition; 
(d) To enhance, if possible, an appropriate or balanced hybridism in indigenous and 
formal security cultural practices by both state and sub-state actors in the 
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reorientation and transformation of security sectors of societies in transition in 
West Africa and at large; and 
(e) To encourage dialogue among local/national actors and partners in undertaking 
SSR and SSG as a way of promoting synergy, and enhancing coordination and 
coherence between indigenous forms of security cultural practices and  the 
modern liberal peace approach.  
The above-mentioned objectives are informed by several reasons. First, is the 
lack of recognition and appreciation of the context within which security sector 
governance practices should take place. Stereotypes are brought to bear or imposed, 
especially by donors, expecting all actors to fall in line in the implementation of SSR or 
SSG in all contexts. In addition, it is also generally assumed that foreign or externally 
imposed cultural norms and values are generally known and ideal, and must or should, 
therefore, be accepted and practiced. More importantly, the questionable notion that 
proposed conditionalities, in whichever form, would compel the imbibing of external or 
foreign values have proved otherwise. These objectives also reflect a complex and 
multivariate system with multiple and intervening factors, that could directly or 
indirectly influence each other in ensuring an appropriate hybrid or cultural-mix to 
enhance security sector governance in Ghana and Nigeria. Fulfilling these objectives 







CHAPTER 3  
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY  
3.1 Introduction  
Research design is intended to provide an appropriate framework for undertaking 
research through the adoption of the right research methodology, the collection and analysis of 
relevant data of the study, as well as cater for limitations and constraints (Saunders et al 1997:72;  
2007). In doing this, however, this research design would “deal with a logical problem and not a 
logistical problem” (Yin 1989: 29).  
In line with the above, this chapter focused on three major issue areas: the philosophical 
underpinnings of this research; the research approach to data collection; and the method of 
analysis and presentation of findings. This approach was adopted in order to ensure that the right 
participants in this research were identified, and appropriate research methods adopted to gather, 
interpret and analyse data collected towards answering the research question as precisely as 
possible.  
In fulfilling this objective, the critical theory was adopted to answer the research question 
“to what extent could security culture minimise the complexity and facilitate the acceptance and 
effectiveness of security sector governance in the comparative cases of both Ghana and 
Nigeria?”  It provided the general framework to guide the research in an attempt to understand, 
explain, analyse and make inferences based on findings. This was complemented by the use of 
the case study approach to observation and data collection. The research strategy employed was 
based on the qualitative method for data collection and analysis. These were facilitated by the use 
of semi-structured/one-on-one interviews, open-ended questionnaires, focused group discussions 
and desk-based research. A combination of hermeneutics, translation, ideation and reflexivist’s 
76 
 
techniques was then employed for interpretation and analysis of data, in the context of 
actor/institution dynamics, towards findings and drawing conclusions. The grounded theory 
approach was finally used to establish the theoretical proposition of this research, based on the 
unpredictable and evolving nature of culture, its dynamics and relation to governance processes 
in West Africa.  
3.2 Philosophy and Approaches to Research  
Human beings perceive reality through a cultural force-field, which makes this cultural 
force-field evolutionary in nature rather than static, and thus presents the likelihood for a 
“paradigm shift” (Kuhn 1962/70a). Paradigms are generally perceived as models or patterns 
(Göktürk 2011). They are “universally recognised scientific achievements that, for a time, 
provide model problems and solutions for a community of practitioners” (Kuhn 1996:10). 
Paradigms are “novel” in nature and could be controversial, given its subjective nature, and 
depending on the schools of thought and the latitude it offers to extend its boundaries (Kuhn 
1962/1970a: 187).  
Guba and Lincoln (1994:105) defined various competing paradigms considered as 
paradigms of choice in informing and guiding inquiry, especially qualitative inquiry. These 
include positivism, post-positivism, critical theory and related ideological positions; and 
constructivism. Each of these paradigms could be considered “as the basic belief system or 
worldview that guides the investigator, not only in choices of method but in ontologically and 
epistemologically fundamental ways” (Guba and Lincoln 1994: 105); ontology referring to the 
form and nature of reality, while epistemology, which relates to knowledge, refers to the 
relationship between the “knower or would-be knower and what can be known” (Guba and 
Lincoln 1994: 108).   
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Of major essence to this study, however, was the need to adopt an appropriate and 
acceptable paradigm to guide the research, notwithstanding the probability of a paradigm shift 
(Kuhn 1962/70a) or the idea that beliefs are basic and must be accepted simply on faith as there 
is no way to establish their ultimate truthfulness (Guba and Lincoln 1994: 107). And as 
mentioned in previous sections, the critical theory proved most relevant taking into consideration 
its contentious, evolutionary and transformational attributes, and thus paving way for exploring 
probable solutions to the research problem.  
This approach to the research thus provided the latitude for an exploratory or qualitative 
research into possible influences of security culture in the governance of the security sector. This 
made it possible to discover, disprove and reinforce new ideas, beliefs or widely held views on 
the security reform and governance concept, and its acceptability or otherwise in effectively 
meeting security needs of the people in the two country case studies of choice, i.e. Ghana and 
Nigeria, and beyond. 
 Further details are given below for the choice of the critical theory among the others 
identified. 
3.2.1 Critical Theory   
The contributions of Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcus known, among others, as 
proponents of the critical theory in the early 1920s, are widely recognised (Held 1980; Cox 1981; 
Hoffman 1987; Buzan 1991; Wyn Jones 1999; Kincheloe and McLaren 2002). The Frankfurt 
School, which these renowned academics belonged to, attempted the revival of socialist ideals in 
a rapidly expanding capitalist world, prior to and during the during the Cold War, by espousing 
notions of emancipation, enlightenment and egalitarianism out of which derived the critical 
theory. The critical theory is an offshoot of the Marxist tradition which aims at social 
transformation and emancipation through critique (Fierke 2009). It formed a larger part of the 
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post-positivist thinking and ideology which led to development of critical security studies started 
by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde of the Copenhagen School (Mc Sweeney 1996: 81-93) and later 
reinforced by Booth (2005), Wyn Jones (1999) and Krause and Williams (1997) of the 
Aberystwyth School.  
This theory has gained significance, particularly in the area of qualitative research, given 
its attribute of questioning existing views, perceptions or ideologies, and giving interpretations 
based on evolving political, security, social, economic and even cultural dynamics related to 
human activities and endeavours. This comes in handy with the authoritarian and bureaucratic 
security culture attributes and practices in Africa inherited from its colonial past, and with 
ongoing efforts to consolidate an evolving democratic security culture through security sector 
governance as part of security sector reform efforts. 
Critical theorists sought to develop a critical perspective in the discussion of all social 
practices (Held 1980: 16). They also have a similar aim of laying the “foundation for an 
exploration, in an interdisciplinary research context, of questions concerning the conditions 
which make possible the reproduction and transformation of society, the meaning of culture, and 
the relation between the individual, society and nature” (Held 1980: 16). In all these, attempts on 
the security front were made by Buzan et al (1998) to reconceptualise security with regard to 
primary actors in international relations, security referents, securitisation of issues and issues of 
survival. While doing all these with Eurocentric undertones, Aberystwyth School focused more 
on reinforcing the human security component by shifting emphasis from the international 
relations realist angles of power, war and conflict to more of world security with focus on the 
civil society actors’ security needs and concerns (Diskaya 2013).  
While the thesis leans much more towards the Aberystwyth School of thinking, it seeks to 
go a step beyond that in order not to totally neglect the essential role of capacitating the state 
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democratically to still retain monopoly over the use of force, as eroding this attribute in recent 
past has led to several civil wars and conflicts to the detriment of society. The emphasis on 
democracy here is to judiciously respond to security threats in a consultative and responsible 
manner, while respecting principles of transparency, accountability and civilian oversight over 
security forces. It would equally seek to progressively contextualise SSR/SSG practices within a 
contextual hybrid security setting – i.e. employing positive ideals of both informal/traditional and 
modern/formal security norms and practices – while avoiding a Eurocentric or translational 
hybrid approach of transferring purely western norms, values and practices which may not be 
suitable and sustainable. This approach would be situated within the social democracy context 
for the progressive change or transformation required within the security sector in the African 
continent. 
 The major attribute of this critical theory, therefore, rests on the fact that it retains its 
ability to disrupt and challenge the status quo (Kincheloe and McLaren 2002: 87). The critical 
theory tradition is also always changing and evolving (Held 1980: 182).  This attribute of the 
theory creates the space for revisiting existing paradigms, and using discursive, translational 
(Barrinha and Rosa 2013: 101-115) or hermeneutical approaches to add value or make inferences 
from data gathered or observations made. This adaptive approach facilitates qualitative research 
relating, specifically, to human activities, and which may be both predictable and unpredictable. 
But essentially, critical theorists are both concerned with interpretation and transformation (Held 
1980: 15) which remained most relevant to this thesis.  
 This paradigm, in an attempt at answering the research question, provided the avenue for 
interrogating and interpreting the two variables of security culture and security governance, its 
interrelatedness, complexity, and possibilities of exploring transformation in the sector given 
several years of attempt at transforming security sectors, particularly in Africa, without much 
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success. The focus has mainly being on ‘hard’ reforms of restructuring institutions, equipping 
security forces and building their capacities, management of the sector and general security 
oversight responsibilities, without much focus on the ‘soft’ reforms which rests mainly on 
security culture entailing the upholding of positively shared security norms, values and principles 
which inform behavioural and attitudinal changes for the needed transformation required in the 
sector. The strength of this paradigm lies in its critical and interrogative attributes which make it 
possible for making inferences along the lines of change in the areas of acceptance of the concept 
of SSR/SSG and making it more effective in terms of security responses as opposed to its current 
status in West Africa and beyond.  
 Hermeneutics, which constitutes a critical element of critical theory, facilitated the 
interpretation of data and making sense of what has been observed in a way that communicates 
understanding (Kincheloe and McLaren 2002: 96-97). It entails the study of meaning and 
interpretation of historical texts (Mack 2010). The centrality of hermeneutics to the critical 
hermeneutical tradition makes the theorists contend that perception itself is an act of 
interpretation (Kincheloe and McLaren 2002: 97).  In addition, the idea of pristine interpretation 
is non-existent, while discursive approaches to data interpretation cannot claim a privileged 
position for the production of authoritative knowledge. Analysis takes place within the 
boundaries and blinders (Kincheloe and McLaren 2002: 97). Reality, therefore, cannot be 
grasped from a single point of view (Held 1980: 204).   
 This notwithstanding critical theory lends itself to criticisms as the possibility exists to 
always question anything and everything, including widely acceptable and crystalised ideals, 
whether positive or negative, explore challenges and seek options to improve and bring about 
change. Those in the positivist tradition have criticised this theory for its subjectiveness, bias and 
theory-laden nature based on making interpretation, inferences and induction. But this, from the 
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epistemological point of view, also makes possible the reinforcement of critical security studies 
geared towards meeting the ever evolving rather than stagnant security needs of both state and 
non-state actors. This theory has also brought enlightenment through its emancipatory approach 
to critiquing both socialist and capitalist or liberal ideals with emphasis on social advancement as 
the end goal. 
 3.2.2 Constructivism 
Constructivism, which is also referred to as interpretivism, connotes the idea of 
constructing one’s own views, perception or mental image of what reality is. It has its intellectual 
roots in critical theory (Price and Reus-Smit 1998: 259). Human beings' perception and 
interpretation of existence or reality forms a central theme of this paradigm. From the ontological 
and epistemological dimensions, constructivism is seen as the construction of social reality and 
the social construction of knowledge respectively (Guzzini 2000: 160).   
 Constructivists believe in the existence of a phenomenal world which is external to 
thought, but it opposes the idea that a phenomena can constitute themselves as objects of 
knowledge independent of discursive practices (Guzzini 2000: 159). The construction of social 
reality through knowledge is not entirely internal to discourse, but socially constituted through 
practice (Guzzini 2000: 160; Bourdieu, 1980: 87).  
Constructivism relates mainly to human behaviour which is very unpredictable, evolving 
and subject to change. As a result, this paradigm seeks mainly to understand or comprehend 
these social phenomena. As Cohen et al (2007: 19) and Mack (2010: 8) rightly put it, scientists in 
the context of the constructive or interpretivist paradigm seek to "understand, explain, and 
demystify social reality through the eyes of different participants". The attribute of this paradigm, 
therefore, contrasts sharply with that of a positivist intention of seeking to explain an objective 
reality. In this particular context, learners construct their own meaning, build on prior knowledge 
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through new learning or discoveries, enhance learning by social interaction, and improve 
knowledge through 'authentic' tasks (Cooperstein and Kocevar-Weidinger 2004: 141). 
The constructivist paradigm is also heavily influenced by hermeneutics, as in the case of 
critical theory and phenomenology (Mack 2010: 7). Hermeneutics and phenomenology – which 
advocates for a consideration of human beings’ subjective interpretations and perception of the 
world as the starting point in understanding social phenomena (Mack 2010: 7; Ernest 1994: 25) – 
facilitate the understanding of social phenomena. Hence the systems of meaning, in this case, 
define how actors interpret their material environment (Price and Reus-Smit 1998: 266). The 
interpretations made are based on a shared system of codes and symbols, languages and social 
practices (Guzzini 2000: 160). Constructivists also depend on induction or making of inferences 
in the interpretation of social reality. In doing this, however, action precedes observation 
(Cooperstein and KocevarWeidinger 2004: 141). In other words, experiential knowledge or 
activity leads to the formulation of concepts rather than concepts leading to the activity 
(Cooperstein and Kocevar Weidinger 2004: 141). 
So while constructivists essentially seek to explain, shed more light on issues, construct 
their mental image and build on prior knowledge, critical theorists question the status quo and 
pursue changes towards transformation for the benefit of all actors. In addition, constructivism 
having its intellectual roots in critical theory, with commonalities in approaches, informed the 
choice of critical theory as the most preferred paradigm for the study. 
3.2.3 The Post-Positivist Paradigm  
The post-positivist school of thought transcends that of its predecessor, the positivist, 
critiquing the nature of observed reality from the positivist’s point of view. Epistemologically, 
what is observed and the one doing the observation are not necessarily independent of each other, 
as the knowledge and values of the researcher has a tendency to influence that which is being 
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researched or observed. In other words, the observed reality is not all there is, as the researcher 
can reach behind it and reveal more fundamental layers (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009: 18). 
More importantly, all that is being observed is not construed as the absolute fact but is fallible 
and, as a result, all theory is revisable (Trochim 2006). Emphasis is, therefore, placed on 
triangulation, based on series or multiple measures and observations in order to arrive at the 
proposed reality, which in itself may be subject to error.   
 The notion of bias, thus, plays a key role in the post-positivist position as they also believe 
that all observations made are theory laden, and that scientists are inherently biased by their 
cultural experiences and world views among other things (Trochim 2006). Hence for positivists 
and post-positivists, emphasis on the ‘objective truth’ is paramount, but the notion of bias and 
making conjectures in arriving at the reality becomes a major point of departure. Theory, for 
post-positivists, is one step removed from reality, as it is largely arrived at through induction 
(Waltz 1997: 913).   
 The post-positivist stance thus acknowledges the role of bias in scientific inquiry, and 
proposes triangulation as a means of establishing objective reality. Hence, while this paradigm 
highlights cultural experiences and world view of events as having the tendency to cause bias in 
findings, it still makes a case for objective reality which could be contested at all times. The notion 
of triangulation, however, remained relevant to this study, given that data gathered from respective 
actors within the security sector helped establish certain facts and corroborated inductions or 
inferences made from the research. 
3.2.4 The Positivist Paradigm  
Positivism, as the French philosopher August Comte puts it, is driven by the motto, Love, 
Order, and Progress. The primary object of positivism is twofold: “to generalise scientific 
conceptions, and to systematise the art of social life” (Lenzer 1998: 317-318). Positivism is 
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mainly based on positive science which may deal either with objects themselves as they exist or 
with separate phenomena that the objects exhibit (Lenzer 330).   
Its epistemological underpinnings reflect the ‘knower’ or ‘would be knower’ being 
independent of the phenomenon being investigated, as both are independent of each other. 
Emphasis on cause and effect takes preeminence (Guba and Lincoln 1994: 109-110). In essence, 
the positivist believes that reality can be apprehended directly without benefit or recourse to 
theory (Waltz 1997: 913). Thus, reality is what is observed.  
Critics of this paradigm, nevertheless consider it as both reductionist and deterministic 
(Guba and Lincoln 1994: 109; Bernstein 1988; Hesse 1980; Reason and Rowan 1981). This 
conclusive and/or absolute perceptions of what exists, guided by natural laws and limited to what 
can be observed in reality, underscore its pejorative intent in a world of paradigms (Guba and 
Lincoln 1994: 105),  and thus would not be conducive to this research.  
Adopting this positivist stance for the research would have posed some challenges given 
that the inquiry undertaken in the areas of security culture and security governance were not 
issues to be construed as objective or falsifiable, based on which deductions could be made. 
More importantly, social activities or phenomena are largely subjective and dependent on the 
interpretation given by the researcher or the ‘knower’. The emphasis is, therefore, not necessarily 
on cause and effect (Guba and Lincoln 1994: 109-110).  
  The above analysis of the most preferred paradigm of choice is summarised in the 
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The choice of the critical theorist paradigm, highlighted in the figure above, helped 
establish the following: “what is to be observed and scrutinised; the kind of questions that are 
supposed to be asked and probed for answers in relation to this subject; how these questions are 
to be structured; how the results of scientific investigations should be interpreted; how an 
experiment is to be conducted, and what equipment is available to conduct the experiment” 
(Kuhn 1996:10).  
The interplay of security culture and governance of the security sector presented 
possibilities of demystifying the complexity of the security sector reform and governance 
concepts, facilitated probabilities for its acceptance, and created room for effective responses to 
security needs of the state and people of Ghana and Nigeria and, to a larger extent, the West 
African region. 
3.3 Research Methodology  
Many varied approaches are adopted in undertaking research, based on the philosophical 
underpinnings and the methodology to be employed. Crotty (1998) considers a research 
methodology as a strategy or plan of action that shapes choices and use of particular methods, 
Post - Positivist  Constructivist  Critical Theorist  Positivist  
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and in turn links them to desired outcomes. Research methodology could also be considered as a 
way of systematically solving a research problem (Kothari 2004: 4). The methodological process 
essentially covers the epistemological aspect of the research, laying foundations for research 
approaches and methods or techniques required for observation, collection and interpretation of 
data for desired outcomes. In its simplest form, therefore, a research methodology involves the 
systematic steps taken to solve a research problem, based on a defined logic (Saunders et al 2009: 
5).   
  Systematic research encompasses specific methods for data collection, deliberation on the 
significance of the results obtained, and an explanation of any limitations experienced. The 
primary focus of research should be to increase knowledge of a particular topic in order to help 
solve relevant problems (Saunders et al 1997:1).  
The collection or gathering of data, its analysis and findings are pertinent in ensuring that 
observations made are credible and provide specific or general answers to the research question. 
This would depend on choosing the appropriate method for data collection and analysis.   
Three major types of research remain pertinent to this study. These are the quantitative, 
qualitative and mixed-method approaches.   
3.3.1 Quantitative Research  
Quantitative research relates to undertaking scientific-based research that uses numbers 
and statistical method, as it tends to be based on numerical measurements of specific aspects of 
phenomena; abstracts from particular instances to seek general description or test causal 
hypotheses; and seeks measures and analyses that are easily replicable by other researchers 
(Thomas 2003: 2; King et al 1994: 3-4). This type of research is generally associated with the 
positivist/post-positivist paradigm, and usually involves collecting and converting data into 
numerical form for statistical calculations and drawing conclusions. It is guided by one or more 
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hypotheses, with predictions about possible relationships between variables being investigated 
(Alzheimer Europe 2013).  
The emphasis for this kind of research is based more on explanation and prediction, 
which facilitates the generalisation of findings to other people and places (Thomas 2003: 2; 
Glesene and Peshkin 1992: 6). It focuses on measurement and analysis of causal relationships 
between variables and not processes (Denzin and Lincoln 2011: 8).   
Objectivity is of utmost concern as the researcher tends to observe and measure data 
without any biases or personal involvement with the research subject (Thomas 2003: 2; Glesene 
and Peshkin 1992: 6). Great care is taken to avoid one’s own presence, behaviour or attitude 
affecting the results of the research, while methods and conclusions of a study are critically 
examined for any possible biases (Alzheimer Europe 2013).  
The qualitative nature of this research which relates mainly to social reality, cultural 
norms and values, and multiple relations and interaction at different levels of the social strata 
would not, therefore, make it possible to use this quantitative approach.  
3.3.2 Qualitative Research  
Qualitative research, as the name implies, relates to observing and making meaning of an 
inherent feature of a phenomenon relating mainly to social reality or behavioural patterns of an 
individual or a group. This type of research is considered as the world of lived experience where 
individual belief and action intersect with culture (Denzin and Lincoln 2011: 2).   
The qualitative method of research, also seen as multi-method in focus, involves “an 
interpretive, naturalistic approach to its subject matter”, laying emphasis on studying things in 
their natural settings and attempting to make sense of them, or interpret phenomena in terms of 
the meaning people bring to them (Thomas 2003: 1). They use any and all of the research 
strategies, including case studies, ethnography, phenomenology, grounded theory, biographical, 
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historical, participatory and clinical research strategies (Denzin and Lincoln 2011: xii). This 
inquiry is largely based on the collection of a variety of empirical materials gathered through 
case studies, personal experience, introspection, life story, interviews, among others, that 
describes routine and problematic moments and meanings in people’s lives (Thomas 2003: 2; 
Denzin and Lincoln 1994: 2).   
This approach to research is usually associated with the critical theory or social 
constructivist paradigm which seeks for social change and transformation or socially constructed 
nature of reality (Walker 2015). It tends to be inductive in nature, by depending on data collected 
to develop a theory or look for a pattern of meaning from this data. It adopts the bottom-up 
approach to research which facilitate making inferences. In essence, qualitative research tends to 
focus on one or a small number of cases, use intensive interviews or depth analysis of historical 
materials, adopting discursive methods, and concerned with a rounded or comprehensive account 
of some event or unit (King et al 1994: 4).  
This method was, largely, suitable for this study as it makes it easier to collect, analyse,  
interpret and critique socially complex and sophisticated data related specifically to issues of 
identity, norms, values and behaviour of individuals and groups, which could be very 
unpredictable.  
3.3.3 Mixed-Method Research  
As mentioned earlier, both quantitative and qualitative research methods are guided by a 
combination of positivist and post-positivist paradigms  (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998: 3; Guba 
and Lincoln 1994). These two contending paradigms, with their inherent tension captured as 
“wars” (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998: 3; Datta 1994: 53-70; Gage 1989: 4-10; Guba and Lincoln 
1994: 105-117; Rossi 1994: 23-36), made the application of both research types seemed rather 
impossible. Notwithstanding, the “pacifist”, also referred to as the “pragmatists”, have held the 
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view that both qualitative and quantitative research methods are indeed compatible rather than 
antagonistic (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998: 4-5).   
In effect, both qualitative and quantitative research methods can be used effectively in 
same research project. Triangulation in this context is of essence in ensuring that both approaches 
complement each other in attaining the research objectives and logic. In doing this, however, 
emphasis is or may be placed on one of the methods, based on convictions, training and the 
nature of problems studied (Thomas 2003: 7; Strauss and Corbin 1990: 18).  
 Beyond the differences, in terms of paradigms and strengths and weaknesses of the 
qualitative and quantitative methods to the research, pragmatists hold the view that the two 
methods are alike in the fundamental values on which they are founded, including "beliefs in the 
value-ladenness of inquiry, belief that reality is multiple and constructed, [and] belief in the 
fallibility of knowledge" (Thomas 2003: 7; Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998: 13).   
  More importantly, in adopting the mixed-method for research, emphasis is usually placed 
on whether the method chosen can yield convincing answers to the questions that the 
investigation is intended to settle (Thomas 2003: 7). It equally circumvents the philosophical and 
paradigmatic boundaries, making it possible for the combination of research methods in search of 
explanation, understanding or solutions to research problems.  
 The mixed-method approach, from the above, looks feasible for this research in combining 
the quantitative and qualitative approaches to research, where hypotheses, theories and sampling 
techniques based on numbers could be employed. Nonetheless, emphasis on the chosen research 
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Table 1 above explains the ontological and epistemological approaches to research and 
the related research types or methods that correspond with these philosophical approaches. As 
demonstrated in the table above, in the exception of the positivist stance on the ontology and 
epistemology of inquiry which is objective, factual, independent, repetitive, deductive and 
falsifiable, those of the post-positivist, critical theorists and constructivist believe in the bias, 
fallibility and theory-laden nature of inquiry. The post-positivists, like the positivists, however 
believe in an objective reality, though not independent of the researcher, and the possibilities of 
making deductions.   
The critical theorists thus see linkages or interdependence between the reality (the object) 
and the researcher (subject) where observations made, based on induction, stem largely from 
actions and subjective interpretation, in contrast with that of positivists whose observation, based 
on deductions, inform established facts. Positivists, therefore, apply the specific to the general 
case, while critical theorists, like the constructivists, apply the general to the specific.   
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This study, given its qualitative nature, therefore adopted the critical theorist research paradigm 
as the best suited philosophical approach to the study given its socio-cultural interrogative and 
security dimensions.   
3.3.4 Research Strategy: Comparative Case Study Method  
The exploratory nature of the research requires using the comparative case study method 
as the main research strategy for data collection, analysis and reporting as it also presents the 
option to be complemented by other research methods like interviews, questionnaires, sampling 
and focus group discussion. Yin (2009a:18) defines a case study as “an empirical inquiry about a 
contemporary phenomenon… set within its real-world context – especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”. Of critical importance to this research 
strategy is its fundamental assumption that an understanding of the case under consideration is 
contingent upon the examination of the context and other complex conditions related to the 
case(s) (Yin: 2012:4).  
The comparison undertaken in the phenomena under investigation helped in two 
fundamental ways. The first, which encapsulates more of the traditional approach to cases, 
engages the compare and contrast logic in bringing out similarities and differences for lessons 
learned purposes, while the second focused more on the heuristic or discovery aspects of 
evolving phenomena through the tracing logic towards solving the research problem (Bartlett & 
Vavrus 2017: 6). The traditional approach is seen as more static, confined and deterministic 
within its context, while the comparative case study approach, in addition, gives more attention 
to complex issues including culture, context, space, place and even comparison within three axes 
which include the horizontal, vertical and transversal (Bartlett & Vavrus 2017: 14-15). It 
straddles state, sub-state and supranational spheres as well as entities and non-entities based on 
the process orientation or approach in which the real-world context is perceived in terms of 
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people, situations, events and the processes that connect these elements (Bartlett & Vavrus 2017: 
8; Maxwell 2013: 29).  
The comparative case study method made it easy to gather data, facilitate analysis and 
contribute largely towards solving the research problem as it examines security culture influences 
on security sector governance within its real-world context in the two different West African 
countries of Ghana and Nigeria (Guest et al 2013: 14). It also afforded the opportunity to 
undertake an in-depth study of both state and sub-state actors, while considering supranational 
perspectives within the security sector in the different contexts.  
Additionally, it favours data collection within natural settings, as compared to relying on 
“derived” data (Bromley 1986: 23; Yin 2012: 5). This approach contributes to knowledge about 
individuals, groups, organisations, social, political and related phenomena (Yin 2009: 4). This 
also conforms to the critical theorist’s approach to observing, interpreting and generating data as 
it “seeks to disrupt dichotomies, static categories, and taken-for-granted notions of what is going 
on” towards change and transformation (Bartlett & Vavrus 2017:10 in Heath & Street 2008).   
The comparative case study research, despite it practical and explorative nature, does 
have challenges. This method did not attain widespread recognition as a method of choice in the 
past, but that of a last resort, given its exploratory or heuristic nature, and the tendency to 
perceive it as a prelude - at the exploratory phase in data collection - for other methods of inquiry 
as mentioned earlier. It equally has a tendency of being construed as lacking the rigour, the trust 
and credibility owing to its subjective nature and the perception held that the researcher employs 
it to find what he or she intends to (Yin 2012: 5). It is also quite complicated and requires a lot of 
tact and expertise in the research planning, design, data collection, analysis and reporting or 
triangulation of findings.  
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That said, the strength in employing this method of research lies in the fact that it 
provided the chance to examine issues across various fields of discipline, and triangulate findings 
based on the multiple cases adopted. The emphasis here is not on objective findings towards 
predictable actions, but to gain knowledge and understanding of complex unpredictable human 
behaviour, and find ways of improving on this dynamics. And as a means of validation, it sought 
to push the fronts of perceived reality in order to accommodate and reflect contemporary or 
evolving trends in meeting the needs of actors and stakeholders in the security sector reform and 
governance field.  
In a nutshell, the comparative case study strategy or method afforded the opportunity to 
understand the behaviour of actors in the security sector and their approach to security 
governance, informed by their respective cultures. Additionally, the context, perception and 
dynamics of the actors and the sector was brought under closer scrutiny in order to understand 
complex relations and interactions within the sector, as well as make possible inferences towards 
a more acceptable and enhanced security governance of the sector. 
Figure 3.2 

















Source: Adapted from Yin, R.K. Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Sage   
                 Publications, Fourth Edition, Vol. 5, p.1, 2009. 
 
Figure 3.2 above depicts a comparative case study research undertaken in a linear but 
iterative way. This research method was planned and designed to facilitate the data collected in 
the field, complemented by other forms of data collection, including interviews, questionnaires 
and focus group discussions, Information was gathered, based on this approach, and analysed and 
shared as a result of findings and patterns that emerged from the field, while the other 
accompanying research methods facilitated triangulation and validity of research findings based 
on data collected. The comparative analysis was guided by taking a look at challenges posed by 
issues of complexity, acceptance and effectiveness of SSR/SSG and how progressive security 
culture indicators or elements circumvented or mitigated these challenges towards enhancing 
SSR/SSG in both countries.  
3.4 Research Methods  
Research methods relate basically to techniques or tools chosen to facilitate the 
acquisition of data from both primary and secondary sources. The tools employed for data 
collection in this study included sampling, interviews, questionnaires, focused group discussions 
and desk research.   
3.4.1 Sampling 
Sampling, as a research act, process or technique, entails the selection or choice of a 
suitable subset or part of a collective whole or of a population to be studied, and based on which 
inferences are made from the findings of the characteristics of the subset studied to represent the 
larger population (Mungo Fridah 2002: 1). The sampling types used for this qualitative research 
were chosen to afford flexibility and a pragmatic approach in relation to sample type and size, as 
well as being able to blend with other research techniques for data collection (Marshall 1996: 
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524). These are the purposive or judgmental, the stratified and the snowball samples (Crossman 
2014).   
  The purposive or judgmental sample makes possible the selection of a subset of a 
population based on the knowledge of that population and the purpose of the study (Crossman 
2014). The sample size chosen, thus, comprised three major categories of actors in the security 
sector. These are members of the executive and legislative arms of government, and civil society. 
Under the executive arm, specific attention was paid to government officials in the relevant 
ministries in charge of the security of the state and its people. The specific ministries were those 
of the interior and defence. The security agencies, including the military and the police, also fall 
under the executive as public service institutions. 
Under the legislative arm, select members of parliament serving on the defence and 
security committees formed part of the sample size while those within civil society comprised 
members of some security and governance-related non-governmental organisations (NGOs), in 
addition to some academicians and security experts. Some traditional leaders in the Southern and 
Northern sectors of both countries were also sampled, through interviews and focused group 
discussions where possible.  
 The stratified nature of the actors involved in this sample size necessitated a further  
division of the entire sample population into subgroups or strata, in order to make it possible to 
select samples within the specific subgroups (Mungo Fridah 2002: 8; Crossman 2014). Majority 
of these actors were identified based on institutional affiliation, thereby necessitating the use of 
the purposive sample type. There were, however, some other essential actors to this research who 
were not necessarily known, like civil society actors engaged in the fight against corruption as 
well as some vigilante actors, though falling in the groups identified above. As a result, the 
snowball sampling method was adopted to reach actors that were not known and difficult to 
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locate, particularly in the northern and southern parts of Nigeria where this study was 
undertaken.  
These individuals or groups were identified based on recommendations from persons or 
respondents interviewed, in order to ensure a fairly exhaustive list of the sample size. Sampling 
errors were not ruled out given the specific types of sampling employed for the study, and the 
tendency of bias, lack of adequate resources to reach the entire population size in the southern 
and northern sectors of Ghana and Nigeria, and inadequate information in some cases given the 
sensitive, confidential and covert nature of security issues. Another major flaw encountered in 
the course of the research, based on gender factors, was the low representation of women in the 
population sample size. This had to do specifically with two major factors. The first was the 
limited number of women directly involved in SSR/SSG activities in the security sector with the 
requisite knowledge or expertise, while the second had to do with the unavailability of those 
identified to be interviewed given other engagements at the time. Notwithstanding, the women 
representation in the focus group sessions was quite impressive and made up for those with 
expertise in the sector but were unable to be interviewed. The chosen sampling types, to a large 
extent, facilitated the coverage of core and remote actors in the field of security governance and, 
as a result, provided credible basis for adequate analysis and triangulation of findings towards 
induction and inference.  
3.4.2 Interviews  
Interviews are intended to facilitate in-depth interaction with individuals/groups for 
observation and the collection of detailed information on a subject. Interviews take the form of a 
conversation where the researcher undertakes in-depth probe to uncover new clues, explore new 
dimensions of a problem, and to ascertain a vivid, accurate and detailed accounts of personal 
experiences on a subject (Simkiss et al 2014: 201).   
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Three fundamental interview types were considered as options for this research. These are 
the structured, semi-structured and unstructured interview methods (Gill et al 2008: 291).  The 
structured interview entails verbally administering predetermined questionnaires with no scope 
for follow-up questions. This method of interview only allows for limited participant responses 
to questions. It was, therefore, of little use to in-depth study or research in this regard (Gill et al 
2008: 291).   
Unstructured interview, on the other hand, follows no logical or structured questions, but 
are based on initial general questions which serve as a starting point for further questions. The 
questions asked are not necessarily pre-conceived, and this method is employed where significant 
depth of a subject is required, or in cases where virtually nothing is known about the subject 
under study (Gill et al 2008: 291).   
The semi-structured interview comprises verbally administering several questions which 
may be predetermined or preconceived, but also allows for further follow up questions which 
provides the option for the interviewer or interviewee to diverge into other areas to provide more 
detail on a subject or topic under investigation. The flexibility of this method allows for further 
exploration and follow-up of issues for clarification purposes, as well as the gathering of more 
qualitative in-depth information or data for useful analysis (Gill et al 2008: 291). The semi-
structured data collection method, thus, served as the most useful and appropriate interview 
method for this research. The advantages of in-depth interviews conducted were that issues were 
thoroughly probed, clarifications sought, and sensitive information obtained (Simkiss et al 2014: 
201).   
The interviews were conducted with relevant government and civil society actors, 
including security experts and traditional leaders within the epistemic communities of culture, 
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security and governance. This afforded the opportunity of getting more precise and credible data 
for the research.   
The snow-balling approach was used, as mentioned earlier, in order to enable the 
researcher contact and engage with other relevant security actors who could have been possibly 
left out of the interviews. Community-based interviews, which focused on specific sampled 
individuals, mainly traditional leaders, within structured local/traditional security systems, were 
undertaken to ascertain the civilian perspective on culture and security sector governance 
processes.  And as mentioned earlier, all appointments with the few ladies recommended, 
particularly in Nigeria, did not hold as they were engaged in other activities during the course of 
field research. 
Hence in all, research and academic institutions like the Kofi Annan International 
Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Ghana and the University of Ghana, located at 
Legon, were visited to conduct interviews, in September 2015, with security experts and conduct 
desk research. Some members of the Select Committee on Defence and the Interior of the 
Parliament of Ghana were also interviewed to gain insight into oversight, transparency and 
accountability issues. A visit was also paid to the Ministry of the Interior that oversees many of 
the security agencies having responsibility over internal matters, including the police, 
immigration, customs, excise and preventive services, the prisons and fire service, to also 
conduct interviews.   
Former and current heads of military, police and intelligence agencies and units within 
these agencies were interviewed to seek their professional views and insight on the subject. From 
the international community side, arrangements were made with the UNDP and the British 
Department for International Development (DfID). Civil Society Organisations, including the 
Ghana Centre for Democratic Development (CDD), were also visited for research and 
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interviews. Visits were also paid to the northern and southern parts of Ghana to conduct focus 
group discussions among traditional and opinion leaders on endogenous security culture, 
mechanisms and practices.  
In Nigeria, the field research undertaken was equally divided into two major regions of 
North and South, including the Federal Capitol Territory (FCT) in Abuja and selected 
communities in Ogun State next to Lagos State. Academic institutions were also visited 
including Libraries and Tai Solarin University of Education, located in Ijebu Ode, to lecture, 
interview and also gather materials while on the field research. On the executive side, most of the 
officials interviewed opted to remain anonymous but some were from the Office of the Vice 
President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, retired senior military officers, civil society groups 
including Trust Africa Nigeria, an official from the British High Commission located in Abuja, 
the FCT, and Traditional leaders mainly in the Ijebu Ode and Ijebu Itele districts of Ogun State.  
A head of a vigilante group who opted to remain anonymous, given the nature of work he 
and his followers do also gave detailed accounts of their activities and collaboration with local 
government authorities and the police under the leadership and guidance of the traditional leaders 
in the respective communities.  
3.4.3 Questionnaires  
Questionnaires are considered as tools for collecting and recording information about a 
particular issue of interest (Corporate Research and Consultant Team). Burcu (2000: 2) identified 
two different types of questionnaires. These are the Mail and Self-Administered questionnaires. 
The Mail questionnaires are prepared questionnaires that are mailed to respondents, explaining 
the purpose and objectives of the questionnaire and the value to be derived from responses to the 
questions (Burcu 2000: 2). The Self-Administered questionnaires, on the other hand, are 
presented to the respondents by the researcher or a person so identified in an official capacity 
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(Burcu 2000: 2). The researcher explains the purpose of the questionnaire and leaves the 
respondent to respond to the questions. Completed questionnaires may be collected later or sent 
by the respondents. The advantage of this method lies in it being less bias, accurate sampling, 
possible high response rate and providing explanations for better clarity as compared to the self-
administered questionnaire (Burcu 2000: 2).   
The questionnaires to be administered could also be structured or unstructured. Structured 
questionnaires are usually associated with quantitative research which deals mainly with 
numbers, and which focuses, among others, on knowing how many of, how often about, and how 
satisfied is a researcher with an event or a phenomenon (Corporate Research and Consultant 
Team online). Structured questionnaires also go mainly with closed-ended questions, which are 
usually conclusive in approach, and limits respondents to a yes’ or ‘no’ answer or alternatives 
being offered (Reja et al 2003: 161; Foddy 1993: 127). The unstructured questionnaires, on the 
other hand, are more exploratory in nature and are more associated with qualitative research 
which goes with open-ended questions. The open-ended questions give room for respondents to 
answer questions without any influence from the researcher (Reja et al 2003: 161; Foddy 1993: 
127).  
 The open-ended questions were, thus, adopted in crafting the questionnaires and in 
facilitating a more in-depth or detailed responses to questions. This elicited responses related to 
behavioural patterns, personal experiences and opinions, beliefs and practices, as well as 
exploring new dimensions of the subject under research. Questionnaires were therefore designed 
to facilitate answers to questions by relevant actors who could not have the time to grant an 
interview, or prefer responding to questions through questionnaires particularly in Nigeria. It was 
also employed for data collection due to limited time and/or lack of adequate resources to cover a 
wider section of the populace within which the actors resided. These questionnaires were 
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designed with open-ended questions to allow flexible responses and gather detailed information 
for analysis.  
 General questions guided interviews and focused group discussions held to establish the 
existence, particularly, of endogenous security cultures and their positive or negative influence 
on governance of the security sector, but were equally nuanced to understand and capture the 
different contexts and dynamics in the different countries. Emphasis was placed on which 
indigenous values, norms and standards guided governance processes in addressing security 
threats or challenges in the communities, localities or the country under consideration, and how 
relationships were managed with regard to the interface between these different and varied 
cultures in addressing security needs in respective countries. Follow up questions also came up in 
various forms depending on responses and the need for further clarification or suggestion to 
address challenges.  
Specific questions were also posed in both countries with regard to drafting national 
security policies to give a comprehensive framework to security in the national interest, agree on 
common and diverse threats to the people and the state, and define national strategies and 
implementation plans to address them.  
3.4.4 Focus Group Discussions  
Focus group is considered as a special type of group based on its purpose, size and 
composition, formed to assess needs, encourage interventions, explore or generate new or a range 
of ideas on a subject or research area (Simkiss et al 2014: 202-203). In this group, “collective 
conversations” are held with focus on collective activities (Liamputtong 2011: 3; Kamberelis and 
Dimitriadis 2008: 375; Kitzinger 2005: 56). Ideas gathered or generated from this group 
discussion could provide background information gathered for designing more structured 
questionnaires. A focus group generally comprises six to eight individuals sharing certain 
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characteristics that are relevant to an ongoing research. Focus group discussions are organised in 
order to obtain information on participants’ beliefs and perceptions on a subject or topic of 
interest (Simkiss et al 2014:203; Gill et al 2008: 293).   
Focus groups are considered to be appropriate for capturing and exploring the depth and 
nuances of opinions with respect to an issue; understanding differences in perspectives or 
opinions; understand factors that influence opinions or behaviour; and learn more about actors or 
participants by observing their interactions (Education, Training and Research (ETA) Associates 
2014).  
The focus group discussions were adopted to help gather more detailed information, 
clarify issues, refine observations made, contrast diverse views, as well as help triangulate 
research findings. These discussions were held mainly with traditional leaders in Ghana, 
including several queen mothers and women opinion leaders, who were very much open to this 
form of discussion in the northern and southern sectors of the region, including Sunyani in the 
Brong Ahafo Region and Abutia Kloe in the Volta Region, on what constitutes security, 
governance and probable positive cultural influences to enhance these concepts. This helped in 
getting different and diverse insights or perspectives within groups with similar backgrounds.  
The situation was much different in Nigeria as the traditional leaders interviewed 
preferred being interviewed from their homes or palaces on one-on-one basis. The researcher 
was, however, accompanied by two academics from the university, a male and female, to 
facilitate interactions based on culture and protocols. They equally participated in discussions 
which contributed to enriching the data gathered.  
Information gathered reinforced desk researches carried out and facilitated the collation 
and analysis of data. The epistemic community played a major role in the collection of data, as 
well as beneficiaries of security services.  
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3.5 Data Sources 
With regard to the primary sources of data, official documents from government 
ministries were reviewed to gain insight into government policies and practices on security sector 
reform and governance processes, especially within the executive and legislative arms of 
government. Newspaper articles and available journals with first-hand information on the subject 
were also accessed.   
Secondary sources of data were gathered from published or unpublished articles in 
various books, journals, newspapers, numerous libraries and bookshops in Ghana and Nigeria, 
and the internet among others. Again, other relevant actors, as mentioned above, with second-
hand information and the grasp of cultural and security sector governance issues, were also 
interviewed or accessed for relevant information and collection of data. All these were 
complemented with desk research gathered from the internet, books and journal articles among 
other sources. 
3.6 Triangulation  
Triangulation in research plays an important role in establishing the validity or certainty of 
research findings, by confirming the accuracy of the situation reflected in the findings, and to the 
extent that these findings are evidence-based (Guion et al 2011). In essence, triangulation is 
considered as a method used in qualitative research to check and establish the validity of a study 
being conducted through the analysis of a research question from multiple perspectives (Guion et 
al 2011; Patton 2002).   
 The complex nature of security sector governance, reflected in multiple and diverse actors, 
varied cultural influences, the fusion of security cultures and its impact on decision-making 
processes as individuals and groups, require the collection of accurate or valid data in order to 
make the findings more credible. This necessitated using more than one research method to 
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investigate the research question, in order to enhance confidence in the findings (Bryman's 2004: 
1-3; Denzin 1970). This, in effect, also minimised the uncertainty of the interpretations based on 
two or more independent measurement processes (Bryman 2004: 1; Webb et al 1966).  
 Two different types of triangulation were employed. These are data triangulation and 
methodological triangulation (Bryman 2004: 2; Denzin 1970). In the data triangulation approach, 
data was gathered through several sampling strategies already identified, covering different 
actors at different times in different social contexts (Bryman 2004: 2; Denzin 1970). 
Methodological triangulation, on the other hand entailed using the different data collection 
techniques including interviews, questionnaires and focus group discussions to collect or gather 
data, in an attempt to establish some commonalities or variance.  
 In doing the triangulation, care was taken to avoid the tendency of hurriedly jumping to 
conclusion on findings, given that the points of convergence of the different methods or sampling 
strategies adopted in this research were not necessarily conclusive of a valid or credible data as 
some assertions were perceived to be flawed. Notwithstanding, and based on the qualitative 
approach adopted for the study, points of convergence, similarity of opinions or commonalities 
contributed to the identification of some key concepts for categorisation and codification. 
Differences in findings, however, provided options for further inquiry in ascertaining the root 
cause of the variance. That said, and based on the critical theorist approach to research and 
triangulation, findings based on security culture influences or non-influence on security sector 
reform and governance in Ghana and Nigeria respectively were not taken as the absolute truth.  
3.7 Research Analysis  
Research analysis basically “brings conceptual order to observed experience” (Daly 2007: 
209). The analysis entails subjecting social reality to closer scrutiny in an attempt to "identify 
patterns and uniformities" which is considered as nomothetic (Daly 2007: 212; Crotty, 1998). On 
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other hand, research analysis is also undertaken to identify the uniqueness and variability of 
individual behaviour referred to as idiographic (Daly 2007: 212). So, while nomothetic relates 
more to the quantitative research methods, the idiographic deals more with the qualitative 
approach and case study method. This research, which focuses on different actors and varied 
cultural traits, perceptions and needs, thus, adopted the idiographic approach, with emphasis on 
trends, patterns, uniformities, uniqueness and variations in behaviour. This approach is, however, 
not mutually exclusive from that of the nomothetic as they complement each other in various 
ways.  
 In essence, the analysis phase of this research, which more or less covered all phases of 
the research work, transformed raw data gathered through the various research methods in the 
field into new knowledge based on findings generated. Hence reading, understanding and 
interpreting the data gathered formed an essential part of the research analysis based upon which 
what constitute social reality is inferred through the process of induction (Thorne 2000: 68-70). 
The process of induction relates mainly to generating ideas or using the ideational approach to 
data interpretation, based on which the meaning of a phenomenon could be uncovered or 
deconstructed (Thorne 2000: 68-70). In doing this, emphasis was placed more on why something 
happened rather than how it happened.  
 From the ontological, epistemological and theoretical perspectives, the analysis 
undertaken in this research was considered as constituting the critical component that bridges the 
gap between what is perceived as social reality and what is known or understood as such, based 
mainly on subjective interpretations (Mauthner and Doucet 2003: 415).  In doing this, the data 
gathered in the field focused on the what, how and why of social experiences of security sector 
governance in both Ghana and Nigeria. This was intended to depict the nature of what exists, and 
further interpret how security cultural influences could make governance better or worse. This 
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facilitated inferences made with regard to the importance of culture and its potential influence on 
enhancing security sector governance amidst complexity and making security sector reform 
acceptable.   
This was done through a combination of the perspectives or viewpoints of both the 
participants and the researcher known respectively as the emic and etic focus of induction (Scuhtt 
2012: 322; Daly 2007: 212-213, Denzin & Lincoln 2003: 1-45; Fetterman 1998; Guest et al 
2013: 11-12).  
The issue of reflexivity was, as a result, given prominence based on interpretations made 
from “a particular background and set of values [of the researcher] and not simply based on the 
situation itself” (Scuhtt 2012: 333; Altheide and Johnson 1994: 485-499). This underscores the 
assertion that “Researchers are only human, after all, and must rely on their own senses and 
process all information through their minds” (Scuhtt 2012: 332-333; Altheide and Johnson 
1994). Reflexivity, in this regard, was essential for drawing meaningful or qualitative 
conclusions for the research. In doing this, the positive values and norms being practiced in the 
security sector were reinforced, while those necessitating a relook and change in approach were 
equally given prominence.  
 Some analytical strategies were adopted in the course of analysis, including the constant 
comparative analysis - which involves the comparison of similar or different data gathered 
towards conceptualisation (Thorne 2000); narrative analysis - which "displays the goals and 
intentions of human actors; it makes individuals, cultures, societies, and historical epochs 
comprehensible as wholes” (Schutt 2012: 339); and discourse analysis – which emphasises 
uncovering societal influences underlying behavioural and thought patterns (Thorne 2000).   
These analytic strategies were adopted to facilitate the coding, categorisation, themes or 
concepts and probable theories (Schutt 2012: 328). Put differently, content analysis of data 
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gathered through interviews, questionnaires and focus group discussions involved coding and 
classification of data, or categorising and indexing, with the aim to making sense of the data 
collected, and highlighting the important features, messages or findings that emerged (University 
of Surrey online).  
 The security sector comprises different actors and institutions with diverse roles and 
responsibilities informed by different beliefs and practices. It is also multi-sectoral as it involves 
different ministries, some of which are not core security institutions but, playing very important 
and relevant roles. Hence an analysis of this sector was undertaken in the context of a security 
system in which the actors were mapped out in relation to the other, by looking at how relations 
between their beliefs and practices can help positively impact an enhanced and effective 
governance within a hybrid context (Stroh 2015: 1-91; Meadows 2009: 1-202).  
With regard to security cultural influences – aimed at minimisation of the complexity and 
clarification of the SSR/SSG concept, the focus was on exploring avenues for imbibing or 
adopting the right security culture values and attitudes, and generally undertaking sensitisation on 
the security terrain towards acceptance and improved governance of the sector. Hence security 
culture provided a general framework for analysis. This made possible a theoretical proposition 
on demystification of a complex security sector, and engendering recognition and acceptance of 
reform, as well as change and transformation towards enhanced SSG in countries in transition in 
West Africa and beyond.   
 In a nutshell, the research analysis began right from the selection of a research topic 
through the data collection and analysis phases to writing the research report.  
3.8 Theoretical Proposition  
This research made the proposition that shared norms and values on safety, protection and 
freedom from fear, influence the acceptance and commitment towards security sector reform and 
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governance efforts, hence imbibing the appropriate security cultural values, norms and practices 
by both state and sub-state actor groups, would ensure the needed change and transformation 
towards successful SSR/SSG processes in West Africa.  
3.9 Justification of Methodology 
 Planning and designing this research required careful selection and application of research 
approaches, strategies and methods to facilitate appropriate data collection, analysis and 
validation of findings. This informed the choice of the research methodology above in 
conducting this qualitative research through the comparative case study strategy in Ghana and 
Nigeria. Several reasons accounted for this choice.   
Firstly, the research being undertaken is largely exploratory in nature, and to an extent 
descriptive or narrative. Hence adopting a quantitative or mixed-method approach to guide the 
research design and methodology in the collection and interpretation of data, would not totally 
serve the purpose of subjecting security cultural norms, values, behaviour and attitudes to 
adequate scrutiny. More importantly, some level of subjectivity or bias from the researcher was 
required in the interpretation of data, as well as interdependence between the researcher and the 
social reality or phenomena investigated. These facilitated finding an appropriate solution to the 
research problem.   
Secondly, the research, as mentioned above, was heavily dependent on values, norms and 
behavioural patterns of the different state and sub-state actors within the security sector. The 
culture/security culture of these actors were predictable in some cases, based on institutional 
arrangements and dynamics, but also unpredictable in some cases given cultural differences, the 
tendency to adopt hybrid forms of culture, evolving security and governance dynamics, as well 
as the ideational, ethnographic and phenomenological tendencies inherent in these norms, values 
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and decision-making processes. These characteristics required adopting a qualitative approach to 
the research.  
Thirdly, this research attempts to understand and explain why certain phenomena exist 
the way they are, including norms, values and behavioural patterns. This provided the basis for 
drawing lessons and proposing probable changes, based on inferences and inductions, towards 
transforming the security sector. Doing this also required adopting not only a qualitative 
approach to the research, but also using the comparative case study method for analysis. This 
made it easy to, not only compare and contrast but also, facilitate the tracing logic in 
understanding developments in their real-world context. Based on this, major patterns emerged 
and served as a basis for theorising the future conduct of enhanced security sector governance in 
transitional and other societies in West Africa. The qualitative approach equally proved useful in 
highlighting untapped potentials within the cultural and traditional settings of indigenous sub-
state actors in various communities, and its positive impact on the security sector as a whole in 
respective countries.   
 Last but not least, the theories adopted for analysis in this research are meant to provide 
adequate framework for critiquing the status quo and conducting thorough and systemic analysis 
of the security sector, its actors and governance processes towards positive change and 
transformation. In effect, the qualitative research method was employed in this inquiry, based on 
highly unpredictable social phenomena, which also necessitated a subjective and biased 
interpretation of social reality, leading to possible inferences and inductive conclusions. This 
qualitative approach facilitated the interpretivist approach to the data collection, precisely 
because issues related to culture are dynamic and ethnological in nature, and thus requires 
flexible qualitative methods. The identification of actors and sampling of data might have some 
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quantitative attributes in ensuring adequate sampling and data collection. Notwithstanding, the 
emphasis was more on the qualitative than the quantitative or mixed-method of research.  
3.10 Research Ethics  
Ethics in research is considered largely as established norms for conduct which helps in 
distinguishing acceptable behaviour from the unacceptable. Put differently, ethics could also be 
considered as a method, procedure or perspective that guides decision-making on how to act, and 
for analysing complex problems and issues (Resnik 2011). Maintaining high ethical standards in 
research is essential in ensuring that studies undertaken follow acceptable rules and regulations, 
while respecting the rights of privacy and confidentiality of other researchers, officials and 
participants, among others, to be engaged in the process (Smith 2003: 56).  
Determining what is acceptable and unacceptable, or right and wrong, is usually subject 
to all manner of controversies or disputes as decisions to be made in this regard could be largely 
subjective or interpreted differently in relation to differences in values and individual life 
experiences. Upholding the right ethical standards in research is necessary for the protection of 
intellectual property rights, ensuring the credibility of research, protect sources and 
confidentiality of facts, and avoid falsifying facts, misrepresentation of data and error in research 
which could have dire consequences (Resnik 2011: 2).  
Hence in undertaking this research, ethical principles and requirements in the fields of 
academia, human rights and general social responsibility were taken into consideration in 
ensuring an accurate, credible and acceptable gathering and generation of data towards useful 
analysis and findings in meeting the objective and rationale of the research. Approval was sought 
from the academic institution enrolled in on the basis of meeting ethical standards before 
conducting the research. This process outlined specific requirements which were followed in the 
field in gathering data based on approved ethical standards. Some of these ethical principles 
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include honesty, objectivity, integrity, openness, respect for intellectual property, confidentiality, 
and non-discrimination among others (Resnik 2011:2-4.).    
The application of these principles proved useful and formed the basis for conducting a 
credible, trustworthy and acceptable research which took cognisance of respect of actors engaged 
in the field, as well as preceding works done in this research area. Indeed, the security sector 
does not only engage various actors, but predisposes these actors to varied forms of high security 
risks. Hence the protection of sources of information and human rights, ensuring confidentiality, 
as well as the respect of different cultural norms, values, belief systems, and opinions or 
perspectives proved vital in acquiring open, frank, objective and useful data for the research.  
3.11 Limitations  
The study faced some limitations given the sensitive nature of issues on security, culture 
and governance. The sensitive nature of data required for the thesis partly hindered collection of 
data, owing to some security personnel, diplomatic officials and international partners refusing or 
not willing to divulge information. Request for confidentiality by some research participants who 
provided very useful and relevant information limited the provision of data. Professional 
networks within the security agencies and institutions, however, provided some way out for the 
collection of data, while respecting ethical considerations surrounding gatekeeping (Bound 
2012). Gender representation in the security sector was also quite limited and in cases where 
contacts were made for interviews for those identified in the field, particularly in Nigeria, they 
were unavailable for diverse reasons. This might have been purely co-incidental, given many 
different engagements ongoing at the time the study was conducted. This notwithstanding, the 
snow-balling approach to data collection proved useful.  
The security situation, particularly in the middle belt and north-eastern part of Nigeria 
continues to deteriorate, and is generally in a state of flux, given the activities of the terrorist 
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group 'Boko Haram', and the farmer-herder disputes across the country. This posed difficulties 
for field work owing to the risk involved in visiting these areas.   
Limited resources equally hindered a wide coverage and focus of the field work. 
Sampling and collection of data was, thus, restricted to reasonably optimal cases, taken into 
consideration the North-South divide in both countries of Ghana and Nigeria.  
3.12 Conclusion  
This chapter sought to outline the research design and methodology of the study by 
providing an appropriate framework for undertaking research through the adoption of the right 
research methodology, the collection and analysis of relevant data of the study, as well as cater 
for limitations and constraints. It gave consideration to the philosophical underpinnings of this 
research; the research approach to data collection; and the method of analysis and presentation of 
findings. These were mainly based on the critical theorist research paradigm and the qualitative 
research approach to the explanation of the ontological and epistemological issues under 
consideration. The study also employed the comparative case study strategy in its inquiry, while 
conducting semi-structured/one-on-one interviews by using open-ended questionnaires, and also 
through focus group discussions to gather data. The primary and secondary methods of data 
collection through policy documents and papers, journals, books, newspapers and desk research 
among others, facilitated adequate data collection for the study.   
The comparative case study approach adopted in the gathering of data in Ghana and 
Nigeria also proved useful in the comparative analysis of findings in the field and a better 
understanding and explanation of phenomena, while the different methods of data collection 
helped in the triangulation of trends and patterns in the field towards a theoretical proposition 
based on the grounded theory approach.  
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This research methodology was adopted in order to ensure that the right participants in 
this research were identified, as well as appropriate research methods adopted to gather, interpret 








SECURITY CULTURE AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE IN WEST AFRICA  
4.1 Introduction  
Security sector reform (SSR), and for that matter security sector governance (SSG), has 
gained increased attention in the past decade within the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS); a region confronted with diverse security challenges. These challenges, 
commonly referred to as transnational or cross-border crimes, include small arms trafficking, 
narcotics or drug trafficking, human trafficking, intra-state conflicts, terrorism and recently 
piracy (UNODC 2013: 1-62; Addo 2005: 1-71; and Addo 2006: 1-23). All these security 
challenges have undermined the security of ECOWAS countries and its population, resulting in 
displacement, deaths and destruction of properties among other things.   
In addition to all these challenges, bad governance practices, including unconstitutional 
changes in government, exclusion in decision-making processes and the sharing of wealth, 
corruption, and the promotion of regime interest rather than the interest of the citizens and the 
state, have also resulted in political instability and unstable democracies in the region (Bryden et 
al 2008: 4, 12-22; and Bryden and Chappuis 2015). All these have contributed to undermining 
statebuilding processes in the region and beyond.  
These security challenges, among several others, have necessitated responses requiring 
changes in approach to addressing them; the need for reorientation of attitudes, and the adoption 
of appropriate security cultures towards reform and transformation. In the process, regional 
security frameworks have evolved towards putting in place governance structures and 
implementation mechanisms to address these issues. These frameworks have largely gravitated 
from the regime-centred to human-centred approaches to addressing security issues, laying 
emphasis on addressing the needs and welfare of community citizens. These frameworks include 
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the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework 2008; ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on 
Democracy and Good Governance 2001; and the ECOWAS Policy Framework on Security 
Sector Reform and Governance 2016.   
Despite the existence of these useful security frameworks, mechanisms and processes, 
challenges still persist in the reform and governance of security within the ECOWAS region. 
These challenges are reflected mainly in terms of the lack of comprehension of the security 
sector reform/governance concept, given its complexity, colonial legacies, including the 
Francophone, Anglophone and Lusophone divide, diverse security culture practices despite 
common community security arrangements, and the ineffective implementation of security 
frameworks and mechanisms in member states.  
Given these developments, the need arises for a review of normative, legal and 
governance arrangements put in place so far in West Africa to address (in) security issues, and to 
establish to what extent regional security culture has influenced or enhanced security governance 
in the region. The term ‘security culture’ is used here to reflect shared values, norms and 
principles adopted or used to address or combat threats in the ECOWAS region. In doing this, 
notions of ideation, which gives room for departure from perceived norms and values, as well as 
reflexivity which presumes the translation of regional norms and values to the national context, 
are assessed. Some good and bad practices are equally highlighted in the context of positive and 
negative influences of security culture on security governance practices. This provided options to 
improve upon SSR/SSG processes towards possible transformation of the SSR/SSG concept in 
the ECOWAS region and beyond.   
More importantly, ways of engendering an appropriate mix or hybrid indigenous and 
acquired security cultures in security sector governance are highlighted. This is intended to 
provide the background or context for looking at the comparative case studies of Ghana and  
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Nigeria towards establishing ways in which security culture has contributed or could contribute 
to enhancing SSG for a secure and transformed region, capable of meeting the security needs of 
ECOWAS citizens and its Member States.  
4.1.1 The Evolution of Security Culture in West Africa   
4.1.1.1 Pre-Colonial Era 
West Africa, and for that matter the rest of Africa, went through a period of colonisation 
under western influences from the late 1870s to 1960. The colonisers sought to have a presence 
in Africa to help them establish institutions for exploitation of natural resources, tap the vast 
amount of existing labour to facilitate their objectives, and use systems of taxation to sustain 
their imperialist objectives in the continent (Gann and Duignan 1969; and Adu Boahene 1985). 
Colonial rule eventually became possible through military conquest and the signing of treaties 
which, to an extent, also revealed the level of resistance to imperialism on the continent (Adu 
Boahene 1985: 31-44, 114).   
The colonisation of the continent introduced ‘western’ or the so-called ‘modern’ cultures 
that had some similarities and differences with pre-existing indigenous traditional cultures in pre-
colonial times. This western culture, no doubt, impacted both negatively and positively on 
political, security, economic and social conditions and systems in place upon its introduction.  
Indeed, various scholars have differed on the impact, be it positive or negative, of colonialism in 
Africa, particularly in the context of its influences on the culture and traditions of indigenous 
societies. Ajayi (1968:196-197; and in Adu Boahene 1985: 44) for example argued that:   
the most fundamental aspect of the European impact was the loss 
of sovereignty… once a people lose their sovereignty, and they are 
exposed to another culture, they lose at least a little of their self-
confidence and self-respect; they lose their right of self-steering, 
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their freedom of choice as to what to change in their own culture 
or what to copy or reject from the culture.   
As illustrated by Ajayi above, prior to colonisation of the continent of Africa, Africans 
had pre-existing cultures, including security cultures, that informed and regulated their way of 
life, as well as  guaranteed, to a large extent, their safety and minimisation of threat in their 
kingdoms, chiefdoms and communities. Before 1880, about 80% of the African continent was 
ruled by kings, queens, clan and lineage heads in empires, kingdoms and communities (Adu 
Boahene 1985:1). Also as a typical indigenous, traditional and developing society, it had well 
organised security communities in which the traditional leaders discussed and put in measures 
and mechanisms to safeguard the safety or security of their people and communities (CHRI 
2007: 10).   
Political organisation of society was done based on lineages or at the clan or village level, 
while indigenous African political systems and institutions that facilitated governance were based 
largely on kinship and common ancestry (Martin 2012: 11). Roles and responsibilities were 
ascribed to the various actors in the community based on either democratic or consultative 
governance systems, or dictatorial exigencies. In addition to palace guards and informants in the 
king’s palace and the communities, these kingdoms and chiefdoms had armies and vigilante 
groups that guaranteed the security and safety of individuals in the towns and villages, creating a 
conducive environment for undertaking development activities within the communities (Umar 
and Bappi 2014: 11; and Rotimi 2001 ).   
These traditional systems of governance did not only prove useful to clans, chiefdoms 
and communities, but also suited the cultural context and environment in addressing their 
political, security, socio-economic and other vital needs towards their survival. Hence Africans, 
despite the evolution and emergence of post-colonial systems of governance, characterised by 
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western institutions and practices, continue to recognise the traditional forms of governance and 
largely adhere to its norms and values, which sometimes contradict those of the modern systems 
(UNECA 2007: 1).   
Two main types of African traditional institutions of governance existed in pre-colonial 
times. These were classified into decentralised and centralised systems of governance (UNECA 
2007: 3-5). The decentralised systems were largely based on consensual decision-making 
arrangements with variations from one place to another. This system sought to curb the 
concentration of power in an individual or institution, while doing away with hierarchical power 
relations (UNECA 2007:3; Leggesse 2000; 1973). In the context of dispute resolution for 
instance, differences were resolved in a win-win manner as opposed to a win-lose situation, with 
emphasis on negotiations (UNECA 2007: 3; and Martin 2012: 17). This system equally focused 
on individual views and rights as against opinions of the majority, in which case an individual 
had the right to veto decisions or opinions of the majority (UNECA 2007: 3).   
Despite these rights enjoyed by individuals, they were equally entreated to respect the 
wishes and interests of the community through compromises or else face isolation in some 
instances. This arrangement helped to prevent conflicts between minorities and majority 
segments of society and, more importantly, reinforces the modern day human security concept of 
accommodating individual, community and state security needs. A setback to this system of 
traditional governance lies mainly in the time consuming nature of consensus-building towards 
decision-making processes. Examples of this type of governance system were found in some 
parts of eastern Nigeria, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Zambia (UNECA 2007: 3).  
The centralised system entailed empowering kings or monarchs with varying degrees of 
power, be it absolute in a dictatorial sense or limited with checks and balances by other actors or 
institutions, for governance (UNECA 2007: 4; Beattie, 1967; Osaghae 1989: 53-75; & Busia 
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1968). In traditional institutions with checks and balances for example, provisions were made 
through customary laws based on traditions and customs empowering council of elders, 
traditional priests and opinion leaders, among several others, to hold traditional leaders 
accountable for their decisions (Busia 1968; Coplan 1997: 27-60; and Martin 2012:12).   
Community residents also wielded some significant level of influence as a collective 
action towards a despotic leader, and could sometimes reverse or change some decisions not in 
favour of the people. The centralised system was thus characterised by some levels of 
dictatorships and some level of democracy and accountability. Accountability in this system was, 
however, construed as a bit weak given the combination of executive and judicial powers by 
kings or monarchs. In addition, some members serving on the council of elders owed some form 
of allegiance to these traditional leaders or to be relatives (UNECA 2007:4).  
The above illustration indeed negates the assertion that prior to the arrival of Europeans 
on the shores of Africa, the continent was static and bereft of any kind of evolution or transition 
towards modern trends of civilisation (Afigbo 1985: 487).  
4.1.1.2 Colonial Era  
Between 1890 and 1910, the continent experienced rapid changes, characterised by its 
conquest and occupation by imperial powers. By 1914, however, the whole of the continent did 
not only come under European influence, but was subjected to European rule. New systems of 
administration and governance were introduced, as efforts by Africans to maintain their 
sovereignty and independence failed (Gueye and Adu Boahene 1985: 138). Centralised forms of 
colonial rule were thus established for the retention of legislative authority in metropolitan areas, 
in which we had Governors who were more or less sovereign, but reported to His Majesty’s 
government; and consultative councils representing commercial interests that played more of an 
advisory role.   
120 
 
At the district or provincial level, we had European Administrators who represented the 
interest of the colonisers, while local Chiefs, as African component of the governance structure, 
were also elected to facilitate the ‘indirect rule’ within occupied territories (Crowder 1985: 317).    
The indirect rule in this regard was construed as a conjunctive administration in Africa; “that 
which joined African authorities, in traditionally-held or European-imposed political roles, to the 
colonial government, but in an obviously subordinate capacity” (Crowder 1985: 315). This, 
according to a former colonial Governor, Lord Lugard, was necessary as institutions and 
methods would only command success and promote happiness and welfare of the people if they 
are deeply-rooted in their traditions and prejudices (1929: 211; and Asiwaju 1985: 315& 318).   
In furtherance of this objective, George Léyguès (1906: 1, in Asiwaju 1985: 315) 
reinforced the indirect rule approach by stating that “The fundamental principle of our colonial 
policy must be scrupulous respect for the beliefs, habits and traditions of the conquered or 
protected peoples”. This statement was quite instructive to the extent that it showed the need for 
the recognition of the role of traditional or indigenous institutions in facilitating the acceptance 
and effectiveness of foreign policies rather than its forceful imposition on citizens or 
governments. However, it fell short for its imperialist motives and tendencies.   
Hence direct rule was largely restricted to the coastal areas where it was considered 
feasible with a fairly dominant presence, as compared to the hinterland areas, where the colonial 
presence was quite limited and required some traditional leadership to facilitate colonial 
objectives through the so-called ‘native policy’, albeit forcefully (Delavignette 1946: 121; Betts  
1972 and Asiwaju 1985: 317). The term ‘native’ was employed surreptitiously to qualify the 
European policy at the time in order to portray an African dimension towards its acceptability 
and implementation. This was based on the general perception; both in theory and practice, that 
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colonial rule could only take place effectively through the use of indigenous personnel and 
institutions in a complementary and supportive fashion (Betts 1972 and Asiwaju 1985: 312).   
Herein lies the proposition for hybridism, not in a neo-colonial context but rather with 
recognition for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of African states to own their policies, 
determine their direction, and lead through prudent and inclusive governance systems to achieve 
them. The notion of this hybridism must be underpinned by sound indigenous and exogenous 
principles, norms and values in order to circumvent its challenges in a contemporary world.  
Indeed, the introduction of this new colonial administrative system was geared towards 
the exploitation of economic resources, labour, collection of tax, as well as the establishment of 
authoritarian rule to facilitate the imperial motive. Colonialism thus became the bane of Africa, 
especially between 1880 and 1935. This development “represented an assault on established 
cultures” (Adu Boahene 1985: 1). It was equally construed as “… overthrowing a whole ancient 
world of beliefs and ideas and an immemorial way of life” (Adu Boahene 1985: 3). The 
emergence and entrenchment of colonialism and its systemic imperatives on the continent, no 
doubt, introduced new cultures and different ways of doing things which affected indigenous 
political, economic, security, religious and social ways of life.  
On the security front, already established indigenous security systems in the pre-colonial 
era had to accommodate or be subsumed under newly introduced western political and security 
arrangements. The major or initial area of influence was in the area of security governance and 
policing, given the need to ensure the safety and protection of colonial officials, exploited 
resources, and a stable and peaceful environment for trade. In the case of Ghana, for example, the 
Ghanaian traditional society had in place notions of policing meant to promote and protect 
cultural values and democratic ethos of the state or polity (CHRI 2007: 10). This social 
mechanism was disrupted with the emergence of colonialism and replaced by the “Colonial 
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Police Model”, designed to advance and protect the colonial interest as against the rights of those 
colonised (CHRI 2007: 10; Appiagyei-Atua 2006: 8). Hence, the designs of the imperial powers 
to subdue, exploit, control and profit from resources on the continent largely gave rise to 
authoritarian or dictatorial methods or means of ensuring peace, security and stability on the 
continent.  
With time, particularly in the post-colonial or independence era, western security 
practices were introduced side by side the traditional indigenous ones, which eventually 
constituted the basis for the establishment of modern security architecture and their dynamics. 
These practices dominated and influenced contemporary security mechanisms and practices, 
despite co-existing with the traditional ones in Africa, and for that matter a globalised world. The 
introduction of these colonial security practices were essentially meant to “ensure the protection 
of colonial officials; maintain peace and security necessary for economic exploitation through the 
production and trade in agricultural and mineral resources and manufactured goods; and to 
generally enforce the “rule of law” to various political and economic ends” (Atuguba 2003:2). 
This phenomenon led to the contentious development between tradition and modernity, in which 
indigenous security practices were subsumed and sometimes ignored to the advantage of modern 
security cultural practices, which made its acceptance and effectiveness sometimes difficult.  
4.1.1.3 Cold War Era  
The Cold War which spanned a period of about half a century, right after the Second 
World War in 1945, was bi-polar in nature and was fought on ideological and geo-strategic 
grounds between the United States of America (USA) and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR). On the ideological front, the USA pursued policies based on capitalism 
(Meltzer 2012: 3-31) – which subjects itself to the dictates of free market with private ownership 
of property or resources for production – while the USSR pursued policies aligned with 
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communism (Brown 2009: 1-618) – where property is owned by the public or community based 
on control from the state. The major focus for this ‘bloodless’ war was in Europe, reinforced by 
victories of these two powerful states in the Second World War. Notwithstanding, the influence 
and ramifications of the Cold War, or better still the ‘battle’ or competition between the two 
powerful allied states in Europe at the time, were felt across the globe (Painter and Leffler 2005: 
1).   
` The US, for instance, seeing that communism was gaining grounds the world over with the 
Soviet’s determined motive for world  domination, embarked on the Marshall Plan, an economic 
initiative towards the reconstruction of Europe, as a means of gaining and maintaining control 
over Western European states (Hogan 1987: 1-445). The USSR equally concentrated, first and 
foremost, on gaining influence and control over territories in Eastern Europe while promoting its 
geostrategic objectives. All these activities were basically geared towards maintaining power and 
control through access to weapons of mass destruction and resources (Leffler and Painting 2005: 
58-87). Other African states also made decisions to remain non-aligned to any of the two power 
blocs or superpowers which led to the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) which, 
in effect, was considered as a ‘Third World” response to the Cold War (Arnold 2006: xxv)   
All these activities reinforced a ‘westernised’ security culture on the continent of Africa, 
as de-colonisation and the assumption of sovereignty by independent African states made these 
states to practice an acquired security culture passed on by colonisers. Davidson (1992: 10) 
construed events after colonialism as nationalism metamorphosing into nation-statism. The 
acquired colonial practice of control and subjugation of the populace by the ruling class did not 
cease but rather became reinforced. Hence what looked like liberation struggles from the onset 
‘was not a restoration of Africa to Africa’s own history, but the onset of a new period of indirect 
subjection to the history of Europe” (Davidson 1992: 10; and Mohan and Zack-Williams 2004:  
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8).   
In effect, the systems of ‘direct rule’ by colonial Governors and ‘indirect rule’ by chiefs, 
through strict regulations and control towards taxation policies, exploitation and export of 
resources, and the establishment of security forces rather than services to enforce colonial 
policies and decisions, continued in form and content. The Governors who exhibited legislative, 
executive and judicial powers by themselves instead of different branches of government or 
administration reinforced control of power and to an extent, patronage systems through neo-
patrimonial systems and arrangements leading to the establishment of one party rule.   
This form of governance became a new autocracy (Mohan and Zack-Williams 2004: 8; 
Davidson 1992; Mamdani 1996; and Ekeh 1997: 83-110). Revolutionary nationalist movements 
in most African states equally exploited the Cold War rivalry to pursue their interests, aligning 
themselves with communist or socialist ideals (Leffler and Painter 2005: 1-2). In effect, the Cold 
War era with its ideological underpinnings and alliances only deepened and entrenched this so-
called ‘modern’ or ‘westernised’ security culture, but hardly obliterated the indigenous ones.   
With the end of colonialism and the advent of independence, the inherited or acculturated 
western security systems and practices dominated political governance and security practices. 
Responses to political dominance and control of power gave rise to political dissent and 
agitations by civilians and the populace in general. These open rejection of authoritarianism, 
fueled by the Cold War ideological battle, eventually led to military dictatorships and revolutions 
spanning a period of about three decades on the African continent which led to several regime 
changes through military coups and revolutions (Hutchful and Bathily 1997).   
Military dictatorships, coups d’état, and autocratic regimes, thus, dominated the 
governance and security landscape until the end of the Cold War when emphasis began to shift 
towards more democratic means of security and political governance. West Africa was not left 
125 
 
out of these developments as Ghana and Nigeria, for example, experienced military dictatorships 
and autocratic rule marked by military coups and undemocratic governance during and 
immediately after the Cold War era. The resultant effect of all these was the contention between 
issues of ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ in which hybrid systems of political and security governance 
co-existed through various legislations. All these led to changes in all facets of governance, 
necessitating the need for reforms in political, economic and security spheres.  
Capitalism and its ideals began to guide the pursuit of governance in all spheres of 
endeavour with emphasis on democracy, the rule of law, good governance and human security 
among others. The seemingly gradual collapse of communism and the advent of capitalism led to 
the quest for transparent and accountable governance, the call for the respect of people’s rights 
and private ownership of the means of production which eventually culminated in several civil 
wars in Africa and the eventual taking of root of democracy and good governance on the 
continent.  
Civil wars, mainly in the MRU sub-region of West Africa and southern and eastern parts 
of the continent became manifest as the Cold War gradually came to an end and super powers’ 
interests in the continent dwindled. The breaking down of the ‘Berlin Wall’ in November 1989 
and the merger of East and West Germany, as well as emergence the Bretton Woods system, 
brought about a whole new dimension and perspective which reinforced capitalist systems of 
governance rather than the very well embraced communism. The search for peaceful resolution 
to conflicts caused by rebellion against repression, control and bad governance practices in 
general gained grounds.  
4.1.1.4 The Changing Context of Security Culture 
All said and done, the issue of change and continuity in the context of culture, and for that 
matter security culture, during the period of colonialism and its aftermath, generated interesting 
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debates and perceptions on the subject. To start with change was perceived, in rival mythologies 
of European imperialism and colonial nationalism, to be introduced by European rule into 
traditional societies (Afigbo 1985: 487). This was construed by imperial apologists as a 
progressive change which was “a dramatic and beneficial linear transition from a static and 
barely productive traditional culture to a dynamic and limitless modernism” (Afigbo 1985: 487). 
Recent scholars however discarded such claims or proposition of a static African traditional 
culture. They argued that traditional societies were far from static and have evolved over time 
from its pre-colonial through colonial to post-colonial times.   
The Colonial Nationalists have considered this view of European imperialists as a 
“disruption” and “the process by which unsympathetic and uncomprehending imperialists 
shattered the idyllic world of colonial peoples leaving in its place turmoil, instability and 
uncertainty” (Afigbo 1985: 487). These modern scholars thus dispute the static nature of African 
societies, seeing it more in the light of products of generations informed by centuries of millennia 
of change. In other words, modernisation through change or modification of culture in Africa has 
been a continuous process from earliest times, characterised by factors such as social mobility, 
urbanization, occupational specialisation, and labour migration (Afigbo 1985: 487).   
So in effect, the above demographic and evolutionary processes indicate a dynamic and 
changing cultural values and norms in pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial epochs. These 
changes have largely been in the form of voluntarily or forcefully imbibing modern cultural 
values with its positive and negative attributes in addition to the already existing indigenous 
ones. This has made it possible for the hybridism that is experienced currently in African 
societies across the continent and indicates the potential for acculturation, while equally 
maintaining indigenous traditional norms and values. The quest for the recognition, therefore, of 
the interplay of tradition and modernity, leading to the acceptance of positive traditional and 
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modern values towards reform and effective governance of the security sector in West Africa, 
remains the hypothesis this thesis intends to prove or disprove.  
4.2 ECOWAS’s Security Culture and Regional Security Frameworks  
West Africa’s security culture and practices are believed to be based largely on pan-
Africanist ideas and ideals which informed the struggle for and liberalisation of the continent 
from the vestiges of colonialism and apartheid (Jaye: 2008: 165). These shared ideals are 
common to and thought to have emerged from a heterogeneous and diverse societies within the 
West African region and beyond in pre-colonial, colonial and the post-independence era. Indeed,  
Jaye (2008:155) and Soderbaum (2001: 63) argue that patterns of regionalisation within West 
Africa have been created through shared history, manifested through highly integrated pre-
colonial kingdoms, empires and cultures.   
ECOWAS’s security culture is equally informed by both ideation and the availability or 
otherwise of capacity and material resources in response to security threats or its minimization  
(Williams and Haacke 2008: 128). In reality, however, the ‘majoritarian conception of culture’ 
which accommodates some degree of divergence or occasional contestation of ideas in relation to 
norms and practices manifests in the ECOWAS region (Williams and Haacke 2008: 130;  
Meyer 2005: 529). Hence, ECOWAS’s responses to community or transnational security 
challenges, based on its adherence to norms and principles, have sometimes been mixed or 
contradictory (Jaye 2008: 156). Reasons for non-adherence to some of the principles or norms 
are attributable to colonial legacies, as well as ideological, economic and personal factors. These 
factors, as a result, create the room, sometimes, for biases in interpretation and importance 
attached to issues considered as threat or otherwise to ECOWAS member states and its people.  
Security culture is considered on the normative side “as encompassing shared patterns of 
thought and argumentation that establish pervasive and durable security preferences by 
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formulating concepts of the role, legitimacy, and efficacy of particular approaches to protecting 
values” (Johnson 1995a:6).   
In practice, however, “culture is manifested in specific norms and practices [as] ideas 
informing a shared culture tend to find expression in shared discourses [which] are themselves 
actualized in habitual practices” (Williams and Haacke 2008: 129; Neumann and Heikka 2005). 
These shared values and norms, captured in the founding documents and subsequent regional 
security legislations and policies, inform the collective decision-making of the regional 
organisation, ECOWAS, which in effect influences and shapes its nature and development. It 
equally helps explain what, to the organisation, constitutes a security threat, and why it does or 
does not respond to particular threats with possible security implications (Williams and Haacke  
2008:131). Jaye (2008: 154) summarised ECOWAS’s embryonic security culture in the 
following ideals:  
• equality, territorial integrity and political independence of states;  
• solidarity and collective self-reliance;  
• non-aggression and good neighbourliness;  
• peaceful settlement of disputes;  
• adherence to democratic governance;  
• zero tolerance for power obtained and maintained through unconstitutional means; 
and economic and social development on the understanding that security of the 
peoples and states are inextricably linked.  
These ideals, most of which are captured in Declaration A/DCL.1/7/91 of Political Principles of 
the Economic Community of West African States, guide and preserve community relations mainly 
in political, economic and security spheres.  
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ECOWAS at the time of its inception, 28 May 1975, had purely economic objectives of 
integrating the West African region based on free movement of persons and goods, enhanced 
trade and investment, common customs arrangements and other related socio-economic issues.  
These were captured in ECOWAS’s founding document, Treaty of the Economic Community of  
West African States, concluded in Lagos, Nigeria. With time, the institution’s focus shifted in 
response to the Cold War dynamics, by integrating common community security arrangements 
that would secure the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its Member States. This led to the 
adoption of the ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression (PNA) of 22 April 1978 also in Lagos, 
Nigeria, and subsequently the Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance of Defence (PMAD) made 
in Freetown, Sierra Leone on 29 May 1981.   
These two security protocols sought to address fears about inter-state security threats and 
facilitate inter-state cooperation on community security and defence arrangements. This was 
intended to further promote integration efforts, and prevent undue, divisive, suspicious and 
external influences or attack in the region (ECOWAS Treaty 1975). These initial security efforts 
laid the security foundations for subsequent reinforcement of community security arrangements.   
The signing of the 29 July 1993 ECOWAS Revised Treaty in Cotonou, Benin, reinforced 
the need for early warning and conflict prevention, management and resolution mechanisms for 
the containment and addressing intra-state conflicts that threatened to engulf the MRU sub-
region, including Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea at the time, and the ECOWAS region at 
large, given its spill-over effects. This proposition manifested in the adoption of the Protocol 
Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, and Peacekeeping 
and Security in Lomé, Togo, on 10 December 1999. This Protocol, however, had gaps which 
needed to be addressed to make it more effective.   
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Hence the adoption of the Protocol A/SP1/12/01on Democracy and Good Governance 
Supplementary to the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, 
Resolution, and Peacekeeping and Security in Dakar, Senegal, on 1 December 2001. This 
supplementary protocol, also known as ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and 
Good Governance, focused on issues such as prevention of internal crises, democracy and good 
governance, rule of law and human rights. These issues needed to be observed in order to create 
the conducive environment for attaining the security, peace and stability goals of the region.  
Despite the adoption of all these initial security frameworks and arrangements, bad 
governance practices, including regime protection, unlimited rule of power, unconstitutional 
changes in government, political marginalization and exclusion, and corruption, continued to 
pose significant challenges to peace and security in the region. This reinforced a shift in focus 
and emphasis on the security of ECOWAS citizens as compared to that of Member States, owing 
to pressure for community residents, mainly civil society and human rights activists among 
others. These efforts eventually culminated in the adoption of The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention 
Framework (ECPF) on 16 January 2008 in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.   
The ECPF encompassed major initiatives for enhancing the safety of life and property, as 
well as the security of Member States and institutions in the region (ECPF Preamble). Its 
emphasis on the safety of life and property and the security of not only the member states but its 
people is instructive. Article 4 of the Framework seeks to transform the region from an 
‘ECOWAS of States’ to that of an ‘ECOWAS of the Peoples’ under the ECOWAS Strategic 
Vision. More importantly, the ECPF has a major purpose of serving as a reference for the 
regional economic grouping and its member states in attempts at strengthening human security. 
These ideals, though laudable and worth pursuing, is yet to fully manifest in specific programmes 
and activities of the regional bloc.  
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After all these frameworks, the need arose, given all the ongoing challenges of 
transnational crime in the region and internal security problems, as well as human rights abuses 
by security agencies, to ensure a standardised, comprehensive mechanism and concerted effort to 
restructure the security sectors of various ECOWAS Member States in order to ensure effective 
and efficient security sector governance and security services provision and delivery. The 
regional body, therefore, came up with a 2016 Supplementary Act on ECOWAS Policy 
Framework for Security Sector Reform and Governance. This security sector reform and 
governance policy framework, supplementary to the 1999 ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the 
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, came 
up with core principles, essential features, implementation  mechanism and gender 
mainstreaming on SSRG in West Africa. 
ECOWAS’s regional security frameworks are therefore largely reflective of its security 
cultures acquired over the years since its inception in the mid-1970s.  
4.3 Security Culture and Security Governance in West Africa: Challenges, Progress and           
      Prospects  
 
As established in the previous sections above, ECOWAS’s security culture reflects 
thoughts or patterns of argumentation crystalised around common ideals, principles and values 
for community safety of ECOWAS Member States and its peoples. ECOWAS’s security culture 
may or may not influence its security governance processes in West Africa. This, as mentioned 
earlier, could be attributed to several factors, including issues based on ideation or contestation of 
ideas, the availability or otherwise of resources, and state or individual interests and 
considerations. Governance of the security sector in ECOWAS, on the other hand, is made 
possible through established institutions, mechanisms and processes.   
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The Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2015) definition of governance would be re-emphasised in 
this context which considers governance as public goods and services that every citizen is 
entitled to from the state, and which the state has a responsibility to deliver to its people. The 
elements of governance have four major categories, and these include safety and rule of law; 
participation and human rights; sustainable economic opportunity; and human development. The 
safety and rule of law aspect of governance is sub-divided into rule of law, accountability, 
personal safety and national security. Though these elements identified are mutually reinforcing 
of each other, the sub-categories of safety and rule of law provide benchmarks for assessing the 
status and effectiveness of security services delivery in West Africa, and Africa as a whole.   
With regard to ECOWAS structures and institution for governance, Article 4 of the  
ECOWAS Conflict Mechanism established the Authority, the Mediation and Security Council 
(MSC) and the Executive Secretariat now the ECOWAS Commission. The Authority, as the 
highest decision-making body of ECOWAS, has the powers to act on all security matters as 
relates to the Mechanism. The MSC, which comprise 9 Member States of ECOWAS, acts on 
behalf of the Authority by making appropriate decisions for the implementation of the 
Mechanism. Meetings of the MSC which is presided over by the current Chair of the Authority 
takes place at three levels, including that of Heads of State and Government, Ministerial and 
Ambassadorial levels. The ECOWAS Commission facilitates the implementation of policy 
decisions of ECOWAS.   
The above-mentioned institutions comprise the Executive wing of ECOWAS with 
additional supporting organs. The organs established to assist the MSC in Article 17 of the 
Mechanism are the Defence and Security Committee (DSC); the Council of Elders (CoE) now 
Council of the Wise (CoW); and the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) now 
known as the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF). The DSC, which comprises the Committee of 
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Chiefs of Defence Staff (CCDS) and Committee of Chiefs of Security Service (CCSS), is in 
charge of providing technical assistance and expert knowledge in the area of peacekeeping and 
deployment of the ESF, while the CoW uses good offices roles and their rich experiences to 
serve as mediators, conciliators and facilitators.  The idea of the CoW is based on the recognition 
of the effectiveness of traditional mediation roles in the West Africa region that helps in the 
resolution of disputes among conflicting parties. These institutions and organs are complemented 
by the established Observation and Monitoring Zones and an ECOWAS Situation Room to 
facilitate the work of the regional body in its conflict prevention, early warning and response 
efforts under its ECOWAS Early Warning Response Network (ECOWARN) operationalised in 
2003.  
The ECOWAS Court of Justice, the Community Court, is charged with giving legal 
advisory opinion on any matter that requires interpretation of community text. Some of the cases 
relate to the determination of violation of human rights, disputes relating to the interpretation and 
application of Acts of the Community, and adjudication on disputes between institutions of the 
community and their officials among others things. The Court was created pursuant to the 1993 
Revised Treaty of ECOWAS, and officially began operations in November 1996 after the 
coming into effect of the 1991 Protocol that created the Court (ECOWAS Community Court of 
Justice Protocol A/P.I/7/91).  
The Authority of Heads of State and Government also established the ECOWAS 
Parliament, also known as the Community Parliament, in August 1994 upon the signing of the 
Protocol of the Parliament. It was established under Articles 6 and 13 of the 1993 Revised Treaty 
of ECOWAS. The Protocol which came into force in March 2000 led to the inauguration of the 
Community Parliament in November 2000. This regional parliament serves as “a forum for 
dialogue, consultation and consensus for the representatives of the people of the Community 
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[with a view to promoting] integration” (ECOWAS Community Parliament Protocol A/P.2/8/94 
1994: 4). 
These structures, institutions, mechanisms, processes and legal frameworks facilitate the 
governance process within ECOWAS with specific regard to issues of community security. The 
three major governing arms of the ECOWAS, including the executive, parliament and judiciary, 
are structures or state mechanisms and processes for governance and are established for the 
benefit of ECOWAS Member States and its peoples. Decision-making and policy 
implementation undertaken both at the regional and national levels in the ECOWAS region have 
civil society input from the WACSOF and in the areas of security West African  Network on 
Security and Democratic Governance (WANSED). These are meant to ensure the needs of the 
people are catered for based on human security ideals, and adequate provision of oversight from 
all stakeholders in the process.  
4.3.1 Security Sector Governance and Statebuilding Processes in West Africa  
The essence of security sector reform/governance in West Africa and beyond is to 
maintain secure and stable states for the community and its peoples. Hence SSR/SSG is mainly 
construed, not as an end in itself but, as a means to an end. This brings up the concept of 
statebuilding in West Africa which follows similar trajectory as is done in different parts of the 
world. The differences in approach might, however, be related to the context, dynamics and, 
above all, actors involved. This may be due to different and varied cultural traits which require 
its recognition and acceptance to facilitate effective SSG processes toward an integrated and 
strengthened ECOWAS member states and human development in the region.   
Additionally, broader reform approaches are required to make SSR efforts effective given 
the multi-faceted nature of threats to both the state and its people. Hence the need to link 
SSR/SSG efforts to statebuilding goals and objectives, which presents the opportunity to explore 
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a much more comprehensive way of addressing security issues from a broader perspective, rather 
than a limited, technical and narrow approach to SSR (Jackson 2009: 1).   
This approach feeds into the human security debate that encompasses a broad range of 
issues, but with the emphasis on accommodating the interest of the individual or people in 
addition to that of the state. Institutions and legitimacy of central authorities play major roles in 
building a state as it forms a critical link between statebuilding and nation-building. But success 
in this area is mainly defined by external intervention and its possible impact on socio-political 
cohesion.  
Statebuilding as conceived in a previous chapter connotes “overcoming institutional 
blockages, or changing the ‘rules of the game’, through turning bad governance into good 
governance” (Chandler 2010: 6). With regard to home-grown, national and whole-of-government 
approaches, statebuilding could also be perceived as “an endogenous process to enhance 
capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by state-society relations” (OECD 2008d 
cited in OECD 2011: 20).   
Indeed, commonly identified indicators for state weakness which leads to state failure 
include notions of “disharmony between communities, inability to control borders and the 
entirety of the territory, a growth of criminal violence, corrupt institutions, and a decaying 
infrastructure” (von Bogdandy et al 2005: 581). Again, in the field of security, statebuilding 
activities are undertaken through the establishment of security sectors in accordance with 
democratic norms, good governance, and the call for civilian control of the sector, accountability, 
transparency and observance of the rule of law, (Schroeder et al 2013: 382).   
Of equal importance is the “cultural change in terms of how people relate to that state as 
well as how people conduct everyday business” (Jackson 2009: 4). This relates strongly to the 
issue of nation-building which provides a much broader context for and linkage to statebuilding 
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processes. Nation-building, as defined in an earlier Chapter, relates more to the endogenous 
context and embraces ‘collective identity formation’ in a country by indigenes through redefining 
issues of cultural identity, and the use of traditions, indigenous institutions and customs (von 
Bogdandy et al2005: 586). Though external influences may be quite limited (Scott 2007: 3), 
they, nevertheless, provide an opportunity for support and collective efforts toward successful 
statebuilding activities. In this regard, a cultural projection of a nation is made manifest through 
sets of assumptions, values and beliefs, which facilitate the legitimisation of state structures and 
processes (von Bogdandy et al 2005: 586). 
In drawing lessons for the future, approaches to statebuilding, security and governance 
require a rethink, and the need to adopt and mainstream transformative approaches in which 
hybrid forms of progressive traditional and modern practices would inform theories and policies  
(Mac Ginty 2008: 139 -163; and Podder 2013: 353-380). Current security threats to peace, 
stability and development including, conflicts, terrorism, transnational crimes and environmental 
degradation in West Africa, have necessitated the need for reforms in both post-conflict and 
transitional societies to effectively address these threats.   
SSR could contribute to statebuilding by building the integrity of the security system, 
establish or promote its legitimacy, and promote the governance of the sector through citizen 
participation, in order to transform the sector towards respecting the security needs of both the 
state and its people (Weigand 2013: 18; Patel 2010). In ensuring this is done, governance serves 
as the critical element in providing guidance and direction through policies informed by the 
contribution of all stakeholders, including both state and sub-state actors. Hence the necessity to 
revisit the critical element of security sector governance (SSG) in an attempt to facilitate SSR 




4.3.2 Challenges, Progress and Prospects of SSG in West Africa 
Political governance in Africa, and for that matter West Africa, has faced major 
difficulties in areas of exclusion of relevant actors in decision-making, bad governance practices, 
including misapplication of resources, nepotism, corruption and unequal distribution of wealth, 
as well as external influences with its attendant conditionalities and western-imposed views and 
practices. Similar challenges are experienced in the governance of the security sector in the West 
Africa region where most of the countries in transition are either emerging from authoritarian 
rule, like Ghana and Nigeria, or years of intra-state conflicts in the cases of Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
Ivory Coast and Guinea Bissau, just to mention a few (Marc et al 2015: 99-137). These 
challenges are seen in various forms and at different levels of manifestation, and have made the 
delivery of security goods and services rather difficult, leading to increased threats and 
destabilisation in the region.  
The genesis of the challenges could be traced mainly to colonial practices inherited from 
colonial authorities, and which have led to the emergence of traditional or regime security 
practices rather than that of human security (Mohan and Zack-Williams 2004: 8). This led to the 
centralisation of power in the executive, weak institutions, and human rights abuses among other 
things. Other negative effects of bad governance include weak civilian control of the sector, 
narrow or limited knowledge of the security concept, emphasis on western security practices 
rather than integrating both indigenous and western forms of security practices, and an ill-
equipped security sector. This development necessitated the need for reform and transformation 
in the security sector in order to make it effective and efficient in maintaining peace and stability 
in ECOWAS Member States.   
The security sector in West Africa, comprising Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone 
countries, has similar characteristic features regarding its structures and institutions, security 
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mechanisms and processes, legislations, its management, and to an extent security cultures that 
influence behavioural patterns and attitudes in the discharge of services within the sector (Bryden 
et al 2008: 27-303). A cursory look at the 15 West African states in the ECOWAS region reveals 
that while efforts at reform of the security sector in few of the countries are quite impressive and 
worth emulating, as in Mali in the past and Sierra Leone, depicting transitions from authoritarian 
rule and conflict situations respectively, others have remained lukewarm in their efforts towards 
reform like Ghana and Nigeria, and worse still some have remained completely adamant to calls 
for restructuring and reforms in cases of The Gambia, particularly under former President Yahya 
Jameh, and Guinea Bissau for example. Emphasis has also been placed on adopting a 
transformative approach to SSG practices in West Africa which focuses on change in attitude or 
behaviours rather than a mere restructuring or reform institutions, and the provision of needed 
resources or materiel for effective and efficient security agencies.   
At the regional level, challenges to SSG have been faced in three major areas, including 
the needed political will to drive SSR/SSG, translating regional security frameworks into credible 
programmes and action to effectively combat transnational criminal activities, and strengthening 
regional security institutions, including ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF), to combat crime, 
terrorism and contain conflicts in West Africa. Several ECOWAS security frameworks identified 
above, and with specific reference to the ECOWAS Conflict Mechanism, the Supplementary 
Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, the ECPF and the ECOWAS Policy Framework 
for Security Sector Reform and Governance, contain adequate security provisions to guarantee 
peace and stability in West Africa.   
West African leaders have, however, been selective in their political decisions in 
addressing security challenges as were in the cases of Burkina Faso, Togo, Mauritania, Ivory 
Coast and Guinea Bissau to mention a few (Bamfo 2013: 12-22). In these instances, responses to 
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some of the issues were swift, for instance Togo, while in others engagements were either slow 
or there were disagreements in the appropriate course of action to undertake owing to differing 
interests and suspected acts of complicity. All these are attributable to individual or national 
interests against that of the regional, colonial alliances, geo-strategic considerations, resource 
constraints, including fiscal resources, and the non-involvement of other stakeholders, like the 
civil-society, in finding solutions to these challenges. Thus, despite the existence of West African 
security culture, its consideration in governance of the security sector becomes limited owing to 
its non-recognition and personal consideration of some leaders within the organisation.  
Within the ECOWAS Member States, it would have been expected that security decisions 
made at the regional or sub-regional levels would logically translate into its implementation, but 
that is not always the case. The reflexivity in security decisions and its implementation is 
undermined by lack of sensitisation and inadequate cooperation and partnerships between 
Member States and its citizenship. Issues of corruption, limited grasp or understanding of 
security concepts and their evolution, as well as lack of expertise in respective areas have equally 
contributed to this. As a result, there are still problems of civil-military relations, regime security 
manifestations in the form of militarization, authoritarian rule, coup d’état and political 
repression, and non-inclusive governance of the sector.   
With the exception of Senegal and Cape Verde to an extent, almost all West African 
countries are confronted with these challenges (Bryden et al 2008:14-15 &18). Intra-state 
conflicts used to be rampant in the region, particularly Mano-River Union sub-region of Liberia,  
Sierra Leone, Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire. Others also include Guinea to an extent, Guinea Bissau 
and some parts of Nigeria, Senegal and Ghana on limited scales. These and many other 
challenges, including long-term rule, have brought about dysfunctional security sector in 
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countries like the Gambia. This has also affected security oversight functions from different 
stakeholders within state and sub-state actors at national and regional levels.  
Despite these identified challenges, some progress have been made in selected West 
African countries with prospects for further improvement and enhancement of SSG in the region 
and beyond. Since its inception, as has been observed earlier, ECOWAS’s major priority was in 
the area of regional integration. With the end of the Cold War and advent of the post-Cold War 
era, characterised by several complex, multi-national and multi-tasking security challenges, the 
ECOWAS adopted several security legislations, mechanisms and processes to prevent, manage 
and resolve the crisis. These well-thought out and well-crafted security frameworks have 
succeeded, to a large extent, in minimising the threat to peace and security in West Africa. The 
intensity of intra-state conflicts in the region has reduced drastically, while many West African 
countries are making concerted efforts to entrench democracy and the rule of law in their polity  
(Marc et al 2015: 156-161).   
In the area of SSR/SSG, some best practices remain instructive, and which could serve as 
useful case studies for improving upon reform and governance in the security sector in West 
Africa. In the specific case of Mali, for example, the 1991 revolution/coup d’état paradoxically 
spurred on improved civil-military relations which made it possible for the initiation of a  
transformation of the security sector from the one-party authoritarian rule and military dictatorship 
to the democratic governance of the sector. This was inspired at a national conference in 1991 
through the acknowledgement of wrongs by the armed forces that rendered apologies and made 
appeals to civil society to forgive them for wrongs committed, as well as making the request to 
work in harmony towards a peaceful country (Bryden et al 2008: 191-193)   
This effort, however, was quickly undermined by the Tuareg rebellion and its associated 
incessant attacks and terrorist in the northern parts of Mali in 2012 which eventually affected the 
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state of security in all parts of the country (Bryden and Chappuis 2015: 79-95). This 
transformative approach through recognition of bad practices and behaviours, and the genuine 
willingness and desire for change through the recognition of all stakeholders and their 
contribution, is instructive in improving democratic governance in the security sector. This, 
nevertheless, requires the political will to sustain the efforts in this direction.  
In the case of Sierra Leone, going through several years of intra-state conflict and the 
emergence and rebuilding of a robust and quite effective security sector, based on trust between 
and among the leadership, security agencies and civil society, present a good case study for 
SSR/SSG practices in the region (Bryden et al 2008:18, 283-300). This was made possible 
through the required assistance given by the United Kingdom government and other partners in 
efforts toward post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding processes (Horn et al 2006: 
109123). The national truth and reconciliation process, no doubt played a major role in this 
transition and transformation of a dysfunctional security sector through traditional reconciliation 
processes (Hoffman 2008: 129-141).  
These positive developments, though not perfect, demonstrate the prospects and 
possibilities of transforming the security sector in West Africa. This would, as has been 
observed, require a change in attitude and behavioural patterns reflected in wrong cultural 
practices, the acceptance of a need for a change, and the involvement of all major stakeholders in 
bringing about the expected a change.  
4.4 Conclusion  
West African countries are going through transitions, emerging from authoritarian rule or 
military dictatorships into democracies, and conflict into post-conflict, peacebuilding and 
statebuilding processes. All these countries have been confronted with several challenges, 
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including challenges in the governance of the security sector that have resulted in undermining 
development and integration efforts in West Africa.   
Over the past few decades, emphasis on security or minimisation of threats have been 
largely focused on the state, resulting in regime security practices and self-perpetuation in power 
with its attendant human rights abuses and other bad governance practices. In recent years, 
however, developments have shifted more towards guaranteeing human security, which largely 
places emphasis on minimising threats to individuals and citizens of states, as well as 
guaranteeing their well-being and welfare. The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (2008: 
6-7) and the African Union Agenda 2063 (2013: 8) have laid emphasis on people-centred 
policies, which must not necessarily be to the detriment or weakening of the state. 
In guaranteeing a peaceful and stable West Africa and, for that matter, Africa as a whole, 
and in realising the 2015 UN Sustainable Development Goals (2030 Agenda: 3), security remains 
a critical element. And in this regard, governance of the security sector is not only essential but 
requires conceptualising SSR based on the integration of both traditional and modern norms, 
values and practices to make peace, security and development possible. Hence in addition to 
grasping appropriate governance standards, security culture considerations, which entail shared 
security norms, values and principles, are equally important. This will reinforce a hybrid form of 
SSG that could help improve on governance of the sector and eliminate state repression of 
citizens, having in mind the adoption of the human security concept and transformation of the 
sector and its integration into statebuilding processes.   
Putting citizens at the centre of SSG must take into consideration their security concerns, 
practices, and norms and values which sets the appropriate objective of enhancing governance 
and delivering security goods and services in the region. This will, to a large extent, guarantee 




SECURITY CULTURE INFLUENCES ON SECURITY SECTOR GOVERNANCE AND 
PEACE AND STABILITY IN GHANA 
5.1 Introduction  
Ghana’s security sector reform experiences since the 1980s have made major contributions 
to the establishment of democracy and stability in the country. This was largely influenced by its 
mixed or hybrid but not necessarily perfect formal and informal cultural dynamics derived from 
its historical antecedents and based mainly on its traditions and colonial legacies. Attempts at 
security sector reform in Ghana focused on series of activities to streamline security sector 
management, oversight of the sector and delivery of security needs and services in the country. Its 
efforts to overcome economic crisis in the late 1970s to mid-1980s, military dictatorships and 
legitimacy crisis, as well as weak institutional capacities and building a culture of democracy in 
the early 1990s to 2000, laid the foundation for economic and security reforms, and socio-
economic development of the country (Hutchful 2008: 111).   
Security reform efforts covered eliminating coups d’état and military dictatorships, 
addressing the culture of silence and abuses of human rights, reforms within the various security 
and justice institutions and agencies, and creating a stable environment for the pursuit of 
democratic governance and socio-economic development of the country (BICC 2004: 62-65). 
Efforts were also made to draft a new Constitution, that is the 1992 Constitution, with adequate 
security sector provisions and security legislations covering the intelligence, police and the 
armed forces, and opening the space for eventual dialogue and improving civil-military relations 
within a culture of democracy. All these were made possible with external support or assistance 
from donors or international partners who facilitated concessional loans and grants, as well as 
technical support, to undertake these reforms.   
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These reforms were, nevertheless, carried out based on some conditionalities informed by 
western cultures and tradition, some of which proved to be favourable while others were not. 
They were also selective or ad hoc in nature as they were not undertaken within a comprehensive 
security sector reform and governance plan or agenda. Other limitations to Ghana’s security 
sector reform agenda included but were not limited to weaknesses in governance and security 
sector oversight, lack of transparency and accountability, and selected reforms of security 
agencies. Indigenous security institutions and mechanisms for maintaining security, peace and 
rule of law in the country were also largely ignored in the reforms (BICC 2004:7-8). These 
challenges, together with negative external influences and the general neglect of indigenous 
culture and institutions, however, require redress in enhancing the governance of the security 
sector.   
This case study, as mentioned in previous chapters, thus sought to explore if security 
culture influences in Ghana – which connotes shared safety values, norms and behaviours – from 
respective security actors, played a role in minimising the complexity of the SSR/G concept and 
helped clarify the role of security actors, as well as facilitate the acceptance and effectiveness of 
security sector governance in Ghana by both security providers and referents. In doing this, the 
chapter briefly captures the historical background and evolution of the Ghanaian state from its 
pre-colonial, through colonial to its post-independence era in order to establish its cultural and 
security culture antecedents, which shaped its political developments and governance dynamics 
under autocratic, military dictatorships and constitutional governance.   
It follows this with the conceptions and perceptions about security culture and security 
governance in the country, while revisiting Ghana’s security sector and governance arrangements 
to envision the security structure in place, identify the security actors and their roles and 
functions in providing security needs of the state and its people. The case study then traced early 
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attempts at security sector reform and formalisation of the reform and security governance 
processes in order to asses efforts embarked upon thus far in security reforms in the country. This 
is then followed by how effective these reforms have been by looking at the security challenges 
confronting the country and the effectiveness of responses, as well as which way the country is 
headed through security sector governance. Options are then explored for enhancing security 
sector governance in the country by looking at security culture influences and its effectiveness in 
demystifying the complex SSR/SSG concept and terrain, its security arrangements and multiple 
security cultures, towards the acceptance and enhancement of security reform and governance in 
the country.  Conclusions are subsequently drawn on findings based on the field research 
undertaken.  
5.1.1 Brief Historical and Cultural Background on State Formation and Post-Independence      
         Political and Security Developments in Ghana 
 
5.1.1.1 Geographical Boundaries and Location  
Ghana is believed to have stemmed from the Burkinabe word ‘Ga-Na’ which means 
“warrior king’ (Owusu-Gyamfi 2012). The country which was formerly referred to as the Gold 
Coast was named after the Ghana Empire, also known then as Awkar - an important trans-Sahara 
trading route located in the present-day area of south-eastern Mauritania and Western Mali - 
when it became independent. It is located in West Africa and has three neighbouring countries 
including Cote d’Ivoire to the west, Togo to the east and Burkina Faso to the north. Its southern 
part is bordered by the Gulf of Guinea which has the Atlantic Ocean. The country also covers a 
distance of 522 miles from its southern portion to the north, and 355 miles from its eastern 
portion to the west.  Its four ecological zones are classified into the southern savanna, the forest 
zone, the Sahel transition zone and the northern savanna zone (Assimeng 1999: 35). It has 16 
regions and 254 districts.   
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The inhabitants are believed to have settled here before 1471 when the Europeans 
established contact with them. The people migrated from southern Sahara around the North-West 
or Central Africa (Assimeng 1999: 36). The northerners and the Akans were among the first 
settlers in Ghana before other major ethnic groups including the Gas and Ewes (Fynn 1974: 3).   
The following map gives a vivid and graphic description of Ghana:   
The Map of Ghana  
 
Source: Graphic Online, Ghana, available at https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/new-ghana-map-with-





5.1.1.2 Pre-Colonial Historical and Cultural Antecedents  
Prior to becoming a nation, Ghana had to deal with many pre-colonial historical and 
cultural issues as did most of its West African and African neighbours. These historical issues 
centred on “indigenous, Islamic, European, migrant African, and Asian [phenomena in the face 
of] local, continental, and global concerns” (Konadu & Campbell 2016:3). All these provided the 
space and opportunity for the founding of the Gold Coast, made up of the British Togoland, the 
Ashanti Protectorate and the Fante Protectorate, to evolve into the modern day Ghana; the area 
which grappled with issues of slavery and colonialism between the 16th and 19th centuries 
respectively. The interactions through trade, wars, settlement, spread of religion and education 
among others, influenced and facilitated Ghana’s acculturation to its modern state, though largely 
retaining its primordial cultural values, customs and tradition (Assimeng 1999: 1-270; Danquah 
1928; Nukunya 2016: 3-316; Mair 1960: 447- 456; Migeod 1920: 109 - 125; and  
Goody 1975).  
5.1.1.3 Colonial Era and Western Cultural Dominance and Influences  
Ghana’s colonial period spanned 1902 to 1957 which was marked by a period of foreign 
rule and domination. The departure of the Danes and the Dutch between 1850 and 1870 and the 
final defeat of the Ashantis by the British colonial forces in 1874, as well as the abolishing of the 
slave trade, paved way for British colonial rule in the Gold coast (Gocking 2005; Arhin 1985). 
The colonial period witnessed the exploitation of natural resources, introduction of western form 
of governance and indirect rule, and its accompanying western cultures and influences among 
others. The Western culture then was manifest mainly through autocracy but with indirect rule as 
a façade; unequal terms of trade; use of force by security forces rather than services leading to 
abuses of human rights, appointment of administrative officials and introduction of western form 
of literacy among others. The several decades of domination and control led to several forms of 
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resistance by individuals and groups which culminated in the fight for independence (James 
2012: 109-112).  
The United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC), and later the Convention People’s Party 
(CPP), led by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah secured Ghana’s independence in 1957.  Of much 
importance to these developments were the changes that colonialism brought to Ghana. These 
included introduction of the English language as a lingua franca, establishment of legal and 
political institutions, integration of different ethnic and tribal groups into a polity, and the 
introduction of western education and religion, among others, all of which were based on western 
cultures and tradition (Nukunya 2016: 139-178’ Assimeng 2007: 120).  
5.1.1.4 Post-Independence Developments  
After its first and second World War years and the struggle for independence from the 
onset of the 20th century, Ghana got independence from British colonial rule in 1957 and 
remained under one-party rule until 1966 when its first President, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, was 
overthrown in a coup d’état. Since then, several coups and counter coups truncated the 
democratic process in the country until 1993 when constitutional rule was restored under the 
former military leader Jerry John Rawlings. Military rule spanned a period of about 22 years 
compared to 14 years of civilian rule between 1957 and 1993. Adekson (1976: 251-272) 
explained the causes of instability to include Ghanaian political, tribal and class contradictions 
backed by personal rivalries, and external influences from Western imperialist quarters, 
underpinned by a contentious and changing ideologies in the struggle for footholds in Africa. 
Corruption, termed in the local parlance ‘Kalabule’ or ‘Gyinabu’, also served as a major cause 
for the 1979 Revolution which resulted in widespread killings but also, arguably, began the 
change in negative behavioural practices, including addressing moral decadence, attitudinal 
changes from ‘top-bottom’ to ‘bottom-up’ approach to governance, and reform of institutions and 
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the Ghanaian economy towards democracy, growth and development (Rothchild 1985: 1-6; Sam 
2004; Adedeji 2001: 1-27; Chazan 1983).   
Political instability was, therefore, prevalent amidst dictatorial tendencies, human rights 
abuses and lack of inclusive governance (Brenya et al 2015:1-14). The ushering in of democratic 
governance, initially under a transformed military regime to a civilian government of Jerry 
Rawlings, and its subsequent consolidation through alternation of power between the two major 
political parties of NDC and NPP brought about relative stability, peace and development in an 
unstable region for the past two decades and over. This development facilitated attempts at 
reform of the security sector in the areas of civil-police and civil-military relations, given 
negative perceptions generated by human rights abuses of past military regimes, and in particular 
that of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) led by former President Jerry John 
Rawlings (Table 5.1)  
Table 5.1 
Table Depicting Civilian/Military Governments in Ghana from 1957 to 2016  
Name of  
Government  
Name of Leader  Year  Duration  Remarks  
Convention People’s  
Party (CPP)  
Dr. Kwame Nkrumah  1957 - 1966  9 yrs.  One-party civilian 
government  
(overthrown through 
coup d’état)  
Military - National  
Liberation Council  
(NLC)  
Col. E. K. Kotoka/Major  
A.A. Afrifa  
1966-1969  3 ½ yrs.  Military  
Government  
(overthrown through 
coup d’état)  
Progress Party  Mr. K.A. Busia  1969-1972  2 ½ yrs.  Civilian government 
(overthrown through 
coup d’état)  
National Redemption  
Council  
(NRC)/Supreme  
Military Council I  
(SMC I)  
Col. I.K. Acheampong  1972-1978  6 ½ yrs.  Military  
Government  
(overthrown through 
coup d’état)  
Supreme Military 
Council II (SMC II) 
Lt. Gen. Fred W.K. 
Akuffo 









Flt. Lt. J. J. Rawlings  June-Sept. 1979  3 Months  Military  
Government  
People’s National  
Convention (PNC)  
Dr. Hilla Limann  1979 -1981  2 ½ yrs.  Civilian government 
(overthrown through 
coup détât)  
Provisional National  
Defence Council  
(PNDC)  
Flt. Lt. J. J. Rawlings  1981-1993  11 yrs.  Military  
Government  
National Democratic  
Congress (NDC)  








National Democratic  
Congress (NDC)  
Prof. J.E.A. Mills/Dr.  
John Dramani Mahama  




New Patriotic Party   Mr. Nana A. D. Akuffo-
Addo 




Source: Adapted from Assimeng 1999:191, with author’s additions.  
 
5.2. Conceptions and Perceptions about Security Culture and Security Sector Governance         
in Ghana   
 
Culture is defined in the 2004 Cultural Policy of Ghana as “… the totality of the way of 
life evolved by our people through experience and reflection in their attempts to fashion a 
harmonious co-existence between them and their environment material and non-material”.  
Similarly, Anquandah (2007) sees culture as a life-style manifested by a particular people and 
society, and which generally describes human behavioural pattern. Also, culture within the 
traditional set up and indigenous institutions, is generally perceived as a way of life that 
manifests in the form of dresses and clothes worn, food eaten, precautionary measures adopted 
for self and society preservation, as well as the way of worship among other things. These 
definitions resonate with the general perception of culture among the traditional leaders in 
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Sunyani as a way of life of a people, reflected in their day-to-day activities in various 
communities (Focus Group Discussion, Sunyani, Brong Ahafo Region, 18 September 2015).   
Culture, though seen as a way of life of a people, is equally construed as the fulcrum 
around which issues of ‘complexity, acceptance and effectiveness’ revolve. It involves panoply 
of multiple stakeholders whose activities lead to the provision of security for the country 
(interview Aning, KAIPTC, Accra, May 2015; also see Aning et al 2018: 121-135). The 
activities of these stakeholders are underpinned by a set of values and norms for societal 
behaviour. Norms, in this sense, apply to how people think and behave or a ‘shared reality’, and 
when routinised becomes cultural practices, while values relate to the moral judgement which 
may either inform behaviours or not (Frese 2015: 1327-1329; Shteynberg 2009: 46-69; Premark 
1959: 219-233). Notwithstanding, different sets of values and norms can only be accepted when 
they are acculturated and internalised. This underscores the fact that cultural differences exist 
between people and entities including groups, institutions and even countries in the comity of 
nations, and peaceful coexistence could only be guaranteed through the recognition and 
acceptance of those differences manifested in behavioural patterns and traits.   
Security on the other hand, and as discussed in chapters 2 and 4 of this thesis, remains a 
deeply contested and problematic concept but perceived as having two contradictory yet 
complementary faces which include political and social ordering towards stabilisation of the state 
and local power structures, as well as ensuring the protection of citizens or human beings’ safety, 
livelihood and welfare (Bagayoko et al 2016: 7; Luckham and Kirk 2013: 1-30). In his keynote 
address at a Roundtable on Police and Policing in Accra, Ghana, in August 2001 on the theme 
“Challenges to Policing and Police Reform in Ghana Today”, then Minister of the Interior, Hon. 
Alhaji Malik Al-Hassan, admitted that ensuring security at any level in the country was not easy 
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and could be as complicated and elusive as the HIV/AIDs virus (African Security Dialogue and 
Research (ASDR) Roundtable on Police and Policing 2001:1).   
In the Ghanaian context, security is perceived as the protection of the state and its 
borders, the people of Ghana, as well as maintaining public safety which includes the prevention 
of crime. It equally relates to their survival, well-being and satisfaction (interview with Hon. Fritz 
Baffour, Chair, Select Committee on Defence and Interior, House of Parliament, Ghana, 18 May 
2015). Others are also of the view that security connotes a situation in which people hold the 
belief of freedom from attack, damage or harm from robbery, terrorism, murder, assassination, 
scams as well as corruption. Some equally equate security to development by way of addressing 
development concerns by overcoming poverty, illiteracy, land disputes and challenges related to 
access to basic utilities or necessities (Aning et al 2018: 135).  
Security is, thus, difficult to define but easier to explain as it relates more to human 
beings, their way of life, and issues to do with their survival, safety, well-being and contentment 
(interview with Mr. K. Bentum Quantson, retired Director of the Bureau of National 
Investigations (BNI) and the Criminal Investigations Divisions (CID) of the Ghana Police 
Service, Accra, Ghana, 18 April 2019; Quantson 2008: 1-7). Beyond this, however, traditional 
leaders hold the view that security is God’s given resources to mankind, including water, trees 
and other natural resources for survival, and thus should not be mishandled.   
It therefore entails precautions taken to protect lives and property or the legal protection 
against possible harm or loss (Focus Group Discussion, Sunyani, Brong Ahafo Region, 18 
September 2015). Others also think good relations and leadership guarantee security, but courage 
and truth define these qualities (Focus Group Discussions, Abutia Kloe, Volta Region, 15 
September 2015). These definitions raise issues which reiterate a varied sense of definition of 
security in which negating all acts of insecurity to the state and its people become essential, but 
more importantly that security may not connote the absence of fear and threats per se, but having 
the capacity to respond to them if or as and when they arise.  
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Security culture, in an organisation or institutional context, entails having ideas, customs 
and social behaviour which influence the security of that entity either in a positive or negative 
manner. The major dimensions of cultural influences hinge mostly on the individuals or groups 
of persons taking into consideration their attitudes, cognition, behaviour, commitment, norms, 
responsibilities and compliance (Petric & Roer 2018: 7&14). In the broader context of a country, 
such as Ghana, security culture entails the securitisation and responses to security threats to the 
state and its citizens informed by common values and norms (Addo 2008: 197-211). The 
normative and transactional basis for solidarities in a security context is taken into consideration, 
which is in turn informed by networks of social interaction based on the tradition and customs of 
these groupings, institutions or agencies (Bagayoko et al 2016:11).   
Thus, labeling or identifying an issue as a security threat and responses taken to address 
or mitigate such threats or fears are done by a conglomeration of both state and sub-state actors 
within the current democratic dispensation as compared to the past, under military rule, where 
the regime in power determines what constitutes security threats in the country. These values and 
norms are guided by the organic law of the land, that is the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of 
Ghana, other security legislations including the Police Force Act, 1970 (350), the Armed Forces 
Acts, 1962 (105), and the Security Intelligence Agencies Act, 1996 (526) among others. The 
National Security Council and its affiliate Regional and District Security Councils play such 
roles within the formal security sector, while the Traditional Councils and National Peace 
Councils (NPC) on the other hand, made up of chiefs, religious and opinion leaders take 
responsibilities mainly within the informal security sector, though these roles are not mutually 
exclusive but complement each other.  
Within the informal sector, some traditional leaders perceive security culture as measures 
or ways chiefs and their subjects adopt to ensure peace or safety in a community (Focus Group 
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Discussion, Sunyani, Brong Ahafo Region, 18 September 2016). Some examples include the 
protection of water sources against pollution, the way to eat and not get choked on food, as well 
as counseling and learning lessons through local proverbs and riddles to ensure the protection 
and safety in human endeavours. Conflict prevention, management and resolution also constitute 
an aspect of ensuring security in communities. These cultural practices serve to guarantee 
security in homes, communities, towns and the country at large.  
Governance of the security sector entails the ability to manage complex structures and 
institutions to deliver or address the needs of the people in order to ensure they are free from fear 
and want.  This requires providing effective leadership, translated as competent authority, which 
must play a key role in creating an appropriate platform for dialogue and governance of the 
security sector. It also requires the need to lead, give direction, coordinate affairs, diffuse tension, 
and promote cooperation in enhancing the governance of the security sector. An effective 
oversight would, however, serve to minimise the complexity of the governance process 
(interviews with Jaye and Aning, KAIPTC, Accra, 08 May 2015).   
The Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2015) definition of governance in chapter 2 of this study 
considers governance from the viewpoint of citizens where they have the right to expect the 
provision of political, social, economic public goods from the state. These public goods are 
divided into four major categories to include safety and rule of law, participation and human 
rights, sustainable economic opportunity and human development, but emphasis in this thesis is 
placed on the first category which relates to safety and rule of law.  
Modern and traditional governance processes in Ghana have constitutional acceptance 
and is derived from the pre-colonial and colonial antecedents. This diarchy recognises 
governance through common and customary laws which facilitate the regulation of behaviours, 
practices and interaction among individuals, groups, communities and the people within the 
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territory of Ghana (Amenumey 2011: 1-280; Assimeng 2007: 164 – 191; Nkunya 2016: 85-94; 
Brobbey 2008). This system of governance resonates with Boege et al’s (2009: 14) conception of 
governance which goes beyond the Westphalian approach towards a more complementary 
system of formal and informal or endogenous form of governance which draws on “progressive 
attributes of social order and resilience within communities”.   
The formal system of governance, made up of the executive, parliament and judiciary, is 
presided over by the President of the country who is democratically elected through multi-party 
elections, while that of the traditional governance system is presided over by Chiefs and 
Traditional Councils who ascend thrones by nomination or succession. Both forms of 
government gain recognition and legitimacy under the 1992 Constitution of Ghana and among 
Ghanaians (Chapters 8, 10 & 11; Articles 270-277) though legitimacy for specific individuals, 
like the President and Chief, and institutions under these systems of governance vary. The 
Constitution, however, guarantees the recognition, honour and dignity of the chieftaincy 
institution 270 (2a-2b) but forbids their direct participation in politics except if they abdicate the 
chieftaincy title (270(1).  
Notwithstanding, local ownership of policies and strategies for implementation still 
remain a major challenge in the governance process as donor funding and support in the area of 
governance are still tied to conditionalities which in some cases propose western approaches for 
project implementation, lack of recognition for local actors and input, as well as underestimating 
the difficulties involved in statebuilding and transformation processes (Nathan 2007:7).  
5.3. Ghana’s Security Sector and Governance Arrangements  
Self-preservation and survival as a prime objective of every state form the basis of  
Ghana’s security arrangements and governance processes. The Constitution of the Republic of 
Ghana (1992: Articles 83-85) and the 1996 Security and Intelligence Agencies Act (526) define 
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the structure, functions, mechanisms and processes involved in the identification, prevention, 
management and elimination of threats to the peace, security and stability of Ghana. Ghana has 
no national security policy that defines its national interest and threats, or proffer strategies to 
address them. The functions of the core security actors are guided by the 1992 Constitution, the 
Police Service Act 1970 (350), the Armed Forces Act 1962 (105), the Security and Intelligence 
Agencies Act (SIAA) 1996 (526), as well as their respective service regulations. 
The Constitution and the SIAA outline the structure of the security sector and its key 
actors. At the apex of the security architecture is the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC 
is chaired by the President and has representations from both the executive and judiciary, while 
the legislature maintains oversight over the security sector. Section 4(a) of the SIAA requires 
the NSC to take appropriate measures to safeguard the internal and external security of Ghana 
among other things.  
The President has the prerogative to seek counsel from the Council of State on national 
issues (Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992: Article 89). The Council of State comprises 
a body of prominent citizens of proven or distinguished character. They include persons who 
have formerly held positions of Chief Justice, Chief of Defence Staff of the GAF, Inspector-
General of Police (IGP), President of the National House of Chief, a representative from each 
region of Ghana, and eleven other members appointed by the President. These persons are 
appointed by the President in consultation with the House of Parliament. The Council of State, 
among other things, advises the President on the appointment of security service chiefs, 
including the military, police and prisons services, and appointment to their security services 
Councils formerly chaired by the Vice President, but now by the President through a 
Constitutional amendment.  
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The NSC has other supporting structures which include the Regional Security Councils 
(REGSECs) and the District Security Councils (DISECs). The REGSECs and the DISECs 
replicate the composition and structure of the NSC with the Regional Ministers and District 
Chief Executives chairing these Councils at the regional and district levels respectively. Their 
basic duties are to perform functions to be assigned by the NSC and in turn provide early 
warning to the government on the likelihood of any security threats to the region, district, 
country or the government (Security and Intelligence Services Act 1996: Section 5).   
Within the security sector arrangements are national and private security agencies or 
companies that provide operational and tactical security services in response to security 
threats in the country. The national security agencies include the following:  
• The Ghana Armed Forces (GAF);  
• The Ghana Police Service (GPS); 
 
• Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) and the Customs, Excise and Preventive      
Services (CEPS) – which are paramilitary in nature; 
• The Ghana Prisons Service representing the penal or corrections system;  
• The Ghana National Fire Services (GNFS);  
• Bureau for National Investigation (BNI), External investigation wing referred to 
as the Research Bureau within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International 
Cooperation (MFAIC), and the Defence Intelligence (DI) within the GAF; and    
















Source: Adapted from Bluwey & Kumado (eds.), November 2007, p. 18, with author’s own additions. 
 
The Service Councils for the various security agencies are responsible for regulating their 
activities, and are supposed to ensure the proper management, integrity and professional 
standards in the agencies. They are guided by specific legal acts and set of regulations for the 
security agencies. Differences, however, exist between these legal frameworks and their 
accountability requirements (Hutchful 2008: 115-116 in Bryden et al 2008). The Armed Forces 
Act of 1962, for example, made no provision for legislative oversight, while that of the Police 
Service Act (350, Section 36) calls for the submission of annual reports by the Minister of the 
Interior, after 30th of June, on the administration of the police service to parliament. This, 
however, is hardly ever done if at all (Aning 2015: 19-35). The Police Service Act also makes 
provision for the regulation of PSC in Ghana. Since its establishment, the Police Council has 
faced some key challenges including political control in terms of its composition and the chair 
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which is determined by the President, as well as limited activities related to promotions, 
demotions and dismissals (Aning 2015: 27).  
Another body of relevance is the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative 
Justice (CHRAJ) headed by a Commissioner for Human Rights and Administrative Justice, and 
assisted by two deputies. This Commission, in Article 218(b) of the Constitution, is given the 
mandate to investigate complaints concerning the functions of the Public Service Commission, 
the GAF, the GPS and the Prisons Service in relation to unfair service restructuring, unequal 
access to recruitment into these services or unfair administration. The investigation also covers 
alleged violations of fundamental rights and freedoms under the Constitution.   
Violations are taken to court for prosecution in accordance with the rule of law. Also in a 
similar vein of transparency and accountability, the Auditor-General’s Department is responsible 
for auditing public accounts of Ghana and all public offices, as well as other bodies or 
organisations established by an Act of Parliament, thereby submitting an annual report to 
Parliament for oversight purposes. Hence the accounts of all security-related Ministries, 
Departments and Agencies would be subject to probity and accountability geared towards 
effective and efficient service delivery (Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992: Article 187; 
Aning & Lartey 2009: 7).  
The House of Parliament provides oversight security responsibilities through three major 
Select Committees including that of Defence and the Interior in charge of the security agencies; 
the Finance Committee which deals with the budget for the NSC and oversees the activities of 
the CEPS; and the Public Accounts Committee which oversees budgets for the military and 
military expenditure (Aning and Lartey 2009: 6-10). The Judiciary interprets and oversees the 
enforcement of law and order, as well as protection against human rights abuses (Constitution of 
the Republic of Ghana 1992: Articles 125 -162).  
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The works of these formal structures are complemented by that of the indigenous 
governance structures made up mainly of the Traditional Councils, the Regional Houses of 
Chiefs and the National Houses of Chiefs (Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992: Articles 
270-277). The Chieftaincy institution predates the colonial and post-colonial era, taking roots 
from the pre-colonial era and regarded as an institution of honour and dignity (Aning and Addo 
2005: 104; Article 270(b)). This traditional institution “represent[s] [its] people’s history, culture, 
laws and values, religion and even remnants of pre-colonial sovereignty” (Aning and Addo 2005: 
104), and plays significant roles in local and national governance despite its challenges. The 
ideals and conceptions that underscore the ‘resurgent heritage’ of traditional authority in Ghana 
include the belief that all power stem from the people; that traditional authorities reflect the 
embodiment of traditional values and norms; and that the traditional leaders serve as the bridge 
between the past, and future (Aning and Addo 2005: 106).   
A ‘chief’ is defined in the 1992 Constitution of Ghana as “a person, who, hailing from the 
appropriate family and lineage, has been validly nominated, elected or selected and enstooled, 
enskinned or installed as a chief or queen-mother in accordance with the relevant customary law 
and usage” (Article 277). Chiefs or queen-mothers and their elders preside over their subjects as 
custodian of the land, values, customs and tradition of their people, and administer their 
communities, districts and region based on customary law. The Chief Priest also plays specific 
roles, mainly spiritual, in contribution to this effort.   
Chiefs and their elders interpret and codify the customary law, as well as compile these 
laws and lines of succession as applicable to stools or skin, and as required of them by the 
Ghanaian Constitution (Article 272(b); Brobbey 2008). Customary law and usage, among other 
things, define crimes, taboos and threats to the survival of the community. Acts contrary to 
community laws, rules and regulations attract severe fines and punishment, and in some cases 
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banishment or death. The chiefs and elders, thus, securitise issues and depend on the consent of 
community residents to enforce it.  
  The attributes of traditional structures and governance processes captured above facilitate 
governance mainly within the rural/ local governance spheres, but chiefs equally advise on issues 
affecting chieftaincy at the regional and national levels. Issues related to chieftaincy or the 
traditional set up, depending on their nature, context and at what level, are handled by the 
Traditional Councils, the Regional or National House of Chiefs and finally the Supreme Court, 
where their Judicial Committees are unable to resolve them. The Houses of Chiefs, thus, have 
appellate jurisdiction in any cause or matters related to or affecting chieftaincy (Constitution of 
the Republic of Ghana 1992: 273(1)).  
  As mentioned earlier, the chieftaincy institution is protected from state interferences to the 
extent that Parliament has neither power to accord nor withdraw recognition to or from a chief, 
nor undermine the honour and dignity of the institution (Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 
1992: 270 (2a and 2b)). Parliament may, however, determine the composition of the members of 
the Regional House of Chiefs. They are also required to perform functions as may be conferred 
upon them by or under an Act of Parliament. The Chiefs are not allowed to take part in partisan 
politics, and those wishing to do so are required by the 1992 Constitution (Article 276(1)) to 
abdicate their stool or skin which reflects the symbol of authority. This is meant to preserve their 
status as custodians of the land, unifiers, wise men and women who must be as neutral and 
impartial as much as possible. They may, however, be appointed to public office for which they 
are qualified (Article 276 (2)). Given the negative traditional or cultural practices which 
undermine the rights of individuals, chiefs are tasked with evaluating traditional customs and 
usages so as to eliminate customs and usages that are outmoded and socially harmful (Article 
276 (2c)).  
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The institution is tasked with the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts at 
the various levels of jurisdiction. Hence if traditional councils are unable to resolve disputes 
which are chieftaincy-related for example, they refer the matter to the Regional House of Chiefs, 
then to the National House of Chiefs until a final pronouncement by the Supreme Court on the 
issue. Where disputes threaten social harmony and outbreak of conflicts, the DISECs and 
REGSECs are allowed to intervene at their respective levels and where necessary, the NSC 
comes in. These structures, processes and mechanisms, thus, complement each other in taking 
appropriate measures to safeguard the internal and external security of Ghana.  
A newly established institution known as the National Peace Council (NPC) was 
established in May 2011 to promote peace in Ghana and provide for related purposes (for more 
details see NPC Act 2011 (818); and National Peace Council Strategic Plan 2013-2017). The 
NPC was established by Act 818 of the House of Parliament with the objective to facilitate and 
develop mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution, as well as to build 
sustainable peace in Ghana.   
One major function of the Council among several others is to facilitate the amicable 
resolution of conflict through mediation and other processes, including using indigenous 
mechanisms towards peacebuilding. This outfit creates avenues for civil society intervention in 
disputes, some of which involves government institutions like the electoral management body 
and political parties, as well as in cases where government is considered as a party to a conflict or 
dispute, and which requires an independent body to intervene. Its role or functions has eventually 
evolved towards a kind of ‘good offices’ role which is widely recognised and accepted by most if 
not all parties in a dispute. This was made possible by the representation of highly respected 
individuals on the Council from widely recognised religious bodies and traditional institutions, as 
well as respected opinion leaders. The NPC has affiliate Regional Peace Councils (RPCs) and 
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District Peace Councils (DPCs) that complement its work, and perform similar functions at the 
regional and district levels in the country.  
Figure 5.2  
Security Sector Oversight Control Bodies in Ghana 
      
People  
Source: Adapted from Bluwey & Kumado (eds.), November 2007, p. 18.   
The above-mentioned structures, institutions, processes and mechanisms embody 
Ghana’s peace and security architecture with clear roles and functions for prevention, 
management and resolution of conflicts or threats to the state. These institutions have their own 
institutional cultures – derived mainly formal/colonial and informal/traditional cultures, 
mechanisms and processes for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, and for 
the minimisation or elimination of threats in the governance of the security sector. Hence an 
understanding, appreciation, recognition and acceptance of these institutional cultures, 
comprising a mixture of both indigenous and foreign cultures, would be essential in facilitating 
changes in negative behavioural practices of the actors towards enhancing good security 
governance practices and meeting security needs of the people and the state.  
5.4 Early Attempts and Formalisation of Security Sector Reform in Ghana   
Ghana’s security sector reform agenda was initiated in the early to mid-1990s after 
several years of coups d’état, military rule and dictatorships spanning a period of over two and a 
half decades. The genesis of these security reforms in the early 1980s took place under the 
erstwhile Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) military regime which later on 
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transformed into the National Democratic Congress (NDC) political party which ushered in a 
new democratic dispensation. The military dictatorships (1966, 1972, 1978, 1979 and 1981) 
which first began with the overthrow of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, the first President of Ghana in 
1966, were briefly interspersed by two other civilian governments (1969-1972 & 1979-1981) 
under the 2nd and 3rd republics as indicated in Table 5.1 above.   
The reforms which first focused on the economy of the country were in response to the 
many years of corruption, economic crisis and eventual economic doldrums which led to Jerry 
Rawlings’ revolution in 1979 (Aryeetey et al 2000; Rabinowitz 2018: 169-196; Adedeji 
2001:120). The causes of instability, as mentioned earlier in the chapter, included Ghanaian 
political, tribal and class contradictions backed by personal rivalries, and external influences 
from Western imperialist quarters, underpinned by a contentious and changing ideologies in the 
struggle for footholds in Africa Adekson (1976: 251-272). Corruption or ‘Kalabule’ also served 
as a major cause for the 1979 Revolution which resulted in widespread killings though initiating 
changes in negative behavioural practices towards growth and development (Rothchild 1985: 1-
6; Sam 2004; Adedeji 2001: 1-27; Chazan 1983).   
Alagidede et al (2013:6) observed a strong correlation between negative economic 
growth and periods of political instability and external shocks in Ghana by stating that “[t]he first 
negative growth occurred a year after the first military coup d’état in 1966, while the period 
1972, 1979 and 1981-82 coincided with military intervention”. The 4 June 1979 revolution and 
31 December 1981 military coup engendered eventual class struggles among the people with 
socialist and capitalist undertones towards steering the country out of its political and economic 
crises (Yeebo 1985: 64-72; Graham 1985: 54-68).  
Developing and getting the country out of its economic and political woes required major 
recovery efforts and structural changes which led to a consideration of the International 
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Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank interventions through which the Economic Recovery 
Programme (ERP) and Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) were implemented 
(Government of the Republic of Ghana 1983; Konadu-Agyemang 2001; Donkor 1997; & 
Hutchful 2002). The Bretton Woods institutions came with conditionalities perceived as 
encroachment on national sovereignty as developing countries at the time had no choice but to 
accept the conditions in an attempt to reverse the economic woes of the country (Loxley 1990: 
827).   
Tsikata (2006: 101) observed that Ghana’s status of having ‘anti-Western’ sentiments, 
informed by its non-aligned posture, but with clear socialist tendencies, did not immediately 
attract the IMF and the World Bank to its aid as it sought resources to offset terms of trade 
deficits and recover from ‘Africa’s lost decade’. But through this initiative, Ghana gained the 
status of a “star pupil” of the SAP, despite several challenges, thereby establishing the bedrock 
for further reforms and sustained stability and development (Tsikata 2006: 99). This was 
attributed to the strong local and national outlooks in the initiation of the programme and the 
early years of the ERP embarked upon. Adedeji, like Chazan, equally attributed this success to 
former President Jerry John Rawlings’ “strength of character and unwavering determination” 
(Adedeji 2001:1 from Chazan 1983). 
As part of the IMF/World Bank conditionalities to rationalise the economy and promote 
fiscal discipline and good governance, the state had to roll-back its major control or intervention 
in the economy through subsidies and other socialist policies, cut down its military or defence 
expenditure, and shift from excessive militarisation to opening the space for democracy to thrive.   
In the area of military and militarisation, Hutchful (1997: 251-278) identified six stages 
of transformation to include the politicisation and democratisation of the Ghanaian military 
between 1982-1984; its political disengagement and partial re-professionalisation between 1984 
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1987; undertaking further reforms and subsequent transition to democracy from 1987- 1992; the 
enhancement of civilian control over its activities from 1992-1996; a restructuring of the Armed 
Forces of Ghana; and facilitation of civil-military relations in the new democratic dispensation.   
Subsequent period of stability, mainly from the commencement of the 4th Republic of 
Ghana in 1992, facilitated the building of democratic institutions, separation of powers among 
the three branches of government, and awareness creation and the practice of good governance in 
the country. This was made possible largely by a strengthened opposition and the opening of the 
media space for freedom of expression (Boafo-Arthur 2007: 63-64). The security landscape also 
benefited from this development, as more demands were made on government and its security 
agencies to respect the rights of people and remain accountable to citizens.  
The Government of Ghana embarked on a National Institutional Renewal Programme 
(NIRP) in December 1994 as part of efforts to transform and strengthen a weakened and corrupt 
public service oriented towards development and promotional needs (Opoku 2010: 160; NIRP 
1995: 3).  This initiative was not carried out immediately in the security institutions and agencies 
especially under the National Democratic Congress Party government, which was largely an 
extension of the Jerry Rawlings’ PNDC, until much later in the 2000s and beyond when major 
reforms were embarked upon (Aning & Lartey 2009:2). Notwithstanding, the 1992 Republican 
Constitution of Ghana streamlined, rationalised and clarified roles of all the prominent security 
institutions for effective functioning and security service delivery. Other key legislations 
including the 1996 Security and Intelligence Agencies Act 526 also contributed towards defining 
the structure, composition and function of Ghana’s national security and intelligence apparatus. 
The formalisation of SSR and SSG concepts and processes only gained grounds in Ghana 
after the 2000 elections which brought about the transfer of power from one democratically 
elected regime to the other – that is from the NDC to the NPP (Hutchful 2008:111& 117 in 
167 
 
Bryden et al 2008; and Aning and Lartey 2009: 2). This included reforming formal security 
governance structures and indigenous ones, though donor support was initially geared towards 
formal security institutions and agencies.   
The period from 2001 to 2008 experienced basic reforms which were undertaken on ad 
hoc basis within security agencies and institutions rather than in a transformative and holistic 
manner. It was neither based on drafting a security policy to guide the sector nor structural 
reforms under the Kufuor administration. Selected security reform initiatives were embarked 
upon within the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior, and also within some of the 
security agencies including the Ghana Armed Forces and the Ghana Police Service.   
Series of security dialogues were also undertaken to sensitise and share experiences and 
good practices on security reform and governance initiatives towards effective and efficient 
security delivery (see Hutchful 2008 in Bryden et al 2008: 111- 128; Aning 2004; ASDR 
Roundtable on Police and Policing 2001:1-44). Security Sector Management (SSM) programmes 
were organised for both civilian and military personnel from the Ministry of Defence (MoD) 
(Ghana News Agency, 14 July 2004). Donor support facilitated some of these security reform 
and governance initiatives despite initial reluctance under the PNDC regime and the NDC 
Government. Security Sector Management (SSM) programmes were organised for both civilian 
and military personnel from the MoD (Ghana News Agency, 14 July 2004).   
These efforts succeeded to the extent that a platform was created for constant dialogue 
between civilians and their police and military counterparts in meetings, seminars, conferences 
and in the media. The discourse facilitated sharing of lessons from past experiences and prudent 
security practices, as well as cross-fertilisation of ideas between the security agencies and 
civilian security technocrats on capacity-building and the need for an effective and efficient 
service delivery of security needs in a democracy (OECD 2007: 38-39; also see Atuguba 2003: 
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1-29; and Addo 2002). All these were made possible by a transition process marked by a 
peaceful and stable democracy in which the economy thrived and people became informed and 
empowered enough to demand the respect of their rights.   
The late President of Ghana, Prof. Evans Atta Mills of the NDC, and his team who took 
over from the NPP Government after 8 years in opposition sought to focus more on improving 
the welfare and service conditions of security personnel, among others, under the 2009 Single 
Spine Pay Policy Scheme (See Ghana Government White Paper on the Single Spine Pay Policy, 
WP. No. 1/2009, November 2009). The scheme was designed to address low salaries and wages 
towards motivating interest and increased productivity in the public service towards better 
performance as compared to the private sector.  The single by 1 January 2010, which would 
constitute about 50% increase in comparison to the GHS1.9 billion at the end of spine pay reform 
was estimated to raise the base pay wage bill in Ghana to GHS2.8 billion 2008 (Cavalcanti 2009: 
1 in World Bank Policy Research Paper, December 2009). 
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), however, considered this as 
too expensive, unsustainable and had the propensity to increase government fiscal deficit with 
dire consequences on the economy (World Bank 2017: 74-85). Government’s move in this 
direction was informed by the fact that Ghana, in 2011, it arguably became the fastest growing 
economy in the world (Daily Graphic cited on myjoyonline.com 2011; Euler Hermes 2011: 3), 
and was also among the top ten fastest growing economy in the world in 2012 (The Sun cited on 
myjoyonline.com 2012; and Harding 2012: 2-3). It also had a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 
2014 amounting to US$48.7 billion (Ghana Statistical Services 2014).   
The John Mahama-led government that took over governance of the country after the 
death of former President John Atta Mills generally maintained the policies of its predecessors, in 
addition to enhancing the presence and image of the security services, especially the Ghana 
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Police Service. But despite this significant progress made in the past decade, owing to the 
stability and upholding good governance practices alluded to earlier, more still remains to be 
done (see Atuguba 2003: 1; Hutchful 2008 in Bryden et al 2008: 111& 124; and Badong 2009: 
6). The absence of a national security policy which ideally defines the interest of the state, its 
internal and external threats, and strategies and resources required to address these threats has 
captured Ghana’s securitisation of issues as ad hoc (Bluwey and Kumado 2007: 2-11).   
Challenges also persist in the areas of resistance to change within the security institutions 
and agencies, lack of political will, and the belief that there are more pressing demands in other 
sectors of the economy, including health and education (Beckitt and Bakrania 2010: 10; Hutchful 
2008: 124 in Bryden et al 2008). Though security sector governance, including issues of 
oversight, accountability and transparency in the security agencies and institutions, has seen 
some levels of improvement in recent times, owing to vigilance of civil society groups and 
actors, issues of corruption and lack of expertise in this area have served as a hindrance. Efforts 
to build capacity of parliamentary committees to ensure effective and efficient resourcing of 
security agencies and complementary service delivery also stalled and lost momentum.   
Notwithstanding and as mentioned earlier, civil society – comprising NGOs, policy and 
security think-tanks, and citizens in the general – played and continue to play active oversight 
roles through the engagement of government officials in the media, by demanding transparency 
and accountability in their performance of duty and service delivery. In addition, the traditional 
security mechanisms have complemented the formal security mechanisms in successfully 
managing perennial ethnic conflicts mostly in the northern parts of Ghana, and chieftaincy and 
occasional religious disputes across the country (Aning and Addo 2005).   
The successes chalked with regard to the macro-economic indicators present an 
interesting scenario for lessons to be learned, while the potential equally exist to strengthen 
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security sector governance as part of the statebuilding processes towards a more stable 
democracy for growth and development. 
Issues of security governance in the traditional system have been based mainly on the 
protection, security and safety of kingdoms and chiefdoms and their residents, despite limited 
attempts at introducing structured reforms as in the case of the formal sector. With time, 
however, it became necessary to undertake reforms by transforming the chieftaincy institution 
from fighting wars and defending themselves against their enemies in pre-and-post colonial times 
to pursuing dispute or conflict resolution, natural resource management, and other political, 
economic and social development programmes in the post-independence era (Brobbey 2008: ix-
x). Legislative reforms based mainly on the Chieftaincy Acts of Ghana (Act 370 of 1971; and the 
Revised Act 759 of 2008) and Chieftaincy provisions in the Ghanaian Constitution provided the 
basis for these reforms.  
Notions of leadership and legitimacy were central to important factors considered in 
ensuring successful security governance within the traditional institution (Focus Group 
Discussions, held in Abutia and Sunyani in the Volta and Brong Ahafo regions of Ghana 
respectively on 15 and 18 September 2015). Security referents were perceived to be in families, 
homes, communities and the nation and, thus, the focus of security governance in terms of 
meeting safety, security and protection needs was to be seen in this direction. Traditional leaders 
were equally of the view that there were some issues that fell squarely within the domain of the 
traditional leaders, and only these leaders had the skill, expertise and legitimacy to handle them 
as pertains to modern security governance arrangements. Some of these issues relate to seeking 
spiritual protection and healing, and adjudicating some disputes or conflicts, which the formal 
governance arrangements would have problems handling.  
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Some practices within the traditional governance system, alluded to earlier, are also 
perceived under modern value systems as backward and amounting to human rights abuses.  
Controversial examples were cited about the lack of discipline of children and youth leading to 
social ills and crimes given that when corrective measures are taken, it is considered within 
modern security and justice arrangements as human rights abuses.  This partly underscored the 
inherent tensions between the two approaches to security governance, with needed reforms to 
improve upon or integrate values, norms and standards. The need to do away with obsolete 
traditional customs that are harmful to the individual and the integration of traditional and 
modern approaches to security governance were equally highlighted. This was attributable to the 
fact that some security issues, including crime and robbery, have become too modern and 
complicated to handle by traditional security institutions, while others are equally best handled 
by them like alternative dispute resolution which is much cheaper and faster in some instances 
than pursuing cases through the legal justice system.   
In a nutshell, using only ‘top-bottom’ approaches to address SSG issues undermine local 
content and local ownership, which leads to the lack of proper understanding of the concept, as 
well as lack of legitimacy of leadership in the process.  Again, some traditional values, norms 
and standards also differ from that of the modern security governance and arrangements and thus 
require major behavioural and attitudinal changes in embracing the concept. Hence, the concept 
of security sector reform is considered as new, foreign and largely construed as imposed rather 
than internally spearheaded (Bryden and Olonisakin 2010: 6). Formalisation of SSG in Ghana, 
therefore, had to contend with some of the above-mentioned issues and find common and 
systematic approaches to ensuring a hybrid or integrated modern and traditional security 




5.5 Ghana’s Security Challenges and Responses: Whither Security Culture in Security   
       Sector Governance? 
  
5.5.1 Summary of Ghana’s Internal and External Security Challenges 
Several security challenges have confronted Ghana and posed threats to the peace and 
stability of the country. These threats can be categorised into internal and external security 
threats. The internal threats include chieftaincy, land and ethnic disputes; violent crimes 
including armed robberies, kidnapping, car-jacking, ritual murders and homicide; and perennial 
traditional/religious conflicts and disputes between settler farmers and cattle rustlers (Tonah 
2007: 3-240; Appiahene-Gyamfi 1998: 409-424; Adinkra 2005). Beyond these are also issues of 
food insecurity, inadequate health facilities and poor sanitation, and environmental challenges. 
External security threats, on the other hand, have manifested mainly in the form of transnational 
criminal activities including smuggling, human, drug and small arms trafficking, as well as 
piracy, violent extremism or terrorism (Addo 2006: 1-23; Birikorang 2007; Addo 2008: 197-
209).   
On the international front, the promotion and protection of the interest of Ghana, the 
respect for international law and treaty obligations, as well as the settlement of international 
disputes by peaceful means define its foreign policy and treaty obligations (Constitution of the 
Republic of Ghana 1992: Article 40(a-c). In this context, and as a country, Ghana is expected to 
adhere to other principles including that of the United Nations, the African Union and the 
ECOWAS, together with other international organisations of which Ghana is a member (Article 
40d (i-iv)).  
5.5.2 Ghana’s Security Complexes cum Security Culture Influences in Responses to Security     
         Challenges  
   
The values guiding Ghana’s pursuit for foreign policy is categorised into five major areas. 
These include national self-preservation or survival; emancipation of Africa and restoration of the 
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black people; establishment of power and influences in Africa; pursuit of world peace through the 
policy of positive neutrality and non-alignment; and international cooperation for development 
through intergovernmental action (Bluwey 2002: 46-47; Addo 2008: 198). These values were 
promoted mainly under President Kwame Nkrumah’s CPP government, based on the ideals of 
anti-colonialism, pan-Africanism and anti-imperialism in the Cold War era.   
Thus, an integrated domestic and external security policies guide government’s 
intervention in responses to security threats, be it prevention, management or resolution, but the 
extent of the application of these values and effective and efficient engagement of the security 
architecture toward responding to the state and people’s security needs require some critical 
assessment for enhancement.  
Responses to security challenges in Ghana are varied and are mainly undertaken by 
various security actors at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, with support from 
international partners. Additionally, traditional security structures and mechanisms have played 
complementary roles in ensuring effective responses to security needs. However, in attempt to 
assess the level of governance, and its effectiveness or impact on providing security needs of 
both the state and its people, roles played by internal and external actors are reviewed, while 
assessing the extent to which SSG efforts are externally driven and its general impact on the 
security reform process. This is expected to establish the level of complexity of the SSG process, 
given the different security cultures at play, the extent of legitimacy and for that matter 
acceptance, and options for enhancing the SSG process in Ghana. To do this effectively, conflicts 
in the Yendi chieftaincy dispute between the Andanis and the Abudus, and that of the Hohoe 






5.5.2.1 The Yendi Conflict and the Missing Elements of Cultural Sensitivities, Legitimacy and   
            Acceptance 
 
The Yendi conflict, which mainly highlights the lack of legitimacy and therefore 
‘acceptance’ issues, stemmed from chieftaincy succession disagreements between two gates (or 
royal families) – the Andaniyili and the Abuduyili – in the Dagbon Kingdom which was based, 
largely, on the rotation system from 1849 to 1953 (Mahama & Noble 2005). This ethnic group is 
patrilineal and, therefore, the most qualified son inherits the father after his death (Amankwa 
2005). The kin-makers are believed to follow a strict indigenous and widely acceptable 
customary process for selecting the most qualified descendant, mainly a son or one of the most 
qualified sons of the demised king.   
Amankwa (2005) recounts the intrusion of the Europeans, mainly British and Germans, in 
1899 to partition the Dagbon Kingdom, disrupt the rotation system to the skin, and introduce a 
new voting system. Prior to this, it is believed that the rotation system put in place by the people 
of Dagbon for selecting their kings worked rather well. The new voting system is believed to 
have included a probationary period for a selected king who had the tendency to be removed for 
performing below standard. This and other new practices, obviously, were alien to the indigenes 
and believed to have led to the disruption of the traditional system in place. The lack of 
codification during the pre-colonial days, and which the British also tried to find a lasting 
solution to but without much success, always affected and undermined standard practices within 
the chieftaincy institution (Amankwa 2005).   
This and subsequent political interferences in the post-independence period, including 
that of Nkrumah’s Convention People’s Party (CPP) and later the Progress Party (PP), based 
largely on western forms of governance introduced at the time, truncated the rotation and 
succession order in determining who became a king, i.e. Ya-Na. The political drift later aligned 
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the two gates, Andaniyili and Abuduyili who had the same grandfather in the person of Ya-Na 
Abdulai II, to the two leading political parties, the NDC and the NPP respectively, with 
traditional alliances to the CPP and PP respectively. This was partly to amass political sentiments 
and votes for political power, as well as the greed for access to land and other resources in the 
area (Sulemana 2009:110 - 138).   
This chieftaincy dispute eventually worsened and led to fighting between the two related 
chiefdoms caused mainly by disagreements surrounding the celebration of the Muslim festival, 
Eid al-Adha, and the Bugum (fire) festival in Yendi under the auspices and leadership of the Ya-
Na Yakubu Andani II. The Abudus preferred to celebrate these festivals separately from the one 
to be organised by the Ya-Na as they questioned his authority and leadership as the Chief of the 
area. The Abudus, aligned to the NPP Government which was in power at the time, subsequently 
went ahead to celebrate their own Muslim festival under police/military protection, thereby 
undermining the power and authority the Ya-Na. This development equally informed the Ya-
Na’s mistrust and rejection of an offer of police protection by the NPP Government to him and 
his palace, based on a suspicion of planned attacks on his life. The brewing tension led to the 
imposition of a ban on the celebration of the Fire festival by the REGSEC under the directive of 
the NSC and a 6.00 am – 6.00 pm curfew in the area (Republic of Ghana, 2002).   
The curfew which was expected to be in place from 24 to 26 March 2002 at the request of 
the DISEC did not hold as the Ya-Na requested the then Regional Minister, Prince Imoro Andani 
from the Andani Gate, to call off the curfew and lift the ban on the celebration of the Fire festival 
(Republic of Ghana, 2002: 67; Iddi 2013: 41). The Minister accepted the proposal and obliged 
with the Ya-Na’s suggestion by lifting the ban on the celebration of the Fire festival, as well as 
calling off the curfew on 24 March 2002 without consultations with either the REGSEC or the 
NSC. This unilateral decision by the government official sparked protests from the Abudus who 
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felt dissatisfied with the reversal of the decision and fears of possible attacks on their lives by the 
Andanis.   
Fighting thus began on 25 March 2002 and culminated in the murder of the Ya-Na on 27 
March 2002, allegedly by members of Abuduyili, in a three-day war under rather inexplicable 
and mysterious circumstances, and the destruction of properties at his palace and elsewhere (Iddi 
2013: 39-43). The degeneration of the dispute and its escalation was attributed to lapses in 
security in the area. Iddi (2013:42) argues that the “Yendi crisis of March 2002 was a clear case 
of security failure on the part of government both before and during the crisis”. His reason for 
this assertion was attributed to the slow response on the part of the security forces to the 
‘mushroom clouds’ which gathered into a ‘fog of war’ in Yendi as the security forces waited for 
the conflict to break out before responding to the crisis. The security forces were also 
understaffed and ill-equipped to respond effectively and proportionately to the crisis.   
In addition, the unilateral lifting of the ban on the Fire festival celebration and the calling 
off of the curfew at the request of the Ya-Na obviously compromised the security situation. 
Coordination between both traditional and modern security arrangements was poor and decisions 
were undermined by party political alliances and ethnic considerations. Similar killings of 33 
citizens also took place on 9 September 1969 which made the murdered Ya-Na a regent at the 
time (Mahama & Noble 2005). The disputes and killings, as well as destruction of property, in 
the March 2002 Yendi crisis brought instability in the region, and left the conflict partly 
unresolved till 2019 (Republic of Ghana 2002; Iddi 2013: 39). The uneasy peace continued to 
perpetuate fear and insecurity in Yendi and its environs, given the tendency for the conflict to 




The illustration above clearly indicates lack of cultural awareness and sensitivities, and 
the essential role legitimacy plays in the acceptance of leadership towards effective governance. 
It equally unveils the inefficient management of the conflict as a result of lapses in both modern 
and traditional conflict management and resolution mechanisms, and thus leading to disastrous 
consequences. Hence, despite the existence of security governance structures and mechanisms, 
lapses in the coordination and complementarity between and among these structures in a hybrid 
context eluded most if not all the actors involved. The police and military present in the area 
were unable to prevent the outbreak of the war, despite clear signals or early warning signs and 
curfews imposed in the area under the directive of the National Security Council. 
5.5.2.2 The Hohoe Conflict and the Essential Role of Cultural Awareness and Sensitivities in  
             Management and Resolution of Disputes 
 
In contrast to the Yendi conflict, a potentially dangerous conflict in the Hohoe District of 
the Volta region of Ghana which equally threatened to engulf the entire district and its 
surrounding areas was eventually managed and resolved amicably based on lessons learned from 
the past, and the complementary use of the hybrid indigenous and modern security arrangements 
in place (Iddi 2013: 44-47). The conflict erupted in June 2012, during the tenure of President John 
Atta Mills of the NDC government, between the indigenous Ewes from the Gbi ethnic group, and 
the settler Zongo (Muslim) community.  
 The genesis and triggers of the conflict were attributed to two main factors. The first was 
in relation to the destruction of the Hohoe Hospital properties by the Zongo youth who accused 
the hospital staff of delays resulting in the death of their electrocuted colleague by name Mr. 
Magid Malik, and the wrongful assault on a mortuary attendant suspected to be taking their 
deceased colleague to the mortuary against Islamic belief (Okoampa-Ahoofe 2012; Iddi 2013: 
43-44). This action subsequently led to a ban on the entire Zongo community by the Paramount 
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Chief of the Gbi Traditional Area, Togbiga Gabusu VI, preventing them from burying their dead 
on the land for the wrongful abuse of hospital staff and destruction of hospital properties.   
The second had to do with the exhumation, by the Hohoe youth, of the late Magid Malik 
and the late Chief Imam of the Zongo Community who were all buried after the ban, and which 
was seen as a violation of the ban imposed on the Zongo community by the Traditional Council 
(Ghanaweb, 11 June 2012). In response to these acts of exhumation considered by the Zongo 
youth as sacrilegious, the Zongo youth went on rampage and attacked the palace of the 
Paramount Chief of the Gbi Traditional Area, vandalised his properties, torched two of his cars 
and took away some regalia from his palace. They also torched some houses and vandalised 
some properties in the Hohoe municipality (Ghanaweb.com, 11 June 2012; & 
Modernghana.com, 18 June 2012).   
These attacks, particularly on the palace of the Paramount Chief  Togbiga Gabusu VI, 
angered the Gbi youth who equally considered the act as sacrilegious and thus engaged in 
reprisal attacks, resulting in violent confrontations in the municipality (Iddi 2013: 43). Houses, 
shops and other properties of the Zongo community residents were also destroyed, leading in the 
process to three reported deaths, and the burning of several houses and vehicles as a result of the 
fighting in the municipality (Panapress.com, 16 June 2012).  
Swift responses to this conflict by the political and civil society leadership at the national, 
regional, district and municipal levels, facilitated by the existing traditional and the modern 
security architecture, however, led to a timely and peaceful resolution of the conflict (Iddi 2013: 
44-47). The swift and formidable response came as a result of the intelligence gathered by 
security agencies about the likely spill-over of the conflict beyond the municipality, with ongoing 
attempts at mobilisation of other Zongo communities across the country to support their 
tribesmen. All relevant actors, including politicians, top security personnel, the various security 
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councils from the National to the District/Municipal levels, the Volta Regional House of Chiefs, 
the National Peace Council, the Chief Imam and some civil society organisations, facilitated 
mediation efforts, negotiations and dialogue, complemented by the deployment of 200 policemen 
and 300 military personnel in the municipality (Iddi 2013: 46-47; Daily Graphic carried on 
Ghanaweb.com, 15 June 2012; & Panapress.com, 16 June 2012). This laudable partnership 
between the state and sub-state actor groups in the resolution of the crisis gained a lot of 
recognition and commendation from Ghanaians and other international observers, given the 
potential spill-over effects and lax in responses to the crisis at the initial stages. This partnership 
goes to demonstrate the potential effectiveness and efficiency in the governance of the security 
sector. 
The contrast between the two conflict scenarios of Yendi and Hohoe enumerated above, 
therefore, reflects the need to reinforce the hybrid approach of engaging both the indigenous and 
modern security architecture in the governance of the security sector in Ghana. This approach 
was highlighted in the two focus group discussions held in Abutia Kloe in the Volta Region and 
Sunyani in the Brong Ahafo Region with members of traditional councils.   
In Abutia Kloe, the Traditional Council reiterated existing community partnerships and 
collaboration between the Ghana Police Service and the Council in which the GPS is called upon 
to resolve issues and vice versa in cases where the Council has the competence (Focus Group 
Discussion, 15 September 2015, Abutia Kloe, V/R). Calls were equally made to increase police 
presence and resources in the area as that serves to prevent crimes and facilitate timely 
intervention in the prevention of conflicts. In the case of Sunyani, the Traditional Council 
referred specifically to partnerships and collaborative efforts between and among the Chiefs and 
their people and the GPS in the identification and arrest of criminals in the community.   
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They equally cited the intensity and complexity of crimes in recent times as compared to 
the past, such as rape, abortion, armed robbery and murder, hence requiring this important 
partnership between the indigenous and modern security arrangements to combat them (Focus 
Group Discussion, 18 September 2015, BA/R). They also highlighted the potential of the 
traditional councils to deal effectively with spiritual issues in the communities that the law courts 
may have absolutely no jurisdiction or physical means of adjudication. 
Lessons from the above cases indicate the need to always contextualise security responses 
based on expertise, knowledge and cultural exigencies of diverse actors from different 
institutions for successful conflict prevention, management and resolution. Pursing only top-
bottom approaches or translational attributes in governance and security responses to threats or 
security needs without a consideration of the context and hybrid nature of actors involved results 
in failure with dire consequences. 
5.5.2.3 Positive Manifestations of Contextual Hybridism in Electoral Dispute Resolution 
Another pertinent area in the security governance process reinforcing the need for 
positive or progressive attributes of hybridity, that is contextual rather than translational 
hybridity, relates to the management and resolution of electoral disputes in Ghana. Since the 
onset of democratic governance in 1992 and its consolidation for more than two decades, 
elections have experienced tensions, violence and several electoral disputes, one of which ended 
up in the Supreme Court for final judgement in 2012. But the most tensed and highly contested 
election was that of 2008 where the ruling NPP was defeated by then opposition NDC party with 
a slim margin of about 40,000 votes. Emphasis on the 2008 elections, however, relates to the 
robust, hybrid and quite resilient governance and security institutions that helped in preventing 
the escalation of widespread violence, management of conflicts, and the resolution of several 
electoral disputes across the country (Debrah 2016: 371-387; Ayelazuno 2011: 22-47). The trade 
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unions, churches, political parties, policy think-tanks and other civil society and non-
governmental organisations got involved in averting a potential violence and national crisis. As 
Meissner (2010: 10) rightly observed, “… the positive course that the elections ultimately took, 
and the peaceful change of government they brought about, are in the end a purely Ghanaian 
success”.   
Table 5.2 
 
Major Events in Ghana’s Political Trajectory: 1957 - 2020 
1957-1958  Attempts at political pluralism  
1958-1964  Elected Civilian Regime  
1964-1966  One-Party System (CPP)  
1966-1969  Military Regime  
1969-1972  Elected Civilian Regime  
1972-1979  Military Regime  
1979-1981  Elected Civilian Regime  
1981-1992  Military Regime  
1992-1996  Political Transition  
1996-2008  Emerging Democracy  
2008-2020  Consolidated Democracy  
Source: Adapted from Institute of Security Studies (ISS) Situation Report (Zounmenou 2009: 2; & Gocking 2005)  
 
Zounmenou (2009:7) equally buttressed the strong and effective partnerships between 
civil society organisations, the media and the Electoral Commission of Ghana which helped to 
raise awareness about the necessity of transparent elections. In addition, however, he alluded to 
the peaceful power alternation in the country to three principal factors, including the political 
leadership decision to uphold constitutional term limits; the acceptance of the democratic 
consensus by social and political actors; and the efficient national election system or machinery 
(Zounmenou 2009: 1). This in no way projects the electoral system of Ghana as a perfect one, as 
many lapses exist and requires consistent attention. Notwithstanding, it holds major potentials for 
further consolidating democracy and good governance if values, norms and good governance 
practices are continually observed, as well as putting the collective interest of the country first. 
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5.5.2.4 International Partnerships and the Issue of Translational Hybridism  
On the international front, responses to transnational crimes and peacekeeping 
engagements have transpired mainly within the pursuit of Ghana’s foreign policy objectives.  
These objectives have been based on the principle of good neighbourliness towards achieving 
prosperity and dignity for all Ghanaians and their neighbours (Kufuor 2002: 6). This has 
manifested within the spheres of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, with Ghana’s strong 
participation in the activities of ECOWAS, the African Union and the United Nations. But given 
a rapidly changing or evolving global context, President Kufuor, in his first term of government 
from 2000-2004, encouraged collaborative partnerships between all security actors toward 
effective pursuit of Ghana’s foreign policy objectives in addressing transnational crimes and 
strengthening the country’s defence component of the foreign policy. He placed emphasis on 
civil society participation in this regard as this was perceived to be weak, with responsibilities 
mainly on the executive and legislature. The President iterated the following:  
Equally of great interest to me is how to cooperate with other states to deal 
effectively with cross-border crimes and weapons proliferation in our sub-region. It 
would be equally instructive to read your suggestions about the defence component 
of our foreign policy and how to set up an effective coordination mechanism 
between the Executive, Parliament, Academia, foreign policy practitioners and civil 
society so that such reviews of our policy options would occur on a more regular 
basis (Kufuor 2002: 11).  
This call on civil society, including academics/security experts and policy practitioners, 
was instructive in generating the desired partnership needed towards reinforcing Ghana’s foreign 
policy objectives and strategies in addressing its external security needs and challenges for the 
country.  The call created space for freedom of speech and expression, and also underscored the 
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need to mainstream shared values and preferences in securitising issues, and responding to 
external security threats within the ECOWAS region and beyond (Addo 2008: 203). The media 
facilitated this effort through civil society demands for accountability and performance in 
addressing security challenges confronting the country, be it terrorism, cross-border crimes like 
smuggling of goods and trafficking of small arms, drugs and human beings etc. Security experts’ 
views are equally sought on how to remedy the situation, while officials of government and their 
relevant ministries are called upon to address the situation in radio and television interviews and 
discussion programmes across the country.  
   Despite unquestionable commitments to regional, continental and other international 
security arrangements, some of the identified transnational security challenges have intensified, 
while others remain elusive and potential future threats. Questions of reflexivity in national and 
regional security arrangements based on shared values, and the commitment and willingness to 
address challenges in the region, particularly ECOWAS, still linger. At best, the argument could 
be made that Ghana’s attempts at addressing regional security challenges in the context of 
implementing ECOWAS security and governance protocols have not gone much beyond the 
rhetoric as issues of corrupt leadership, weak institutions, security lapses, and the lack of 
interagency coordination and inadequate resources continue to linger as in other West Africa 
countries (Addo 2006; & Addo 2008).  
In the area of security sector assistance and support from donors, while discussions and 
dialogue about the SSR concept and its implementation were initiated, facilitated and promoted 
essentially by an Accra-based security think-tank, the African Security Dialogue and Research, it 
also depended largely on external funding and support for its programmes, undertaking some in 
partnership with other international NGOs including the Stockholm Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI). From 1999-2003 for instance, the MacArthur Foundation gave a grant of US$300,000 for 
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undertaking a research on Security Sector Reform and Democratisation in Africa; and from 2001-
2003 the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and Swedish International 
Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) also gave US$300,000 for a research project on Africa 
Military Expenditures which it implemented in partnership with the SIPRI. It equally benefited 
from the UK Government Global Conflict Prevention Pool funding to the tune of US$187,000 for 
conducting research, seminars and workshops on Security Sector Governance in Africa from 2003 
to 2006 (Hutchful 2018). 
 On direct support to the Government of Ghana, the British Government, through its GFN-
SSR programme now Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC), focused 
mainly on networking, research and information sharing, capacity-building, and promoting the 
SSR Concept in Ghana (GFN-SSR, December 2007).  In addition to this, other security sector 
reform, governance and management training programmes, aimed at capacity-building, were 
undertaken by the British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT) and other security and 
academic institutions with expertise in the area. This focused mainly on training and equipping the 
military. The African Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) also focused on “enhancing peace support 
operations capabilities; security sector reform; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; 
curbing small arms proliferation and misuse; and researching the economic and financial causes of 
conflict” (DFID ACPP, September 2004). As part of this programme, Ghanaian peacekeeping 
troops were deployed in Cote d’Ivoire under ECOMICI in 2003 through ACPP funding to the tune 
of ₤3.5 million (DFID, September 2004: 10).  
These support and training programmes were underpinned by western cultures and 
ideologies and were undertaken based on certain conditionalities. The knowledge gained and 
capacity built were thus translated and acquired respectively. 
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The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Ghana Office also played active 
roles in the support of security reforms in the country. The UN agency which has a much broader 
and holistic definition of security in line with the human security definitions considers issues of 
exclusion from governance and decision-making processes as well as corruption as having a 
negative impact on a country’s security and stability (interview with Justice Agbezuge of UNDP 
Ghana, 19 May 2015).  It has largely focused its attention on addressing small arms and light 
weapons proliferation in Ghana (Tandoh & Satsi 2017) and has also made significant 
contribution to the establishment of the National Peace Council in Ghana. Its support in this area 
has contributed to the development of the National Peace Council’s five-year Strategic Plan from 
2013 to 2017 which guided its programmes and activities over the past years (Awinador-
Kanyirige 2014: 1).   
In addition to its support to the National Peace Council, the UNDP has also facilitated 
capacity-building in the area of alternative justice and lending support to Chiefs and other 
traditional and religious leaders in the country, as some have adjudicative functions under the 
1992 Ghanaian Constitution (Ghana News Agency, 27 July 2013).  
In as much as these assistance and support from donors have facilitated the introduction 
of the SSR concept and capacity-building within security agencies, contributions to security 
sector reform and governance in Ghana, and for that matter West Africa and Africa as a whole, 
still faces challenges from examples given above (Brzoska 2003: 6). This, in most cases, is 
attributed to the undemocratic and regime centredness of African governments, unpredictable 
security environment, huge military budget expenditures, and lack of immediate reward from 
assistance to the security sector as compared with other sectors which are mainly development 
focused (Brzoska 2003: 6-7; Knight et al 1996: 1-37; and Davoodi et al 2001). Few exceptions 
however exist in post-conflict countries like Sierra Leone and Liberia where the British and 
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American governments invested heavily in security sector reform efforts, made easy by defined 
roles in peace agreements and in support of UN-led post conflict reconstruction efforts (Accra 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, August 2003 and Lomé Peace Agreement on Sierra Leone, 
July 1999).   
In all these support or assistance, the contentious issue has been that of donor influences 
and demands in the areas of donor aid, prescriptive programmes, and conditionalities. The 
security sector benefits directly or indirectly from donor aid in the context of guaranteeing 
human security which covers broad areas of security needs. Aid, despite its benefits, however 
goes with conditionalities in accessing donor funds to implement national policies and 
programmes. It equally requires accountability and transparency as a means of justifying 
expenditures on identified areas with proposed impact.   
The Ghana Aid Policy and Strategy (2011-2015), which was later revised (2014-17), was 
developed to help the country attain a middle-level income status by the year 2020 (Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Planning (MoFEP), GoG 2010). The aid component of Ghana’s GDP 
declined significantly from approximately 25.2% in 2002 to 9.8% in 2008 owing to Ghana’s 
qualification to access the Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) funds and Multilateral Debt 
Relief (MDRI) (Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation 2014:3).  
Notwithstanding, the Ghanaian Government has argued that “[t]he use of policy and 
process conditionalities by development practitioners have undermined the delivery of aid in 
considerable ways, especially when conditionality is subjected to DP [Development Partner] 
interpretation” (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 2010: 13). This makes the 
acceptance of future aid problematic and its effectiveness is equally questioned given the high 
demands associated with it. Justice Agbezuge acknowledged the country’s challenges regarding 
donor support to the security sector mainly in the form of imposed conditionalities in terms of 
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meeting specific project requirements during project implementation (interview with Justice 
Agbezuge, UNDP Ghana, 19 May 2015). While some of these conditionalities may be necessary, 
for instance with regard to transparency and accountability, it was equally acknowledged that 
some of the demands from these conditionalities are considered by recipient countries as 
unrealistic and in turn stifle project implementation.   
It has generally been argued, though, that the country’s security needs must be addressed 
from government’s perspective, and security assistance must be tailored to the priorities or 
security needs of the country and its people. Government, thus, has the option to refuse the offer 
and adopt homegrown approaches in terms of security responses to issues (interview with Mr. 
Samuel Amankwah, Director of Research, Ministry of the Interior, Accra, 10 May 2015).   
Going forward, the current government of Nana Addo Dankwa Akuffo-Addo has taken a 
different approach to the aid issue by visualising ‘Ghana beyond Aid’. This policy strategy is 
meant to afford government the opportunity of using Ghana’s own resources and human capital 
to develop its economy, while reducing its dependence on development partners for financial, 
human and technical aid or support in this direction. President Akuffo-Addo out-doored the 
‘Ghana beyond Aid’ Charter during his 2019 May Day address in Accra (See details on 
myjoyonline.com, 1 May 2019).   
A successful implementation of this policy would facilitate governance and decision-
making within the security sector without following prescriptive security programmes, but 
equally maintaining transparency and accountability standards (Brzoska 2003: 9; and Winkler 
2002: 8). This approach would create options and the potential for acceptability, local ownership, 
and sustainability of the SSG concept with local content. This does not, however, eliminate 
possibilities of adopting SSR/SSG best practices for effectiveness and efficiency in the sector.  
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Responses to conflicts and disputes of this kind in the domestic and international fronts 
have informed Ghana’s relative peace and stability over the past decades amidst coups d’état, 
land conflicts and chieftaincy disputes, domestic and transnational crimes and other related 
security challenges, and have equally manifested in the areas of its peacekeeping endeavours 
abroad. The challenges identified above, no doubt, present issues of complexity and acceptance 
of the SSR/SSG concept, and the need to explore useful means to enhance its implementation in 
Ghana.  
5.6 Options for Enhancing Security Sector Governance in Ghana  
For Ghana’s growth and development to be sustained and improved upon, the country’s 
security sector and governance must be enhanced in order to overcome the many security 
challenges that threaten to undermine this prospect. This would require taking a look at specific 
options to improve the governance process as part of statebuilding efforts.  
 To begin with, the issue of security culture, looking at its major impact in responses to 
security challenges in the sector, must be rethought and properly understood in order to facilitate 
effective security governance. This is very necessary given the composition of the sector, 
characterised by many security actors with different conceptions and perceptions about security. 
The sector, as noted above, comprises core security actors made up of security personnel; 
management and oversight bodies manned by government officials and civil servants in the 
executive, legislative and judiciary; and civil society actors including non-governmental 
organisations. There are also justice and rule of law actors made up of human rights institutions 
and activists, the penal system and traditional justice actors, and non-statutory security personnel 
including the private security companies among others. We also have international actors like 
donors and other international partners who bring their influences to bear through the promotion 
of security concepts, drafting of projects and programmes, undertaking training and capacity-
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building, as well as rendering support and assistance through funding towards their 
implementation.  
  Clearly, the multiplicity of these actors with different security cultural values, norms, 
practices and dispositions present a complex and dynamic set of security referents that need to 
coordinate joint efforts in addressing common security needs and threats to the Ghanaian state and 
its residents. Former President Kufuor underscored the essence of this partnership for effective 
responses to security needs of both the state and its people (Kufuor 2002: 6). These complex 
security cultures, however, require clearly defined roles and responsibilities to help address who 
does what, when and how. These cultures range from formal to informal security cultures, with 
varied political, ethnic, ideological and professional/organisational undertones, and all of which 
have values, norms and principles regulating thoughts and behavioural patterns and dispositions. 
This must equally be complemented by a basic reorientation of attitudes or behavioural changes 
that emanate from grasping security objectives and dividends based on possible outputs and 
outcomes of such changes.   
This presents options for credible transformation rather than reform in the security sector. 
This would, however, be made possible through the recognition of the existence of the different 
and multiple security cultures and sub-cultures for that matter, and the decision to either embrace 
or co-exist with these cultures. This brings to the fore the contentious issue of modernity and 
tradition and finding common grounds within a hybrid context for co-existence.  
In the two conflicts reviewed above, it was quite obvious that the one involving the 
murder of Ya-Na  Yakubu Andani II, overlord of the Dagbon Kingdom in Northern Ghana, had 
its roots from years of external influences attributed to the intrusion of the Europeans, mainly 
British and Germans in 1899 as cited earlier (Amankwa 2005). This intrusion led to the 
partitioning of the Dagbon Kingdom and the disruption of the rotation system to the skin 
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(throne), and as a result an introduction of a new voting system. This act eventually led to the 
disruption of an existing traditional governance system, and its replacement through an 
imposition of a modern form of governance that has brought about major divisions between two 
related royal houses until only recently when the ‘peace pipe was smoked’. The introduction of 
the new voting system, through colonial influences, took place without the recognition of 
existing cultures with its indigenous dynamics sustained over several generations. A ‘top-bottom’ 
approach in this instance did not also help in resolution of conflict until the traditional conflict 
resolution approach was adopted.  
Additionally, the politicisation of the chieftaincy institution, particularly in the post-
independence era, also made it difficult to address the conflict given the changing levels of 
legitimacy for both the political elites and that of the chiefs involved in the disputes.  Legitimacy 
here is generally construed as the legal or cultural acceptance, recognition and support to the state 
or traditional leadership in the execution or implementation of policies or decisions reached 
towards meeting the needs of both the state and citizens or community and its residents (Hoehne 
2011: 6-7 from Weber 1956:170). In the traditional context, legitimacy stems from the local 
history, culture and tradition and depends on a leader’s ability to cultivate and maintain that 
legitimacy or lose it (Keulder 2010: 152; Hoehne 2011: 7). The loss of legitimacy through the 
Yendi conflict cost the Ya-Na’s life.  
 In the other conflict at Hohoe in the Volta Region between the indigenous Ewes from the 
Gbi ethnic group and the settler Zongo (Muslim) community, a lasting solution was found given 
that internal actors who understood the culture of the disputing factions and the local context 
collaborated with several other security actors or stakeholders, both state and sub-state, using a 
‘bottom-up’ approach to find solutions to the problem. There was also a classic engagement of 
both the modern and traditional security arrangements to resolve the crisis, thereby underscoring 
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the strength in adopting an appropriate hybrid security governance system in security responses. 
In this context, issues of ideation, based on rich experiences and knowledge of the indigenous 
context and dynamics, contributed effectively in containing the conflict.  
 With regard to the resolution of electoral disputes, similar efforts were made by engaging 
and activating Ghana’s security architecture in responding to a very tense electoral dispute 
between the two traditional parties of NPP and NDC which could have easily destabilised the 
country. Though the Supreme Court eventually dismissed the allegation of diverse and flagrant 
violations of statutory provisions and regulations governing the conduct of the December 2012 
elections on a unanimous decision of 5 to 4, and though the opposing party disagreed with the 
decision it accepted the judgement (Asante and Asare 2016: 1-6). This was as a result of the 
perceived fairness, credibility and transparency demonstrated by the Supreme Court in its 
hearings throughout the process. Foreign interference in this context was rather minimal geared 
mainly towards calling for peace and urging the use of legal and peaceful means to resolve the 
dispute.  
 On the issue of donor aid and conditionalities, responses from interviews conducted 
suggest the need for government to refuse foreign concepts, programmes and projects that ignore 
the local or indigenous context and content. This is because conditionalities make it difficult for 
the implementation of programmes as it aligns with prescriptive or ‘top-bottom’ approaches to 
addressing issues, which eventually gets rejected by the populace.    
The above lessons demonstrate the need to coordinate joint effort among diverse security 
actors to achieve stated security goals and objectives, which would require gaining insight into 
the security culture of actors, as well as issues of leadership and legitimacy. This will build trust 
and confidence in the modern and traditional governance systems and thereby facilitate the 
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broader acceptance of the concept and the willingness for its implementation at the various 
levels, including the grassroots.   
The lessons drawn from the above case study could be summarised in the diagram below:                          
                                                                     Figure 5.3 
Diagram Depicting Top-Bottom and Bottom-Up Approaches to Governance of the Security Sector 
in Ghana 
 
The actors referred to above operate in a triangular context in which levels of engagement 
or interaction in the security governance process vary at horizontal and vertical levels, but could 
adopt the top-bottom or bottom-up approaches in response to security needs depending on which 
comes in as relevant in a hybrid system. The horizontal level depicts relations between these state 
and sub-state security actors in responding to security threats and needs, while the vertical level 
reflects their growing levels of interaction from the grassroots through the national to the 
international level. The actors at the top of the triangle are mainly international partners with 
heavy influences, considered as imposing proposed policies and concepts including that of the 













Source: Author, 2019  
International Actors 
 – Donors, 
,  Regional bodies  
and Int. Orgs 
 
State  Actors  – Executive,  
Legislature, Judiciary  
 
Sub - State Actors  – 
Traditional/Religious  
groups,  CSOs, NGOs,  
Private Security  
Companies  
Levels of interaction of between   State and sub- State Actors  
193 
 
The second-level tier in the triangle are the official or state actors that serve as the 
interface between the international partners and the sub-state or local actors, who are usually 
construed by the sub-state actors at the lower level of the triangle as responsible for 
implementing programmes and projects, some of which are not conducive or do not conform to 
local traditions or context. Some of these officials of government are seen to easily accept and 
propagate concepts from international partners as a result of bribery and corruption which 
eventually undermines the trust and confidence reposed in them.  
The negative behavioural challenge of corruption which undermines transparency and 
accountability in the effective and efficient delivery of justice and security needs to the state and 
its people remain a major threat to Ghana’s security. Hence, in the case study review of fighting 
transnational crime for instance in the West African region, issues of drug, human and small 
arms and light weapons trafficking have proved very difficult to address owing to the weak 
capacities and inability of state institutions to address entrenched corrupt practices within the 
sector (Atuobi 2007). Complicit acts involving government officials, lack of adequate equipment 
and resources, lack of proper coordination and porous borders have contributed to these 
persisting challenges.   
Similar challenges also exist on the domestic front where corruption within the criminal 
justice system undermines efforts to fight crime in the country. The recent revelation by an 
investigative journalist in Ghana, Anas Aremeyaw Anas, of bribery and corruption within the 
judiciary in which higher officials in the judiciary, mainly judges, were caught on tape 
negotiating or accepting bribes remains instructive in seeking ways and means to improve upon 
governance in the security sector (Banesseh 2015; BBC News, 8 December 2015). This is 
cardinal to leadership in eliciting the legitimacy required to govern the security sector.  
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5.7 Conclusion  
 The guiding research question in this case study has been to assess the extent to which 
security culture influences could minimise the complexity and facilitate the acceptance and 
effectiveness of security sector governance in Ghana. This was informed by the quest to enhance 
security sector governance in the country. In achieving this objective, however, it becomes 
obvious that several intervening factors, including the understanding of the concept of SSR/SSG, 
the recognition and clarification of complex security culture interactions, and the need to attain 
the required level of legitimacy or acceptance from security referents, must be circumvented.   
These issues have lingered and served as stumbling block to consolidating security sector 
governance efforts in Ghana and, for that matter, West Africa and beyond. Security sector 
governance has, thus, been limited to reforms within security institutions and agencies without a 
holistic approach to grasping the SSR/G concept. Limited efforts are also made to map the actors 
and their respective cultures, as well as recognise and understand the complexity of the security 
terrain as a result of the mixed cultures and how to effectively govern within this context. Above 
all, an informed leadership quest to bring about proposed changes based on a national security 
policy and transformation of the sector does not appear to be a priority.  
This case study, therefore, serves to unveil existing security culture challenges that hinder 
effective governance of the sector, and serve as a guide to the process of enhancing reform and 
governance of the sector. In doing this, it was established mainly through desk reviews, 
interviews and focus group discussions that SSR/G as security concepts are indeed foreign but 
must be understood in the indigenous context in which it is implemented. Doing this would, 
nevertheless, require an informed and legitimate leadership capable of identifying with the 
security needs of the state and its people, and being able to effectively coordinating multiple 
security actors, both internal and external, with varied security cultures to deliver.  
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Security governance in this context would take place in a highly contentious but hybrid 
environment, where the diarchy in modernity and tradition needs to be contextualised in 
achieving results.  This must equally be guided largely by bottom-up approaches to drafting and 
implementing a national security policy that holistically incorporates the interest of the Ghanaian 
state and its people, and internal and external threats with proposed measures, responses, 
modalities and concepts to guide the process of implementation. Adequate strategies and 
resources must equally be availed to facilitate its implementation.  
 The mix of security cultures, both local and foreign, would require the need to imbibe 
positive foreign cultures and values that are relevant to the local context, while eschewing those 
that undermine prudent indigenous security governance and mechanisms and that have helped 
secure and stabilised the state thus far. The transformative element in this process would, 
however, require behavioural or attitudinal changes through effective awareness creation and 
sensitisation on the SSR/G concept, its purpose and objectives, benefits in terms of output and 
outcomes to be derived, as well as capacity-building and skills training to embrace and 
implement the concept. Acculturation through socialisation and exposure must, therefore, be 
guided by the Ghanaian value system and normative standards derived from its Directive 
Principles of State Policy which is clearly spelt out in the Ghanaian Constitution.  
 Given the tendency for negative behavioural practices, resistance to change and the 
unpredictability of human behaviour, qualitative attributes through good leadership and sound 
security culture values based on notions of ideation and discourse must come into play to 
guarantee success of the entire process. This must be based on positive attributes stemming from 
the values and norms of both modern and traditional governance systems, and as reflected in the 
positive steps taken by stakeholders in the security sector to prevent, manage and resolve 
disputes or crisis. They include being fair and honest, having integrity, seeking the truth, 
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recognition of actors and understanding their roles, and gaining the needed legitimacy and 
acceptance, among others, in a spirit of unity and togetherness to lead and govern. All these 
values inform progressive cultures or security culture and are enshrined in most if not all the 
legal frameworks, including the Ghanaian Constitution and other governance and security 
legislations. Hence the issue of relativism or ambiguity does not necessarily arise as all these 
values, principles and standards have moral and legal basis in common and customary laws as 
reference points for guidance, education and practice. 
In conclusion, security culture in the Ghanaian context could be largely perceived as 
providing an ideational context for understanding wherein, certain preferences in both modernity 
and tradition have become established for effective security governance. Additionally, it has 
created shared patterns of thought and argumentation that have established pervasive and durable 
security preferences in attempts to understand or formulate concepts, legitimacy preferences, and 
the efficacy of particular approaches, mainly ‘bottom-up’, to protecting values (Williams and 
Haacke 2008:129;  Johnston 1995a: 6).   
Also, ‘software’ changes through imbibing positive culture, values and behaviour, as well 
as the respect of democratic principles, is gradually emerging as compared to ‘hardware’ changes 
based on Western security models of reform, including re-equipping, rebuilding and training  
(Murray 2009:187-188; and Sedra 2013: 371-374). It is therefore obvious, thus far, that security 
culture in Ghana could and has had ‘major influences on security sector governance in Ghana 
which has brought about changes which appear more ‘intrinsic’ than cosmetic or ‘instrumental’ 
in security governance and responses to security threats and needs (Hill 2012: 93). This has 
largely contributed to the peace and stability the country currently enjoys in terms of prevention, 
management and resolution of security challenges in the country and explains why culture 
matters. Therefore, a focus on cultures would certainly minimise the complexity of the security 
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sector and facilitate the acceptance and enhancement of the SSR/G concept in the country 







SECURITY CULTURE INFLUENCES ON SECURITY SECTOR GOVERNANCE AND 
PEACE AND STABILITY IN NIGERIA  
6.1 Historical Background  
The name Nigeria is believed to have stemmed from a Berber word “Ni Gir”, also written 
as ‘N’jer’, which stands for the River Gir or the flowing body of water (Jefferys 1964: 8 & 444- 
450). The coining of the word ‘Nigeria’ has been contested but largely attributed to Flora Shaw, 
wife of a former British Governor General Lord Frederick Lugard of then Northern and Southern 
protectorates of the country (Times of London 1897; Meek 1960). Nigeria refers to the ‘Niger 
area’ thereby reflecting an amalgam of the word ‘Niger-ia’. Other definitions also refer to the  
Latin meaning of the word ‘black’ or a ‘dark area’. 
Nigeria is located between latitudes 4°N and 14°N in West Africa and shares borders with 
the Republic of Benin to the West, Niger to the North, Chad to the Eastern part and the  
Republic of Cameroon to the South-Eastern part. It is bounded in its southern part by the Atlantic 
Ocean in the Gulf of Guinea area. As the most populous country in Africa, it has a current 
population of about 200,963,599 people (World Bank Data 2019) with a total landmass area of 
356,669 square miles or 923,769 square kilometres. It has the general West African vegetation of 
a coastal savanna, mangroves, forest vegetation from the southern portions to its middle belt, and 
a dry Savanna or Sahelian vegetation to its northern parts. The country comprises 36 states with 
an additional Federal Capital Territory (FCT) of Abuja, which is its capital town. The following 
map gives a vivid description of Nigeria: 




         The Political Map of Nigeria  
 
Source: United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) [Online] Available at   
              https://www.unido.or.jp/en/coming/3077/. (Accessed: 19 August 2019). 
 
The Nigerian state which got its independence on 1st October, 1960 from the British and 
became a Republic in 1963 experienced a lot of activities in its pre-colonial and colonial periods 
which contributed immensely towards the formation of its polity. Trans-Saharan trade from the 
Northern parts of Nigeria across the Sahara desert to North Africa, Europe and the Middle East 
spanned the “golden age” that is between the 14th and 17th centuries. This period witnessed trade 
in mainly gold and slaves (Falola and Heaton 2008: 15-39). Contact with Europeans in its coastal 
areas from 1450 to 1850, however, brought about radical changes in its political, socio-cultural, 
economic and demographic trends which eventually led to the redefinition and creation of the 
State. This period experienced the abolition of slave trade, pursuit of commercial interests and 
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embarking on missionary activities which brought European influences and the introduction of 
Western culture (Osuntokun and Olukoju 1977: 169; Falola and Heaton 2008: 61-84).  
The Fulani Jihad, fall of the Oyo Empire and the advent of colonialism in the 19th century 
precipitated the evolution of the Nigerian culture in its pre-colonial, colonial and post-
independence eras (Osuntokun and Olukoju 1977: 14). The creation of the Nigerian State began 
in 1914 with the amalgamation of both Northern and Southern British Protectorates which 
eventually led to the formation of 36 states and its FCT. The colonial state which emerged in the  
20th century facilitated the imposition of the Western culture of the European imperialists. 
Though there were some initial forms of resistance, the Western influences dominated but did 
not obliterate existing indigenous cultures which still reflect the customs and tradition of the 
diverse indigenous groups with similar cultural traits reflected in their language, art, customs and 
tradition (Ikime 2000: 1 – 615; Osuntokun and Olukoju 1977: 30 – 35).  
The British form of governance was based largely on indirect rule where local or 
traditional chiefs were used to administer the colonial master’s policies which were largely based 
on exploitation of raw materials for foreign industries. This so-called “divide and rule” approach 
to governance established the culture of top-bottom approaches to government policies, 
exclusion of the masses from decision-making processes and lack of ownership of policies, 
programmes and development activities. In the areas of religion and education, the spread of 
Islam had to contend with the introduction and fast-spreading Christianity, mainly in the southern 
and middle belt regions, to the detriment of traditional religion. In a similar vein, western 
education gained grounds but equally provided the opportunity for further interrogation into 




Specific cultural traits acquired from colonial rule and domination has influenced 
Nigeria’s post-independence nation-building, growth and development with both positive and 
negative consequences. The Nigerian Constitution, delimitation of its territory and division into 
states, the structure of governance, education and several other development processes were 
initiated in its colonial period, and built upon in the post-independence era just like all its West 
African and, for that matter, African neighbours.  
The gaining of independence in the Cold War era left the destiny of Nigerians in their 
own hands with the task of nation-building and redefining its development goals. Securing its 
independence and republican status, and keeping the nation together as one entity, became its 
immediate challenge given the diverse ethnic groups including the Yoruba, Hausa, Igbo, Fulani, 
Urhobo-Isoko, Efik-Ibibio, Kanuri, Edo, Tiv, Ijaw, Nupe and Bura (Osuntokun and Olukoju 
1977: 14-18; Ikime 2000: 14-15; Nwagu 2014). The period to follow was characterised by 
political instability in the form of military coups, civil wars, economic challenges and the 
eventual quest for political stability and good governance (Ejiogu 2011:3-181; Dike 2014: 1-8). 
This political destabilisation came as a result of ethnic differences, greed and corruption of 
leadership, and the inability to fairly distribute wealth to Nigerians across the country and at 









Name of Leader        Year    Duration       Remarks  
Her Majesty’s 
Government  
Prime Minister Tafawa 
Balewa  
1960 - 1963  3 yrs  Nigeria still under 
British Colonial Rule  
National Council of 
Nigeria and the 
Cameroons  
Dr. Benjamin Nnamdi 
Azikwe  
1963 - 1966 2 yrs 3 months One-party civilian 
government 
(overthrown through 
coup d’état)  
Federal Military 
Government of Nigeria  
Maj. Gen. John A. Aguiyi-
Ironsi  
1966-1966  7 months  Military Government 
(overthrown through 
coup d’état)  
Supreme Military 
Council(SMC) I  
Gen Yakubu Gowon  1966-1975  9 yrs  Military Government 
(overthrown through 
coup d’état)  
Supreme Military Council 
(SMC) II  
Gen Murtala Ramat 
Muhammad  
1975-1976  7 months  Military Government 
(overthrown through 
coup d’état)  
Supreme Military Council 
(SMC) III  
Maj. Gen Olusegun 
Obasanjo  
 
1976-1979  3 yrs  Military Government 
handed over power to 
a civilian government  
National Party of Nigeria 
(NPN)  




coup d’état)  
Supreme Military Council 
(SMC)  
Maj Gen Muhammadu 
Buhari  
1983-1985  1 yr 8 months  Military Government 
(overthrown through 
coup d’état)  
Armed Forces Ruling 
Council (AFRC)  
Maj Gen Ibrahim Badamosi  
Babangida  
1985-1993  8 yrs  Military Government  
Interim National 
Government  
Chief Ernest Shonekan  
 
1993-1993  3 months  Handed over power to 
interim government 
Provisional Ruling 
Council of Nigeria  
General Sani Abacha  
 
1993-1998  4 yrs 7 months  Military Government 
took over power from 
Interim Government 
Provisional Ruling 




1998-1999  8 months  Military government 
assumed power after 
death of military leader 
People’s Democratic Party 
(PDP)  
Olusegun Obasanjo  1999-2007 8 yrs 3 months  Civilian Government 
elected through 
democratic elections  
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People’s Democratic Party 
(PDP)  
Umaru Musa Yar’Adua  2007- 2010  3 yrs  Civilian Government 
hands over power to 
another democratically 
elected government  
People’s Democratic Party 
(PDP)  
Goodluck Ebele Jonathan  2011-2015  4 yrs  Civilian Government 
hands over power to 
another democratically 
elected government  
All Progressives Congress 
(APC)  
General Muhammad Buhari  
 
2015-2020  5 yrs Civilian Government 
still in power  
Source: Author’s 2020, adapted from World Atlas, available at https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/nigerian-  
                presidents-and-military-leaders-since-independence.html. 
 
From the above table, Nigeria experienced a turbulent 33 years of governance 
characterised by military coups d’état and dictatorships and interspersed with a brief handover of 
power to civilian governments between 1979 and 1983. This development entrenched 
authoritarianism and dictatorships with consequent human rights abuses and undemocratic 
governance practices which posed major challenges to security sector reform in the country 
(Sanda 1987; Frank & Ukpere 2017; & ICG Report No 237/Africa, 2016). The country has also 
been confronted with many challenges in the areas of governance, socio-economic ills, ethnic 
and religious conflicts, environmental problems, terrorism, kidnapping, armed robberies and 
transnational security challenges including human, drug and small arms and light weapons 
trafficking among others (Ikejiani-Clark 2009: 1-609; Ellis 2016: 1-230).   
Attempts at addressing these challenges in the security sector have not achieved much as 
efforts have revolved mainly around civil-military relations and control, professionalisation of 
the military, demilitarisation of society and general restructuring of the security sector (Bryden et 
al). Efforts towards effective transformation of the sector have been very minimal as issues of 
good democratic governance of the sector through oversight, transparency and accountability, 
effective legislations, and inclusive decision-making processes, among others, are yet to be 
entrenched. Addressing all these issues would possibly require a better understanding and 
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implementation of the SSR/SSG concept, defining roles of actors or stakeholders, gaining 
legitimacy based on bottom-up inclusive approaches to governance, and properly integrating 
indigenous security mechanisms into the country’s security architecture.  
The chapter therefore interrogated security challenges and security culture influences, 
through governance, in addressing these challenges. It specifically focused on finding out if 
understanding the divers security cultures and integrating the indigenous security mechanisms 
and processes into the Nigerian security architecture could help enhance security sector reform 
and for that matter, governance in the country. In doing this, the Chapter captures Nigeria’s 
security arrangements, conceptions and perceptions about security culture and security sector 
governance in Nigeria, efforts undertaken to reform the sector, challenges encountered and 
options, based on findings, for enhancing security governance of the sector. All these helped 
answer the question as to why culture matters and the need to minimise complexity to afford 
acceptability and enhance security sector reform and governance agendas in the country. 
6.2 Nigeria’s Security Sector and Governance Arrangements  
Nigeria’s security sector, like many others in West Africa and beyond, is structured to 
handle internal and external security of the country. The 1999 Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria and accompanying security acts on the Nigeria Armed Forces (NAF), 
National Police Force (NPF), National Security Agencies (NSA) and the Nigeria Security and 
Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) established and made provision for the management of security 
institutions and agencies for effective and efficient security service delivery in Nigeria. 
Provisions are made for security agencies at the federal and state levels of government, with the 
President of Nigeria and the respective Governors of the various states presiding over these 
security institutions at appropriate levels. The security agencies comprise the NPF and NAF, with 
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accompanying paramilitary security agencies such as the immigration service, customs and 
excise, prisons service, the fire service and the NSCDC.   
The efforts of these institutions are complemented by the NSA comprising the Defence 
Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and State Security Services 
(SSS). The DIA deals with the prevention and detection of crime of a military nature against the 
security of Nigeria; internal and external protection and preservation of classified military 
matters concerning the country; and other defence intelligence matters deemed necessary by the 
President or the Chief of Defence Staff. The NIA deals with the maintenance of security, not of 
military nature, outside the country and other related matters as the President or the National 
Defence Council may deem necessary. The SSS on the other hand is responsible for the internal 
prevention and detection of crime against the security of Nigeria, and the internal protection and 
preservation of non-military classified matters against the security of the country. It carries out 
other such responsibilities within the country to be assigned by the President as he may deem 
necessary (Olakanmi & Co. 2015).  
These agencies are managed by various government Federal ministries including those of 
Defence, the Interior, Foreign Affairs and Finance. The various security councils and 
commissions, comprising the Council of State, the National Defence Council, the National 
Security Council, the Nigerian Police Council and the Police Service Commission, advice the 
President on security related matters with regard to public safety, appointments, discipline and 
dismissal of personnel, and internal oversight. They also cover matters in relation to 
administration and organisation of the agencies. The following diagram gives a vivid picture of 




                                                              Figure 6.1 
 
The Structure of Nigeria’s Security Architecture as defined by the 1999 Constitution 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the 1986 National Securities Acts of Nigeria 
 
 
Source: Adapted from the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the 1986 National Security       
              Agencies Act 
 
Other security actors with responsibility and oversight functions for the security sector 
include Committees in the National Assembly of Nigeria at the Federal level and that of the 
House of Assembly at the State level. Some of these Committees comprise those of the Air 
Force, Army, Customs and Excise, Defence, Interior, Maritime Safety, Education and 
Administration, National Security and Intelligence, Navy, Public Safety and Intelligence, and 
Public Accounts. These Committees facilitate law-making by the respective Assemblies at 
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transparency and accountability of security institutions and agencies. The Judiciary at the Federal 
and State levels is equally charged with interpretation and enforcement of the law, as well as 
ensuring the upholding of the rule of law and access to justice.  
On the private security and civil society front, we also have different sub-state actors like 
the private security companies, the militia groups, and the community vigilante groups that 
provide security for private and public institutions, communities and individuals for that matter. 
Some of these sub-state actors fill in crucial gaps where the police are unable to deliver the 
required public safety. Again, civil society organisations, non-governmental organisations, 
security think-tanks and some academic, religious and traditional bodies also play active roles in 
ensuring public safety and security in Nigeria. Nigeria also has a National Human Rights 
Commission (NHRC) which serves as an extra-judicial mechanism for promotion, protection, 
enhancement, enjoyment and enforcement of human rights. These actors generally complement 
the Nigerian core security actors at the federal and state levels.  
Traditional rulers, in addition to religious leaders, are also known to play major roles in 
conflict prevention, management and resolution. A traditional ruler is regarded as one in 
possession of inherent traditional authority and ordained by God, with support of ancestral 
spirits. He or she enjoys the loyalty and goodwill of his or her people as the embodiment and 
custodian of societal customs and traditions, but his or her roles, in general, have been modified 
as a result of colonial influences and imposition of foreign or alien political culture (Ajetunmobi 
& Osunkoya 2009: 242). These foreign influences have led to some changes in societal values 
which have, in turn, undermined the power, prestige and privileges of traditional rulers construed 
as appendages to British colonial rule rather than a repository of tradition and customs of the 
people. This raises clear questions about the legitimacy of these leaders vis-a-vis their formal 
counterparts in the pro-Western system of governance.   
208 
 
This development has equally resulted in the lack of constitutional provision to 
institutionalise the roles and functions of traditional leaders. Article 20 of the 1979 Constitution 
calls on the Nigerian State to protect and enhance the Nigerian culture. The 1963, 1979 and 1989  
Constitutions also gave constitutional backing and assigned advisory roles to chiefs on the 
Federal Council of State (Article 140; Third Schedule Part 1(1J) of the 1979 Constitution) and 
the State Council of Chiefs (Article 178(b) of the 1979 Constitution) as well as the proposed 
Traditional Councils and their functions in designated Local Government Areas (Article 8, 1-3). 
The 1999 Constitution, however, neither gave any constitutional backing for chiefs, their 
representation on the Council of State, maintained a State Council of Chiefs, nor assigned them 
functions at the local government areas.   
Several factors account for this, including the age-old tension between tradition and 
modernity, and the negative impact of colonial indirect rule which not only politicised the 
traditional institutions, but also depicted them as former agents of foreign rule and domination 
(Tonwe & Osemwota 2013: 133-134; Adesina 2018: 8; Ajetunmobi & Osunkoya 2009: 240). 
Notwithstanding, traditional leaders are still respected and held in high esteem, enjoying credible 
levels of legitimacy from their subjects and citizens, as well as government officials who depend 
on them for guidance and advise. They personify the culture and tradition of their people and 
ancestors and still play active executive, legislative and judicial roles at grassroots without 
official recognition (Tonwe & Osemwota 2013: 134).    
With this major gap, issues of collective governance of the Nigerian security sector at the 
Federal and State levels by both formal and indigenous security institutions have remained a 
topic of major discussion as questions still remain unanswered on issues to do with legitimacy of 
the state and sub-state actors with or without constitutional backing or status, amidst major issues 
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of corruption in the sector and increasing security threats, particularly from Boko Haram, armed 
robbers, kidnappers, farmer-herder conflicts and some vigilante groups or militias.  
The diagram below shows the security actors having oversight control and responsibilities 
within the Nigerian security sector governing system.           
Figure 6.2  
 
 
6.3 Conceptions and Perceptions about Security Culture and Security Sector 
      Governance in Nigeria  
 
Lewis and Bratton (2000:2) in an Afrobarometre survey in Nigeria gave credence to 
public opinion considering it as an important aspect of democracy. Its importance relates to its 
ability to endorse official power which tends to strengthen legitimacy of rulers, or hold leaders 
accountable for actions, inactions and indecisions. Of particular importance, however, is the fact 
that these opinions “… consist of values, attitudes, evaluations, and preferences of ordinary 
citizens” (Lewis and Bratton 2000:2). These attributes, together with political behaviours, 
summarise a country’s political culture. Same also apply to its security and security culture.  
As a country of a huge population and diverse cultures, Nigeria has struggled to maintain 
peace and stability in the country owing to the many security challenges confronting it. Attempts 
to gain insights into the conception of and perception about security and security culture in the 
country from pre-colonial times to the current dispensation brought up interesting findings. A 
Security Oversight Control Bodi es in Nigeria 
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typical sense of peace, security and stability is conceived within a village, town or a community 
setting in which people must live in peace and harmony with each other in going about their 
political, social, economic, religious, ethnic and cultural activities.   
In pre-colonial times, a king or a chief, together with the elders of the community, are 
tasked with the responsibility of either guaranteeing or ensuring the safety of each individual, 
families and the community at large through freedom from fear, famine and hunger, wild animals 
or attacks from enemies from neighbouring villages and towns. As a result, in cases where 
disputes or conflicts arose among members of the community, a timely and peaceful resolution of 
the disagreement was sought between and among either individuals, groups or communities as it 
had the tendency to destabilise the peace and stability of the village or town (Ajayi & Buhari 
2014: 138-154). In a worst case scenario, peaceful coexistence is sought. Early warning measures 
and mechanisms are also put in place to detect and prevent crimes or the outbreak of conflict or 
war within and between villages and towns.  
Notwithstanding, the concept of security means different things to different people and 
remains a broad subject-matter. In the informal context, within some communities and localities, 
it is largely perceived as an assurance that anything within the environment is safe, and there is 
no threat to the safety of the people (interview with Chief Alhaji Abdulfatai A. Adesanya, 
Oloritun of Ijada Community, Ijebu-Ode, Ogun State, 28 March 2018). In the formal context, 
however, it has both traditional and human security connotations which focuses mainly on state-
centric goals or individuals, groups and people’s needs. But the common denominator in these 
contexts is for individuals or a state to feel safe and secure, as having a sense of protection 
guarantees security (interview with a Rtd. Brig Gen/State Official in the All People’s Congress 
Government, Abuja, 05 January 2018).   
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In the current Nigerian context, however, focus on security tends to sway more towards 
the traditional or state-centric approaches to security than that of human security. 
Notwithstanding, the 2017 Round 7 Afrobarometre survey summary results in Nigeria revealed 
interesting findings in which a significant percentage of Nigerians living in urban and rural 
communities, countrywide, felt quite safe in their neighbourhoods despite the increasing reports 
of crime in the country. When quizzed on safety with regard to walking in the neighbourhoods 
within the past one year in both urban and rural areas, 67% of respondents and their family 
members indicated never feeling unsafe; 16% felt unsafe just once or twice; 11% felt unsafe 
several times; 4% many times; and 2% always.   
With regard to fear of crime by respondents or their family members in their own homes, 
71% in both rural and urban areas never feared crime; 15% feared crime just once or twice; 8% 
feared crime several times; 4% feared crime many times; while 2% feared crime always. It is 
therefore, quite instructive that a significant percentage of the Nigerian populace felt quite safe 
amidst increased reports of insecurity in the country, though this survey relates to safety and 
crime only in the community and neighbourhood. Data on theft from the house or being 
physically attacked countrywide also revealed similar statistics as regards those feeling unsafe 
while walking in the neighbourhood and crimes at home (Practical Sampling International 2017:  
9).  
Security culture in Nigeria is construed as very diverse and varied among different groups 
of people, both in the informal and formal settings, as well as within ethnic, religious, social 
groups, and organisations. This raises the issue of complexities as there may not be 
commonalities across these varied and diverse cultures (Interview with Chinedu Nwagu, Project 
Director, Trust Africa-Nigeria, Abuja, 05 January 2018). The complexity of shared values on 
safety and freedom from threats among different groups of people and institutions, thus, calls for 
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dialogue in bridging gaps to arrive at a holistic or national sense of security culture in order to 
guide security sector reform and governance processes (British High Commission Official, 
Abuja, 05 January 2018).   
Given that culture is not static, but varied and keeps evolving, it is important to 
contextualise security culture by ‘tailoring’ foreign but positive security cultures to suit the local 
context (interview with Rtd. Brig Gen/State Official of the All People’s Congress Government, 
Abuja, 05 January 2018). This is important as accepting external cultures without modification 
could cause a lot of problems. Again, understanding security cultures can minimize inter-agency 
or inter-group rivalry as they have their peculiar cultures and needs. Therefore, not having a 
culture of cooperation remains a major problem (interview with Akingbolahan Adeniran, Rule of  
Law Advisor, Office of the Vice President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 05 January 2018, 
Abuja). Omatete (1972:291) argues that a high probability exits for the Nigerian State to remain 
secure as a nation based on the observance of its preferred national values, which depict its 
holistic national culture. Culture, in turn, is equally seen as central to the solution of social and 
national problems as it is predicated upon ultimate values which motivate human and national 
actions (Oladiran and Adadevoh 2008: 97).  
Chief Alhaji Adesanya (Ijebu-Ode District, Ogun State,  28 March 2018) considered 
vigilantism as a security culture, not only in Ijebu-Ode in Ogun State of Nigeria, but as a security 
culture of the people across Nigeria. This is reflected in the activities of the youth of the 
communities who go through some form of traditional initiation processes to empower 
themselves to protect their communities against crimes and all forms of security threats to the 
people through non-state community policing (Pattern 2008).  
In the area of security governance, indigenous governing structures and mechanisms were 
put in place to ensure safety, peace, stability and development in communities (Olowu & Erero 
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1997: 106-109). The king or chief, depending on the context, had the general responsibility of 
ensuring peace and security in the land. He also led his people to war, in the pre-colonial days, to 
defend his village or town. In a Yoruba community for example, he is referred to as ‘Kabiyesi’ or 
he who cannot be questioned as his decision was final (Falola & Genova 2005:299). There were, 
however, checks or mechanisms in place to guide the king in his decisions, actions and 
pronouncements despite his combined executive, legislative and judicial powers. The elders, 
usually sub-chiefs, gave advice and counsel to the paramount chief or king, and in some cases 
made decisions to abdicate him from the throne or banish him from the community if he is seen 
to be excessively dictatorial or brutal in his reign (Olowu & Erero 1997: 108; Tonwe & 
Osemwota 2013: 131; Uweru & Ubrurhe 2000: 6).   
The king is availed of able-bodied men who serve as native police to enforce laws and 
decisions, and as palace guards, undertaking arrests and incarcerating criminals, getting 
intelligence, and defending the residents against any attacks from outside (Ajetunmobi & Ojo 
2015: 7-8). The traditional priest served as the spiritual guide and the eye of the community, 
working closely with the king and elders in the governance of the village, and in cases where 
major decisions needed to be made, the consent of the subjects were sought in a community or 
village durbars etc. Other indigenous systems were also put in place for crime prevention, trials 
and prosecution of criminals (Tade & Olaitan 2015: 138-150).  
In current times, similar arrangements exist within the formal system of governance 
through colonial influences and arrangements where decisions on security matters are made at 
three major levels, including the federal, state and local government levels. The President, 
Governor and the Chairperson preside over these three hierarchical levels of governance. The 
separation of powers into the executive, legislative and judiciary arms of government facilitates 
decision-making, adoption of strategies, and the needed checks and balances to address security 
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challenges to the Nigerian state and its people. Security agencies are also there to enforce the rule 
of law as well as defend the country from aggressors while maintaining peace and security in the 
country with its monopoly over the use of force.  
Attempts have been made in the past to integrate both traditional and formal systems of 
security governance towards the peace and stability of the country but this collaboration 
eventually faltered into practical, needful collaboration rather than a legal, recognised and 
accepted roles and responsibilities under the Nigerian Constitution. As mentioned, earlier 
constitutional provisions, including those of 1963, 1979 and 1989, detailing the roles of 
traditional leaders on the Council of State and as the Council of Chiefs were eventually removed 
from the revised 1999 Constitution mainly for alleged historical, political and financial reasons. 
This has generated several debates among traditional rulers, politicians and academics on the 
need to restore or not to restore and integrate these roles in the Constitution.  
With current security challenges confronting the country, including those of terrorism in 
the north-eastern parts, environmental degradation, high crime rates and massive corruption, an 
urgent decision ought to be made to address the issue as the formal security architecture or 
arrangements are unable to address these security challenges alone, given its magnitude and 
dynamics (Tonwe and Osemwota 2013:128-138).  
 
6.4 Early Attempts at Security Sector Reform in Nigeria in the 1990s  
Relics of colonial rule in Nigeria in the forms of indirect rule through primordial 
traditional institutions, establishment of a police force for exploitation rather than a police service 
to enforce the rule of law, and an imposed foreign rule complicated democratic governance in the 
country in the post-independence era. Military dictatorships, civil war, corruption with its 
attendant political, socio-economic and ethnic problems gained traction, destabilising peace and 
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democracy in the country. The several years of military rule after independence led to massive 
abuses of human rights, loss of lives, curtailing freedom of speech and expression, and lack of 
accountability and transparency among others things (Fasakin 2015: 298 – 317).   
These undemocratic practices undermined the principles of good democratic governance 
in which military dictatorships set the pace by dictating development policies and governance of 
the country. Over three decades of military rule distorted governance arrangements by usurping 
the roles and functions of the respective arms of government, including that of the legislature and 
the judiciary. The brief stint of civilian rule between 1979 and 1983 and the interim government 
of 1993 under Shehu Shagari and Shoneken could not reverse the autocratic culture until the 
restoration of a prolonged democracy from 1999.  
The economic recession in the late 1970s to early 1980s affected the Nigerian economy 
based on its major dependency on crude oil with its attendant price fluctuations. This, together 
with massive corruption in the system, created high levels of unemployment and worsening 
poverty, necessitating the need for economic reforms based on the Bretton Woods institution’s 
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). This programme, with its laissez faire approach, 
required a liberalization of the Nigerian economy by the Federal Government through opening up 
for investment and putting in measures to curtail excessive spending, while diversifying the 
economy.   
These measures led to the introduction of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
World Bank (WB) conditionalities which required a devaluation of the Naira to address balance 
of payment deficits, as well as address high interest rates among other things. These measures 
were put in place with the intention of fixing Nigeria’s ailing economy and possibly restoring 
good democratic governance through constitutional rule after stabilisation of the economy. These 
reform measures under the civilian and military governments in the 1980s and early 1990 did not 
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have much impact as expected (Ikejiaku 2008: 1-6; Biersteker 1993: 133–152). Reasons for the 
lack of success were attributed to harsh conditionalities, weak implementation strategies, high 
levels of corruption and lack of fiscal discipline among others. This period was thus characterised 
by lack of good democratic governance with massive unemployment, low intensity conflicts, 
energy and environmental challenges, as well as increasing crime rates with little or no attempt to 
reform the security sector.  
The mid-to-late 1990s experienced major changes in terms of political activism and 
external pressures to address human rights abuses, environmental degradation in the oil 
producing areas of the country, as well as calls for change in military dictatorships to civilian rule 
as part of good democratic governance in the country. For instance, civil liberty and human rights 
groups’ activism for change, including the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), 
National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS), Nigeria Bar Association (NBA), Nigeria 
Union of Journalists (NUJ), Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC), and Women in Nigeria (WIN)  
increased pressure on the Babangida regime to hold elections in June 1993 (Amuwo 1995:1-6). 
This was preceded by a 168-page White Paper with plans by the Babangida regime to return the 
country to civilian rule by 1990, acknowledging in the process however that old habits die hard 
(in New York Times by Brooke, July 1987).   
The plan entailed having local non-party elections in 1987, forming a constituency 
assembly in 1988, removal of the ban on party politics in 1989, and holding State elections and a 
national population census in 1991, while ending with local, State and Federal elections in 1992. 
All these coupled with efforts by political and environmental activists like Ken Saro Wiwa and 
Chief Moshood Abiola, presumed winner of the June 1993 elections, eventually prepared the 
ground from transitional arrangements toward return to civilian rule in the country in 1999 after 
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the death of General Sani Abacha, the strong Nigerian military ruler (McLuckie and McPhail 
000: 1- 291). 
6.5 Formalisation of SSR/SSG processes in Nigeria  
The assumption of power by the Obasanjo-led government gave a glimmer of hope as 
citizens and international observers held the view that a disciplined military leader with pro-
democratic qualities would be the panacea for restoring Nigeria on its right footing by ensuring a 
peaceful, stable and democratic country. The stage was set for reforming the security sector after 
the long years of military rule and entrenchment of autocratic culture within the security 
agencies. Measures were taken, generally, to restructure and professionalise the security agencies 
in the country, mainly the armed forces and the police force, while reinforcing civilian control 
over the sector (Bryden et al 2008: 243-267).   
A major indication of formalising security sector reform and governance processes in  
Nigeria was reflected in former President Obasanjo’s address to the National War College 
graduates in July 1999 where he sought to define the roles, structures and hierarchy in the 
effective management and operation of the security sector, as well as its delivery on security 
needs of both the state and its people. The speech which focused mainly on civil-military 
relations called for civilian control of the armed forces with the President as Commander-in 
Chief; a civilian head for the Nigerian Ministry of Defence; and subjecting military operations, 
investigations and trials to civilian authority and principles among other things (Bryden et al 
2008: 247). The main focus on the SSR was, thus, on civilian control of the sector and 
restructuring of the security agencies.  
In 2004, however, attempts were made to adopt a broader approach to addressing security 
needs in the country, given the ever-growing and increasing rates of crime, corruption and the 
springing up of Boko Haram, the terrorist group in the North-Eastern part of the country. In the 
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2004 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper where one of the objectives was to improve security and 
administration of justice in the country, emphasis was placed on increasing the effectiveness of 
the NPF and access to justice in the country, as well as creating a more effective criminal justice 
system. Other issues covered reforming the prison service, promoting and protecting human 
rights, improving the judicial system, and increasing women’s rights among other things.   
Emphasis thus shifted from a restricted focus on the state and security agencies 
restructuring or reforms to embracing more of individual and people’s security needs (see 
Nigeria Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper in IMF Country Report No. 05/43, December 2005: 
94-97). This was to be done in partnership with civil society actors through imbuing the right 
values and attitudes towards safeguarding lives and property. It also made provision for 
providing safety nets for the vulnerable groups, fighting drug abuse and corruption, and 
equipping and providing training to security agencies for effective and efficient delivery of 
security services (IMF Country Report No. 05/43, December 2005: 95).   
Challenges in the areas of lack of effective transparency and accountability within the 
respective National and House of Assemblies at the Federal and State levels, high levels of 
corruption and poor governance over the security sector undermined the realisation of stated 
goals and objectives. Hence, the hope and aspirations in the Obasanjo administration were short-
lived as reforms within the security sector were generally limited to professionalisation of the 
military, increased numbers of the NPF, and equipping the security agencies to respond to 
security threats.  
Subsequent administrations of the late President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua and Goodluck 
Ebele Jonathan had to contend with major security crisis. These included the Boko Haram 
terrorist onslaught, the Niger Delta Oil Crisis, Farmer- Herder disputes, and increased crime rates 
of armed robberies, kidnapping, rape, as well as internet impersonation or ‘advanced fee fraud’ 
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also known as ‘419’ – named after section 419 of the Nigerian criminal code. In the midst major 
concerns and apprehension about the criminal activities of Boko Haram, including bombing of 
public places, infrastructure and kidnapping of girls from schools, President Muhammadu Buhari 
resolved in May 2015 to put in measures to eliminate Boko Haram, stem the tide of corruption 
and promote human rights in an attempt to stabilise and promote peace, security and 
development in Nigeria.   
His campaign promises on security in Nigeria included state and community policing, 
recruitment of more personnel for the NPF, the establishment of an anti-terrorist agency at the 
Federal level, as well as the establishment of an anti-crime squad to combat terrorism, 
kidnapping and armed robbery among others. Other promises also included the establishment of 
a Conflict Resolution Commission to mitigate and resolve conflict within Nigeria, and reforming 
the justice system for rapid hearing and dispensation of cases including those of corruption and 
terrorism (SBM Intelligence Report 2016: 1-48).  
In all these efforts, no structured attempt has been made to draft a national security policy 
for Nigeria until recently, and undertake a comprehensive reform strategy in clearly defining 
roles and responsibility of all actors, particularly the indigenous ones, to engage in an effective 
security governance process in the country. Less is heard of structured and effective civil society 
partnerships with government agencies to fight crime, as these institutions are seen working 
within their own remits of providing security for individuals and communities. The security 
agencies lack the numbers and the resources to cover the entire country and communities amidst 
insecurities, leading to traditional rulers presiding over various local militias and vigilante groups 
to maintain safety in their communities. In certain cases, the NPF and local government 
authorities are compelled to depend on these traditional security actors to effectively function in 
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their areas of jurisdiction (interview with Chief Alhaji Abdulfatai A. Adesanya, Ijebu-Ode, Ogun 
State, 28 March 2018).  
6.6 Nigeria’s Security Challenges and Responses: Whither Security Culture in Security 
Sector Governance? 
 
6.6.1 Summary of Nigeria’s Security Challenges 
 
Nigeria is well known for many security challenges confronting the country, and fears 
have been expressed severally about the major negative consequences to West Africa and the 
continent at large, should a major conflict or crisis breakout in the country. Reasons for this are 
based on its huge population with attendant challenges in an event of internal displacement or 
refugees spilling over across the borders; its big economy and contribution to economic 
development in the region; as well as possibilities of increased transnational or cross-border 
criminal activities among others (Obi 2008: 183-196).   
This notwithstanding, the country has remained generally stable since the Biafran civil 
war between 1967- 1970 (Heerten and Moses: 2014: 169-203), but facing both internal and 
external security threats. These threats are similar to those in other West African countries and 
beyond, but differ in dynamics, intensity and scale. They include armed robberies, human, drug 
and small arms and light weapons trafficking, kidnapping and rape, cyber-crime and its related 
advanced fee fraud, herder-settler disputes, and ritual murders and occultism (Marenin and 
Reisig 1995: 501-518; and Ellis 2016). In addition to all these, however, terrorism in the north-
eastern part of the country has become a major threat to the lives of citizens up north, claiming 
many lives, displacing the population and leading to destruction of properties.  
 The security situation in Nigeria has deteriorated over the years to the extent that the 
Federal and State governments have struggled to maintain the safety of citizens and residents in 
communities, villages, towns, cities and the country at large. This has resulted in the springing up 
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of vigilante groups and people’s militia across the country to fill the gap left by the inability of 
security agencies to cover the entire country. The NPF has a force strength of 371,800 with 
police to people ratio of 1:600 persons compared with the UN standard ratio of 1:400 persons, 
while the force strength of the armed forces is around 200,000 (see ISSAT, February 2018, 
Premium Times Newspaper, 22 September 2017). All these have implications for the peace and 
stability of the country. It raises issues about security responses, partnerships and putting in 
adequate and appropriate measures to govern the security sector towards effective responses to 
these threats. 
6.6.2 Nigeria’s Security Complexes cum Security Culture Influences in Response to   
         Security Challenges 
 
In the area of partnerships, informal or indigenous security arrangements under the 
leadership of traditional leaders, together with external support and assistance to government 
efforts in addressing internal and external security threats to Nigeria, has remained quite weak 
and needs further interrogation to remedy the situation. In doing this, however, three of the above-
mentioned security challenges would be used to assess the nature of challenges being encountered 
in the governance of the security sector, and explore which direction governance of the sector 
should head to improve upon the security situation in the country. The three security issues to 
consider are terrorism, the Niger Delta oil crisis and the herder-settler farmer disputes. 
6.6.2.1 Responses to Terrorism 
Terrorism in Nigeria gained momentum following the establishment of the Islamist Jihadist Boko 
Haram Group, also known as Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidha‘Awati Wal-Jihad – People Committed 
to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad – in 2001 by Mohammed Yusuf, inspired 
by the al-Qaeda 9/11 terrorist attack in the New York (Davieson 2014:27; Akinbi 2015: 34; 
Maiangwa & Uzodike 2012: 2; Adesoji 2010: 96-98). Its terrorist activities began mainly in 2009 
and got intensified in 2011 during the tenure of former Presidents Yar’Adua and Goodluck 
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Jonathan under its new leader Abubakar Shekau after the death of Mohammed Yusuf in prison in 
July 2009. The group like other Islamic terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM), al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al-Shaabab in Somalia, and the 
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and the Levant (ISIS/L), was established to fight against western 
interest, mainly western education, exploitation and discrimination.   
The Boko Haram movement despises western education as bringing little benefit to 
human kind, only abject poverty. It is considered abominable and therefore a sin or taboo, 
translated locally as ‘haram’. (Akinbi 2015: 35; Adesoji 2010: 100). This terrorist group operates 
as a fierce, vicious and barbaric group, with a secular motive of establishing an Islamic state in 
Nigeria under the strict Islamic law known as the Sharia. Hence, all those who fail to observe the  
Sharia or are non-Muslims become an object of attack as they are considered infidels and sinful. 
With this religious and ideological conviction, Boko Haram has carried out several terrorist 
attacks on innocent individuals, Muslim and Christian worshipers, foreigners or expatriates, in 
communities, villages, towns and cities of various states in the North-Eastern part of Nigeria. 
Some of these states include Adamawa, Abuja – FCT, Bauchi, Borno, Jos, Kaduna, Kano, 
Plateau and Yobe (Akinbi 2015: 36-40; Simonelli et al 2014). The calamities resulting from 
these attacks include killing by use of explosives as well as crude implements and weapons, 
kidnapping, rape and other related acts which amount to gross violation of human rights. These 
barbaric acts have also led to displacement of large populations internally and across the borders.  
The Federal Government of Nigeria initiated attempts at combating these atrocities meted 
out by the Islamic Jihadist group under the Goodluck Jonathan and Muhammadu Buhari 
administration without much success as the activities of these terrorists still continue, though on a 
limited scale under the Buhari-led government. In 2011, a special Joint Task Force (JTF) was set 
up to fight Boko Haram. This JTF included the Army, Navy, Air Force, the police and state 
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security services. This Task Force has conducted several raids on Boko Haram resulting in 
killing some of their members, but a comparatively larger number of innocent civilians leading to 
significant human rights abuses (Mbah & Nwangwu 2014: 67-68). This only served to increase 
the spate of attacks from the terrorist group, creating more havoc and fears based on which the 
Nigerian Nobel Laureate, Wole Soyinka, acknowledged Nigeria’s “dismal watershed” in its 
nation’s history (New African Newspaper, 1 April 2012 Edition).   
These attacks were also directed at traditional leaders who condemned Boko Haram’s 
onslaught and horrific acts, as some were killed and others escaped by a hair’s breadth (Davieson 
2014: 155). The 2014 raid by the Islamic militants on the government secondary school in 
Chibok, kidnapping over 200 girls, brought international attention to the crisis, necessitating a 
concerted effort to address the problem (see BBC News Report, Nigeria Chibok abductions: What 
we know, 8 May 2017). In the process, President Goodluck Jonathan acknowledged the 
ineffective responses based on military hostilities, and rather called on Boko Haram for a 
dialogue (New African Newspaper, 1 April 2012 Edition).  
Reasons for the inability to effectively combat terrorism in the country include failure to 
address its root causes. Some of these root causes entail issues of poverty and discrimination, 
lack of knowledge about the terrorist group and its structure, negative influences of politicians 
both within and outside of government, unconventional nature of warfare, unrealistic demands 
from the group, as well as issues of corruption and lack of adequate resources by security 
agencies (Eji 2016: 198-220; Solomon 2012: 8-10; Adesoji 2010: 103). International responses in 
support of Nigeria’s effort, including the establishment of the Multi National Joint Task Force 
(MNJTF) (Assavano et al 2016), the provision of intelligence and other forms of support from 
the United State, Britain and Israel, among others, have not helped in solving the problem.   
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Aghedo and Osumah (2012: 856 -869) have called for adopting a human security 
approach rather than state security approach to the issue, while Akinbi (2015: 43) and Abimbola 
and Adesote (2012: 16-28) have requested adequate collaboration and partnerships between the 
Nigerian Government, non-governmental organisations and civil society organisations in curbing 
the menace. What should however be explored in much detail remains effective partnerships 
between the government authorities and the traditional rulers or leaders, as well as their followers 
who dwell in various communities that have suffered such attacks in exploring options to address 
the menace. 
6.6.2.2 Effort to Resolve the Niger Delta Oil Crisis  
The Niger Delta Crisis in Nigeria has been in existence for over five decades and only 
subsided after putting in place a Presidential Amnesty Programme (PAP) in October 2009 under 
the Yar’Adua Administration, but still continues to pose challenges to peace, security, stability 
and development in that region of the country. The crisis remains a very complex one 
underpinned by issues of perceived neo-colonialism, corruption, legitimacy concerns and issues 
of marginalization in addition to environmental pollution (Nwosu 2009: 543-562).   
Since the beginning of the exploration and exploitation of crude oil in commercial 
quantities in the Niger Delta area in 1958, the various oil companies, seen to be agents of 
imperialism, together with the federal and state government officials, are believed to be the sole 
beneficiaries of the ‘black gold’ to the detriment of citizens in the area (Nwosu 2009: 545-547). 
The Niger Delta region comprises nine states including Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross 
Rivers, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers, and these states host different ethnic groups including 
Ijaw, Itsekiri, Urhoba, Ikwere, Andoni, Efik, Ibibio, Kalabari, Ogoni and Okrika. Yorubas and 
Igbos are also found among these other ethnic groups.  
225 
 
 The Niger Delta contributes to over 80% of the country’s GDP based on earnings 
generated from the sale of crude oil (Afinotan and Ojakorotu 2009: 191). Expectations, therefore, 
are that this would be one of the most developed areas of the country as revenues from fuel 
production and sale, royalties and corporate social responsibilities are expected to create job 
opportunities, develop physical infrastructure and social amenities, build the human capital and 
generally develop the region. But unfortunately, these expectations have not been met. The 
region has suffered pollution of the environment as a result of the exploration and exploitation of 
the crude oil, as well as oil spillage from oil pipelines caused by prospecting multinational oil 
companies, attacks by militant groups in the region, and oil theft among others.   
Shell, which is one of the major oil companies in the area, is believed to have about 40% 
of its oil spills worldwide concentrated in the Niger Delta (Umukoro 2012: 914, in Rowell 1994). 
Also, in River State for instance, about 3,000 oil spills incidents occur annually thereby 
discharging about 2300m3 oil into farmlands, creeks and waterways, while the noise levels from 
all these activities and fumes from the gas flaring has contributed to making the Niger Delta 
region the most polluted area in the world (Nwosu 2009: 549-550;Ake 1985).  All these activities 
have led to pollution and deprivation of various water bodies, wetlands and farms which serve as 
sources of livelihood through communal farming and fishing among other things.   
 Frustrations from domestic imperialism, marginalisation, inequality, unequal distribution 
of wealth, pollution, unemployment, lack of social amenities and general development in the 
region has resulted in grievances induced by perceived greed from the prospecting oil companies 
and alleged ‘co-conspirator’ government officials (Nwosu 2009: 557; Umukoro 2012: 916). This 
has led to genuine or not so genuine agitations but also militarisation of the region as various 
ethnic militias have resorted to the use of arms to demand their share of the oil wealth and 
equally seek redress in the management of the environment. These militias, including the Niger  
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Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV), Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Niger Delta Liberation Front (NDLF) and Niger 
Delta Avengers (NDA), have fought along ethnic lines and also engaged in acts of illegal oil 
bunkering, kidnapping for ransom, assassination of political opponents, armed robberies etc 
(Nwosu 2009: 543-560; Umukoro 2012: 916; Osaghae et al 2011: 19-28).   
The theft of crude oil from pipelines for bunkering, insurgencies, inter-ethnic fighting and 
crimes within the region have not only proved profitable to these groups but also drawn attention 
to issues and challenges confronting the region and the need to make amends (Osaghae et al 
2011; Umukoro 2012: 916). Some of these militia groups, including NDPVF and MEND, 
eventually got amnesty from the Federal Government to lay down their weapons at great 
recompense, thereby inducing the formation of other ethnic militias and existing ones to continue 
with similar activities in expectation of similar rewards (Odisu 2017: 1-4).  
 The Niger Delta crisis has generated a lot of debate in the country with blames, 
accusations and counter-accusations. The indigenes, comprising the various ethnic groups with 
the Ijaws in the majority, blamed the lack of development in the Niger Delta on State Governors, 
Commissioners and other officials, together with Federal Government authorities as being 
responsible for the under-development of the region. In doing this, they have laid the blame at 
the footsteps of these government officials for developing policies and passing legislations that 
favour oil companies in terms of granting them access to land, generating huge revenues that go 
to them and the government, and polluting and degrading the environment without redress or 
fulfilling their corporate social responsibilities (Nwosu 2009: 543-560; Umukoro 2012: 913920).   
These officials are also seen to be highly corrupt by initiating state policies and 
legislation in favour of oil companies and government, and stealing state funds from the oil 
revenues meant for development of the region. This perceived domestic imperialist strategy 
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perpetuates neo-colonialism and in turn undermines legitimacy of these government officials 
who are seen as collaborators with imperial agents. On the other hand, some analysts share the 
view that the blame for under-development in the region rests squarely on the people’s 
representatives at the state level who hail from the various regions from many of these ethnic 
groups. Odisu (2017: 1-4) has argued that the Federal Government has contributed a lot of 
money to the development commissions, as well as state and local government authorities to 
develop the region, but such funds have either been diverted or misappropriated.  
 Amidst all these accusations, the Federal Government made several efforts to address the 
Niger Delta crisis but without significant success of managing the pollution levels, engendering 
development in the region and maintaining peace and stability. Efforts at developing the region 
began in 1958 with the recommendation from the Sir Henry Willink Commission to develop the 
Niger Delta as it found it to be “poor, backward and neglected region” while advocating for it to 
be made a special territory with special developmental strategies to address its problems (The 
Willink Commission Report: 96; Umukoro 2012: 917). This was followed by the establishment of 
the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) in 1962 to advice on infrastructural development 
of the Niger Delta region guided by the 1961 Development Act.   
General Babangida, also in response to agitations for autonomy and development, 
established the Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) in 1989 
to, among other things, receive and administer monthly sums from Federal accounts towards 
rehabilitation and development of oil producing areas, tackle ecological problems arising from 
the oil production, and embark on major development projects agreed upon with local 
communities in the oil producing areas (OMPADEC Decree No. 23, 1992). It, however, failed in 
its objectives despite 3% of federal allocations earmarked for the states in the Niger Delta, owing 
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to corrupt practices, waste and profligacy of officials at the Commission (Odisu 2017: 2; Nwosu 
2009: 549; Umukoro 2012: 917).   
The major development intervention came in 2000 when former President Obasanjo 
established the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and also created the Ministry for  
Niger Delta Affairs. A 13% derivative component from the oil revenue approved by the General 
Sani Abacha regime for oil producing states in the region was also implemented towards 
development of these areas but without much success (Odisu 2017: 1-2). An amnesty programme 
put in place to cater for 30,000 ex-militants on or before 4 October 2009 deadline in exchange for 
surrendering their small arms and light weapons during late President Yar’Adua and later 
President Goodluck Jonathan’s terms of office, only succeeded temporarily in ending the 
disputes and attacks on oil installations as other militias demanded similar packages, thereby 
reinforcing their criminal activities in the region (The Vanguard News, 2 February 2018; Ojo 
2015: 919-939).  
 Multiple suggestions have been made to address the crisis in the Niger Delta in areas 
which include addressing issues of corruption, cleaning the environment, channeling revenues 
from allocations into development programmes and projects, creating jobs for the youths and 
implementing corporate social responsibilities towards community development. In all these 
proposals, however, the alternative option of consolidating efforts towards hybrid security 
governance, reflected in close collaboration with traditional authorities, and the adoption of a 
bottom-up approach as mentioned in the 1958 Sir Henry Willink Commission Report, has not 
been given much consideration. Efforts to engage traditional and civil society actors in a 
sustained dialogue towards identifying specific needs in the communities, states and the region at 




6.6.2.3 The Farmer-Herder Disputes and Responses 
Conflicts between sedentary indigenous farmers from the south and nomadic Fulani 
herdsmen from the northern parts of Nigeria have become a source of great concern in recent 
times as these conflicts have intensified with disastrous consequences. A policy brief produced 
by the Forum on Farmer and Herder Relations in Nigeria (FFARN), has estimated more than 
6000 deaths and over 62,000 displaced persons as a result of disputes between farmers and 
herders in the middle belt states of Benue, Kaduna, Nasarawa, and Plateau (Kwaja and Ademola  
Adelehin 2018: 6). In another report, incidents involving herders accounted for 44% of all 
fatalities recorded in the country in 2016 (ICG 2017: 2). Other states including Enugu, Kaduna, 
Kogi, Kwara, Niger, Ondo and Rivers have equally experienced this crisis. The farmer-herder 
perennial conflict is not only restricted to Nigeria but occurs in other West Africa and African 
countries mostly in the middle belt regions of the continent.   
The crises stem from the destruction of food crops of farmers by grazing cattle under the 
watch of armed herdsmen without compensation, which results in confrontations and subsequent 
attacks mainly on the indigenous farmers who lose their lives, get their properties destroyed or 
are displaced from their settlement areas (Ikueze and Ezeah 2017: 154-156). In some cases, cattle 
rustlers also steal cattle from the herds of the Fulani herdsmen who also occasionally come under 
attack from peasant farmers as revenge to the harm caused them or loss of their food crops and 
property.   
The environmental, ethno-religious and economic dimensions of this conflict make it 
rather complex and difficult to address, given differences in the sedentary and nomadic lifestyles 
of farmers and Fulani herdsmen. Other challenges to addressing the conflict also include cultural 
differences, increased scarcity of grazing land for cattle owing to desertification in the middle 
belt areas of Nigeria, intensity of land use in the south for food and cash crops, and the lack of 
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understanding of the nature of the crisis for adequate intervention by relevant authorities (Mortiz 
2010: 139; Bassett 1988: 453-472; Noorduyn 2006: 83-84; and ICG 2017: 3-6).  
Responses from the Federal and State governments to the crises has not been very 
effective, leading to calls from victims, traditional authorities and various citizens in affected 
states and all over the country for a more effective and robust responses to the crisis. Successive 
governments at the Federal level have attempted over the years to designate or create grazing 
reserves to restrict cattle to these zones and avoid going on farmlands. In 1965 for instance, the 
Northern Region Grazing Reserves Law made provision for corridors for migrating livestock and 
grazing reserves throughout the country (Kwaja and Ademola-Adelehin 2018: 7).   
Subsequent legislations for national grazing reserves have not proved successful. The 
2016 National Grazing Reserve Bill, which did not pass as the Land Use Act of 1978, vests all 
powers on regulation of ownership, acquisition, administration, and management of Nigerian 
land with Governors of the States (Nigerian Land Use Decree No. 6, Cap 202; Kwaja and 
Ademola-Adelehin 2018:8). Passing the bill into an act would, therefore be unconstitutional. 
Alternative legislations prohibiting open grazing and establishment of ranches for the cattle have 
also escalated the conflict as it is perceived by the herders not to be in their interest (This Day 
Newspaper, 5 January 2018, 1&10; Kwaja and Ademola-Adelehin 2018: 7). Several peace 
commissions and committees established to promote dialogue and resolve differences have also 
not worked, while deployment of security task force on operations to contain conflicts and quell 
disputes have not facilitated the resolution of the conflicts (ICG 2017: 10-11).   
An amount of N100 billion approved by the National Executive Council (NEC) and 
released by the Central Bank of Nigeria under the Goodluck Jonathan administration to all the 36  
States to recover and improve all grazing lands encroached upon by farmers as well as build 
ranches for cattle could not be accounted for while the project was not implemented. The House 
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of Representative in January 2017 established a Committee to investigate alleged 
misappropriation of funds and report within a month for necessary action, but the report was not 
still published at the time of conducting this study (ICG 2017: 10).  
Civil society groups and several NGOs had varied responses to this conflict. 
Communities affected by attacks have made several calls for protection against armed Fulani 
herdsmen and bandits, while the herders have also made calls for legislations to be reviewed to 
favour their interest as they also remain citizens of the country (ICG 2017: 13). CSOs and NGOs 
have also organized sensitization seminars and workshops for peaceful dialogue, mediation, as 
well as management and resolution of the crisis with support from international partners, 
including the British Council, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and 
the German Embassy (ICG 2017: 14). Despite all these, the conflict still continues to claims lots 
of lives and property in the country without much redress. 
 6.6.2.4 The Security Culture Deficit and Absence of other Related Factors in Responses to    
             Security Challenges in Nigeria 
 
The inability to effectively address the conflicts in Nigeria has been attributed to many 
factors. Some include lack of proper understanding of the dynamics of the conflict by 
government officials, corruption, inadequate or discriminatory laws, resource scarcity and lack of 
proper planning, neglect of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, low newspaper coverage 
of disputes, and proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the country (Kwaja and 
Ademola-Adelehin 2018: 7-13; Godwin 2018; ICG 2017: 10; and Mortiz 2010: 145).   
Mortiz (2010: 139) calls for the urgent need to understand the dynamics of the farmer-
herder conflicts in West Africa, laying particular emphasis on understanding the relationships 
between structural variables which explain causes of conflicts from the institutional dimension, 
and the processual variables which explain outcomes of conflicts focusing mainly on behavioural 
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patterns. The processual “involves a holistic approach to an event [which entails] interpreting 
events, actions, and actors within their particular local context, considering socio-cultural, 
historical, ecological, economic, political or institutional factors” (Mortiz 2010: 142).   
With this approach, behavioural patterns with the tendency to escalate conflicts are 
properly analysed with options for redress. More importantly, Mortiz (2010:145) and Pelican 
(2006: 237) singles out the issue of culture as a central but missing element in conflict theory. He 
relates culture to the herder-farmer crisis in West Africa, seeing both groups as belonging to two 
different ethnic groups, who may not necessarily share beliefs and practices on how to manage 
and resolve conflicts, and which serves as a recipe for escalation of the crisis.   
Brockhaus (2005) on his part also sees institutional failure on the part of traditional and 
formal authorities in addressing the conflict as a result of inertia, incompetence and corruption, 
while the situation may be the reverse in other contexts where these officials collaborate 
effectively in conflict resolution (in Mortiz 2010: 145). Ragin (1987), acknowledging the 
underlying complexity of the herder-farmer conflict, calls for an integration of both structural 
and processual variables for understanding the current escalation of the herder-farmer conflicts in 
West Africa, as a single factor may not suffice in addressing the conflict (in Mortiz 2010: 145). It 
is therefore obvious from the above herder-farmer conflict that security governance in Nigeria 
lacks a comprehensive approach to addressing such conflicts, and where measures are taken, 
collaboration between the various security actors is weak, lacks legitimacy and undermined by 
corrupt practices. In a nutshell, responses to security challenges in Nigeria have been fraught 
with challenges at the institutional, leadership, cultural, legitimacy, transparency and 
accountability and, overall, security governance levels. Formal governing structures, with its 
security arrangements, have not been capable of handling the task of safety, peace and security 
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all by itself, nor with support from external actors or partners as in the case of the Boko Haram 
crises.   
In situations where the indigenous or informal governing and security structures have 
made attempts at complementing the efforts of the formal structures, it has largely gone 
unrecognised, though it may prove effective within certain communities. This has been as a 
result of lack of proper recognition under the 1999 Nigerian Constitution for traditional rulers 
and their roles in the governance of the security sector, or addressing security matters they are 
confronted with.   
In interviews with some traditional rulers and opinion leaders in the Ijebu-Ode locality of 
Ogun State in Nigeria (28-30 March 2018), the removal of the roles of traditional leaders from 
the constitution as pertained in the past has been mainly political and has largely undermined 
security governance efforts in the country. Interestingly, these same politicians who advocate for 
non-recognition of these traditional leaders under the Constitution consult these traditional 
leaders on regular basis in decision-making processes and seek their consent and support in 
contesting political office or addressing crime and other security-related issues in their respective 
communities.  
 In these communities, the kindred tend to follow and respect their traditional leaders 
more than government authorities. And in cases where the communities are doing well in the 
areas of fighting crimes and development, the traditional authorities are seen to have very good 
communal relations between them and the local government authorities who respect and 
recognise the roles of these traditional institutions and its leadership.   
Hence, in other to effectively address the above-mentioned security challenges of 
terrorism, oil crisis and herder-farmer dispute for instance, the formal and traditional institutions 
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must be seen to be tapping into shared security cultures in various localities, communities, states 
and the country as a whole going forward. 
6.6.2.5 International Partnerships and Skewed Support to Formal Institutions towards Security               
            Responses  
 
On the international front, Nigeria’s foreign policy guides its security engagements in its 
interaction with bilateral and multilateral partners. Its foreign policy objectives include the 
promotion and protection of its national interest; promotion of African integration and support 
for African unity; promotion of international cooperation, consolidation of universal peace and 
mutual respect among all nations, the elimination of discrimination in all its forms; respect for 
international law and treaty obligations; and the promotion of a just world economic order 
(Article 19(a-e) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria). These foreign 
policy objectives have been driven by the principles of African unity and solidarity, 
nonalignment, legal equality of states, non-interference in the domestic affairs of states and 
multilateralism among others (Obi 2008: 188; Olusanya & Akindele 1986: 4).   
Nigeria’s responses to external threats or transnational criminal activities are undertaken 
within bilateral and multilateral frameworks (mainly within ECOWAS, African Union, United 
Nations and the European Union) in which it signs on to various protocols and conventions. As a 
regional hegemon and central player in African affairs on the continent, the country has remained 
active through its participation in multilateral security initiatives in maintaining peace and 
stability in West Africa, Africa and the world at large. Within the ECOWAS security 
arrangements, it has played active roles, in terms of security culture, in the construct of what 
constitutes a security threat to the ECOWAS region and responses to such threats. These 
activities are underpinned by the regional body’s beliefs and norms (Williams 2007a: 253-279, 
2007b: 2; Obi 2008: 186). Its intervention efforts in the Liberian civil war spanning over a 
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decade together with other West Africa States, including Ghana, The Gambia, Sierra Leone and 
Togo, through the ECOMOG arrangement, remain quite instructive (Tuck 2000: 1-12).   
Despite this, its efforts in addressing transnational crimes, including terrorism, the 
trafficking of arms, human beings and drugs, internet fraud or cyber-crimes, money laundering, 
and smuggling of goods, have however been limited. This has been attributed to the fact that 
Nigeria has been an ‘incubator’ for some of these crimes and has also been unable to address 
most of these crimes owing to corruption, lack political will and resources, as well as weak 
capacities (Obi 2008: 184,193). This, questions the reflexive capacity of the country and its 
leadership in upholding and implementing security cultures adopted and signed on to at the 
regional level through the various legislations or legal instruments. This development is not, 
however, only limited to Nigeria but most if not all the ECOWAS Member States.  
Specific assistance was given by the UK government through its Ministry of Defence 
training teams within the ACPP programme towards SSR and development of armed forces and 
the security sector in general. The support was equally aimed at strengthening Nigeria’s capacity 
to contribute to the establishment of the ECOWAS Standby Force Brigade towards peace and 
stability in the ECOWAS region (DFID 2004: 12). In 2004 for instance, the running costs of the 
Nigerian peacekeeping troop deployment to then ECOMIL was funded out of an amount of 
GBP£400,000 made available through the ACPP Fund (DFID 2004: 10).  
An ISSAT Report on mapping ongoing or planned development partner support to justice 
and security sector reform in Nigeria from 2014 - 2016, commissioned by the German Federal 
Foreign Office, focused on four main categories. These included management reform, 
accountability reforms, capacity-building/training reform and equipment/infrastructure support 
(ISSAT-DCAF 2016: 5-75). The nature of support provided covered financial grants, advisory 
inputs, technical assistance, provision of equipment, as well as training and mentoring, with 
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difficulties being encountered to move support to broader areas of reform. (ISSAT-DCAF 2016: 
6). Notwithstanding, there has been noticeable change in priorities and funding support for SSR 
mainly towards Nigerian counter-terrorism capacity given challenges in the North-Eastern part of 
the country, managing migration issues, countering violent extremism and addressing issues of 
organised crime (ISSAT-DCAF 2016: 6).  
Interestingly, donor funding in the security sector accounts for roughly between 1% to 
3% of the total spending and 7% to 12% of capital expenditure based on the 2016 national budget 
estimates and incomplete financial information received from donors, but commitment to 
financial and technical support has grown significantly since 2014 and will follow similar trends 
over the coming years (ISSAT-DCAF 2016: 6).   
Of particular interest, however, is the heavy support by donors to the formal sector, 
compared to that of the informal sector. Findings from surveys conducted in the area of the 
justice and security sector revealed over 80% of Nigeria’s population accessing justice and 
security services through the informal sector (HiiL 2018: 20). Though there has been indirect 
support, the only donor programme reported to have systematically engage with the informal 
sector has been the UK-funded Justice for All (J4A) programme. This programme was, however, 
transformed into separate funding streams and projects led by different donor partners, including 
the EU, but with no clear focus on informal actors’ engagement.  
Also, the focus for these support and activities have been mainly around the Federal 
Capital Territory in Abuja, where most of the headquarters of the national security, defence and 
justice institutions are located, the north-eastern portions of the country where the fighting of 
terrorism and violent extremism is ongoing, and the Niger Delta region with the oil crisis.  
Assistance to SSR has therefore been mainly on the ‘hardware’ institutional and capacity 
support in the formal sector to the neglect of that of the ‘software’ cultural and informal issues 
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which, as observed above, contribute largely to security and justice service delivery, and as a 
result peace and stability in the country.   
6.7 Options for Enhancing Security Sector Governance in Nigeria  
Security governance in Nigeria has taken place, legally, within the formal security 
institutions but rather ceremoniously within the traditional security system. The approach over 
the years has focused largely on the traditional or regime security arrangements rather than that 
of human security considerations, but recent security threats to communities and individuals 
residing therein have led to concerns regarding the effectiveness of security governance in 
Nigeria and which way to go.   
No clear definition of security has been established as a country or polity, except that the 
1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria vests the security and welfare of the people 
in the government as its primary purpose (Article 12(2b)). Obi (2008: 185) however underscores 
specific factors that inform security to include values, norms, interests, contexts and relations of 
power. This brings with it different security cultures within different ethnic and religious groups, 
as well as formal and traditional governance systems. This has made it necessary, going forward, 
for some level of dialogue and cooperation in defining security concepts and partnerships 
between security actors, clarify and recognise respective roles, draft appropriate security 
legislations and policies, and map out strategies for effective implementation.  
 That said, security challenges reviewed above on issues relating to terrorism, the Niger 
Delta oil and the farmer-herder crises demonstrate a clear gap in terms of collaboration between 
formal and informal security systems in security governance and responses to these crises. This 
has further blurred perceptions regarding which way security governance is headed as both 
internal and external security threats still remain a challenge in the country without any clear 
coordinated approach or strategy to resolving the problem. As observed earlier, traditional 
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governance systems existed in pre-colonial times and played very active roles in ensuring the 
safety, protection and general security of the people and their respective communities they 
resided.   
The advent of colonialism and introduction of a western system of governance with its 
cultural influences eventually undermined the legally recognised roles and functions of these 
institutions which were hitherto spelt out in earlier constitutions of the country. This came about 
as a result of the adoption of the ‘indirect rule’ governance system which subjected the 
chieftaincy institution to manipulation and, in the process, severed the ‘umbilical cord’ which 
existed in pre-colonial times between the traditional leaders and their subjects. The bottom-up 
approach to governance, based on consultations and consensus-building among kindred, elders 
and their chiefs gave way to mistrust and politicisation of this age-old indigenous governance 
system (Logan 2008: 3; Tonwe & Osemwota: 131).   
Notwithstanding, these traditional institutions have proved resilient and maintained their 
legitimacy and influence, particularly between the people and their traditional leaders, compared 
to the formal governance arrangements and structures (Olowu and Erero 1997: 1). Reasons for 
such development are attributed mainly to leadership challenges within the formal governance 
system, including corruption and the complicit roles of politicians perceived as agents of 
neocolonialism as demonstrated in the case of the Niger Oil Delta crisis. Formal governance 
arrangements have also tended to adopt the top-bottom approach in responding to security 
challenges as in the cases of the Boko-Haram crisis and the farmer-herder conflicts where the use 
of force, through deployment of security agencies to contain the crises, has been the major form 
of security response, rather than adopting complementary responses with CSOs, NGOs, 
academics, policy think-tanks and traditional institutions to find solutions to these issues.  
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In one such interviews with His Royal Highness Alaiyeluwa Oba Dr. (engr.) M.A. Kasali, 
the Moyegeso of Ijebu-Itele Kingdom in his royal palace in Ogun State (30 March 2018), the 
astute traditional ruler intimated that the non-recognition of the roles and functions of chiefs or 
traditional rulers in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria has remained the 
bane of security problems in the country. He opined that if previous roles and functions stated in 
the 1979 and 1989 Constitutions were left in the 1999 Constitution, issues like the Boko Haram 
crisis and the farmer-herder disputes would not have occurred or worsened to their current state 
before being dealt with.   
At the traditional governance level for instance, an effective early warning system has 
been in existence over the years in which community dwellers and the vigilante groups know the 
terrain, the culture of the people and the tradition and customs that guide activities and 
behavioural conduct. This makes it easy to identify culprits and suspects in crime, as well as 
resolve conflicts without it reaching the State and Federal Government levels. In one such case in 
the Ijebu-Itele district, the Moyegeso had to personally intervene in a farmer-herder dispute upon 
getting information about a potential ensuing conflict. He mediated and got the defaulting 
herders whose cattle grazed on the food crops of farmers in the community to pay for the damage 
to the satisfaction of the farmers. The herders then subsequently requested for the cattle to graze 
on the remaining crops, having already paid for the damage caused, and later resettled to a 
different location. The Moyegeso attributed his success in mediating this dispute to knowing the 
people in the community, their tradition, customs and culture, as well as his acceptance by his 
subjects as their leader. He did this without the intervention of the local government authorities. 
In certain cases, the NPF also sought his assistance in collaborating with the local security actors 
to arrest criminals for prosecution.  
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In another interview with a leader of a community vigilante group in the Ijebu-Ode 
locality (29 March 2018), the gentleman who claimed anonymity stated that his vigilante group 
operates under the guidance and direction of traditional rulers. Their conception of vigilantism is 
based on ‘black power’ which entailed the use of roots of trees, herbs and plants for protection 
and prevention of crime. This aided them in confronting and arresting criminals who are unable 
to harm them as compared to their police counterparts and all their activities are communicated 
to the traditional leader of the area.   
The group has sworn an oath not to be corrupt and going against that oath attracts severe 
punishment which serves as a deterrent and check against any illegal acts by its members. It 
perceives their culture, tradition and custom as central to their operations, and helps them in 
effective maintenance of peace and security in the area. His vigilante group has cordial relations 
with the NPF and has collaborated with them on several occasions to maintain security in the 
area, arrest criminals for prosecution and maintain surveillance in the community. He explained 
that this has contributed immensely in minimising crime in the area as they know the terrain, 
know the residents, understand their language and have established networks to facilitate their 
activities.   
In their relations with the police, sophisticated cases of crimes are passed on to the NPF 
with the consent of their chiefs, while cases of spiritual nature are handled at the traditional level. 
The group has also established a training academy where recruits are trained on issues of public 
relations, upholding and respecting human rights, handling of arms and apprehension of suspects 
among other things.   
The services rendered by these vigilante groups are voluntary in nature and therefore 
depend on contributions from business men and women, as well as community residents for 
payment for their services. Their role in securing lives and property have, as a result, been 
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recognised by the Ogun State Government under whose jurisdiction they fall leading to a formal 
communication from the State Government to the Council of Chiefs to recognise vigilantes in the 
communities. The State Government has also submitted a bill to the House of Assembly for the 
official recognition of registered vigilante groups in the State.   
The proposed interaction for enhancing governance of the security sector among various 
actors could be summarised in the diagram below:    
Figure 6.3 
Diagram Depicting Proposed Interaction among Security Actors towards Good Democratic 
Governance in Nigeria  
 
Source: Author, 2019 
6.7.1 Recognition, Acceptance and Legitimisation of the Roles and Functions of Traditional  
         Institutions in Security Sector Governance in Nigeria 
 
The horizontal base of the triangle in the diagram above captures a hybrid security system 
of interaction where both state and sub-state actors engage and interact legally and informally, or 
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cultures manifest in these interactions or engagement in exploring ways of responding to 
identified security threats. The lack of constitutional roles or functions of traditional institutions 
has, however, undermined this interaction as contributions from these indigenous institutions in 
the security sector are considered informal rather than legal. A decision of a chief may only be 
recognised to the extent that the indigenes accept to go by it. It may not, therefore, be legally 
binding on elected local government councilors for example (Tonwe & Osemwota 2013: 133).  
The formal governance arrangements are, therefore, construed as the legal entities with the 
mandate to deliver on security needs. This situation, in effect, appears flawed given the immense 
contribution that traditional rulers and their followers offer in conflict resolution and the 
provision of community policing in various communities across the country. All these efforts are 
complemented by other civil society groups and non-governmental organisations in the country.   
In the 2017 Afrobarometre Round 7 Survey in Nigeria, findings revealed the willingness 
or likelihood of respondents from urban and rural areas to contact traditional leaders more than 
that of a local government councilor, parliamentarians in the National Assembly, an official of 
government, or a party political official about some important problems or share their views with 
them. This is reflected in the statistics where above 80% never contacted a local government 
councilor (81%), members of the National Assembly (88%) or an official of government (84%). 
Fewer than 10% of these respondents only contacted these officials once, a few times or often. 
The case of political party officials had a slightly better statistics registering 76% who never 
contacted them, 11% contacting only once, 9% a few times, and 4% often.  
 In the case of traditional leaders, it had comparatively more favourable interactions with 
respondents from urban and rural areas, recording a total of 63% for those who never contacted 
them; 12% only once; 18% a few times; and 7% often. Religious leaders in this context, 
however, had much more impressive statistics of 44% never contacting them; 13% only once; 
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25% a few times; and 18% often. This, obviously, demonstrates to an extent, the recognition of 
traditional and religious leaders by respondents interviewed and their belief in finding solutions 
to their problems or listening to their views as compared to their government officials or political 
actors (Practical Sampling International 2017: 14-15). It is, therefore, essential to recognise by 
legitimising or restoring the roles and functions of these traditional institutions in conflict 
prevention, management and resolution efforts under the Nigerian Constitution for the needed 
impact in effective security sector governance in the country. 
6.7.2 International Partnerships and the Need for Contextual Hybridism and Transformative  
         Approaches to SSR/SSG Efforts 
 
The two sides of the triangle reflect the hierarchical levels of interaction between state, 
sub-state and international partners in addressing identified security threats confronting both state 
and sub-state actors. In these levels of interaction, conceptions and perceptions of security in the 
Nigerian case vary based on different security cultures, internal and external, and what forms of 
responses would be suitable in addressing security needs in the country. As Akingbolahan 
Adeniran (Rule of Law Advisor, Office of the Vice President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
05 January 2018, Abuja, Nigeria) argued, the Nigeria Government has faced difficult decisions 
on proposed offers of support from foreign partners which sometimes go contrary to the 
government’s stated aspirations, goals and objectives.   
In one such instance, the Nigerian Government had to refuse support from a donor as 
conditionalities were difficult to meet, and proposed needs to be addressed differed. The donor, 
however, came later on to offer its support based on further dialogue and government’s 
demonstration of commitment and assurance in this regard.  But in other respects, like in the 
Niger Delta Crisis scenario, state actors were seen as agents of imperialists by conniving and 
colluding with foreign oil companies and magnates to deprive the country of appropriate 
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revenues and distribution of oil wealth, while contributing to the pollution of the environment 
without any redress (Nwosu 2009: 543-560).   
Going forward, donor support and assistance through direct contribution to SSR/SSG 
activities must evolve to embrace a broader objective on transformation rather than reform of the 
Nigerian Justice and Security Sector. These efforts must relook the geographic space with 
proportional support and assistance to the hot spot areas of the 36 states, while involving the 
informal justice and security sector in its programme, and taking into consideration the security 
culture influences of the various actors in the sector. 
6.7.3 The Need to Imbibe Positive or Progressive Hybrid Security Cultures towards Eliminating  
          the Culture of Corruption 
  
The issue of corruption, among other ills, has also served as a ‘canker’ which undermines 
efforts in these levels of interaction to effectively and objectively respond to state and human 
security concerns. Olaleye-Oruene (1998: 232-240) perceive corruption, not only as a cultural 
phenomenon but also, as a vestige of colonial legacy and must be looked at from this historical 
context in attempts to eradicate or minimise it. The myriad of anti-corruption measures can only 
succeed through the change in mindset and giving up the protection of vested interests within the 
state machinery. 
6.7.4 Leadership in Promoting Cultural Awareness and Sensitivity towards Clarity of Roles   
            and Simplification and Acceptance of Security Reform and Governance Concepts 
   
The inner part of the triangle depicts the various actors within Nigeria with different 
security cultures, local and foreign, and perceived security threats, as well as varied security 
needs and different response mechanisms to real or perceived threats. This space also presents a 
complex security sector and context within which traditional and human security concerns 
interlock and as a result, require leadership from both the formal and traditional governance 
settings, and the needed legitimacy, in order to bring about the desired change.   
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Governance within this sector must embrace, at the barest minimum, a careful balance 
between traditional and human security approaches, bottom-up consultation, and consensus-
building and decision-making process, guided by shared values, norms and standards. Principles 
of transparency and accountability, oversight and anti-corruption measures, among others, would 
equally facilitate the process.  
 At the bases of all these lie the extent to which a shared sense of what constitute a threat 
to Nigeria and Nigerians has been established, collaborative forms of responses to these threats, a 
legitimate leadership in both the formal and informal sectors to lead the process, the ownership 
of these approaches and appropriate support from donors to respond to these threats.  
6.8 Conclusion  
This case study sought to interrogate the security challenges and find out if understanding 
the divers security cultures and integrating the indigenous security mechanisms and processes 
into the Nigerian security architecture could help enhance security sector reform and for that 
matter, governance in the country. In doing this, it reviewed the security arrangements, 
conceptions and perceptions about security culture from the formal and indigenous security 
sector actors, Nigeria’s security sector governance arrangements or structures, existing security 
establishments to deliver on security needs, reform efforts undertaken to restructure the security 
sector, challenges encountered, and options, based on findings, for enhancing security 
governance of the sector. This approach to the study was meant to explore the importance of 
culture in enhancing governance and effective delivery of security needs to Nigeria and 
Nigerians. 
Findings from the study have revealed a diverse and complex security sector in which the 
state acquires its legitimacy from the electorate, and is mandated by the 1999 Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria to make security and welfare its primary purpose. Despite these 
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provisions, respective governments have struggled to stay the course all by themselves as they 
have, to a large extent, lost trust and credibility from their citizens for lack of effective security 
responses to various security needs. On the other hand, traditional or indigenous security actors 
who lack the legal mandate, owing to the removal of its previous roles and functions in previous 
constitutions, have gained some level of trust and recognition from citizens given their perceived 
ceremonial but effective roles and leadership in complementing functions of formal security 
arrangements.  
This, however, in no way projects indigenous security institutions as having the capacity 
to do it all alone. As was established, certain security responses require the intervention of 
traditional rulers as they understand the culture of the actors involved with the requisite 
knowledge, experience and skill to guide appropriate responses and intervention. The complex 
nature of crime and the involvement of well-informed syndicates with high-level technological 
acumen equally require a well-equipped state machinery to combat such crimes. The nature of 
crime and warfare has equally evolved and in certain cases, like the Boko Haram terrorist Group 
operations, adopt unconventional means of attack on victims. Such crimes require a holistic and 
integrated approach to containing and addressing them.  
 The Nigerian security scenario therefore reflects a typical transitional and complex 
security system where various actors with diverse security cultures perceive security differently. 
Donors or international partners have introduced or rather seek to support the implementation of 
a concept which seems quite foreign but could be applicable to the Nigerian context with some 
adjustments. This will require a basic understanding and contextualisation of the concept which 
provides the option for its recognition, acceptance and adoption. Doing this, however, would 
necessitate an integration of both formal and informal positive security cultural traits which may 
or may not necessarily be sufficient, but necessary for transforming the governance of the 
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security sector. As Ajetunmobi & Ojo (2015:14) stated, “… the political elite should stop 
humiliating the traditional rulers and usurp [sic] the traditional functions of the kings”. That 
hybrid context which is already in existence but not formalised thus needs reconsideration. 
Achieving desired results through changes in mindset and embracing positive formal and 
indigenous behavioural traits based on agreed values, norms and standards would be required.   
In sum, culture as shared beliefs and norms not only vary but presents a complex scenario 
of multiples of actors that need to have or perhaps not have a common understanding of security 
objectives, but require some level of change in mindset and from negative behavioural conduct in 
order to enhance governance of the security sector towards meeting security needs. To guarantee 
this change through discarding certain negative cultural traits acquired over centuries and 
embracing other positive ones may not necessarily be guaranteed. What is nevertheless obvious 
is that changes in some shared values and norms remain pertinent on all sides to guarantee a 
transformation of security governance in the security sector. This, no doubt, demonstrates the 
centrality of culture in demystifying a complex concept and sector, which affords the opportunity 




CHAPTER 7  
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF GHANA AND NIGERIA’s SECURITY 
CULTURE INFLUENCES ON GOVERNANCE OF THE SECURITY SECTOR  
 
7.1 Introduction  
In the quest to contribute to peace, security and development in West Africa and beyond, 
mainly in transitional societies, issues of statebuilding remain paramount. Statebuilding, as 
defined in chapter 2 of this study, entails the creation of new governmental institutions while 
strengthening the existing ones (Fukuyama 2004: 17) towards peace and stability. It also entails 
“an endogenous process to enhance capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by 
state-society relations” (OECD 2008d cited in OECD 2011: 20). It is  generally aimed at 
addressing threats posed by weak states, including issues of terrorism, drug trafficking, crime and 
international criminal networks, and refugees (Chandler 2010: 4) Similarly, solutions to problems 
of insecurity, poverty and the general lack of progress are also pursued through statebuilding 
processes (Ghani and Lockhart 2008: 4 cited in Chandler 2010: 5).  
This field research on Ghana and Nigeria was, thus, undertaken with this broader 
objective in mind, but with specific emphasis on finding out the centrality or otherwise of 
security culture influences in the improvement of the governance of the security sector towards 
meeting stated goals and objectives. This was done within the framework of critical theory where 
data gathered in the field were subjected to detailed analysis and critique, raising the relevant 
questions and exploring the ‘how’ towards change and transformation of the status quo. This was 
largely guided by the social democracy ideology of focusing on both state and people’s needs, 
particularly civil society and the citizens in general. This is meant to reinforce the people’s power 
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to decide within the confines and sovereignty of the state, and to facilitate an egalitarian society 
towards peaceful growth and development.  
This comparative analysis chapter, thus, established the causal link between security 
culture influences and security sector governance in Ghana and Nigeria by identifying several 
intervening factors that facilitate this linkage. They include people-centred approach to security, 
knowledge of the SSR/SSG concept, the need for adequate leadership and legitimacy, 
recognition of actors and their respective cultures, clearly defined roles and functions, 
circumventing hybrid cultural challenges, and mainstreaming positive or progressive values in 
security sector reforms, governance and responses to security challenges. Observing these 
propositions lead to the needed transformation required in the sector and answers the question 
why culture matters.  
The analysis, thus, established the validity of the proposed grounded theory based on 
general trends and patterns observed in the two countries that shared norms and values on safety, 
protection and freedom from fear, influence the acceptance and commitment towards security 
sector reform and governance efforts. Hence imbibing the appropriate security values, norms, 
principles and practices by both state and sub-state actor groups, would ensure the needed 
change and transformation towards successful statebuilding processes in West Africa.  
The chapter begins by briefly recapping the contextual background of challenges 
confronting security sector reform and governance in West Africa and why SSR/SSG efforts 
have not had the desired change and transformation in the security sector in the region. It then 
highlights the findings and observations made in the field in relation to security culture 
influences, based on key cultural factors that enhanced security sector governance in both 
countries. Findings are then compared for both countries in the areas of complexity, acceptance 
and an enhanced security sector governance towards revealing similarities and differences in 
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terms of what worked and what did not work which essentially helped to triangulate findings of 
the research and established why culture matters in demystifying the complexity of the security 
concept and its reform prerogatives, as well as facilitating its acceptance towards improving 
governance of the sector.   
7.2 The Quest for Good Democratic Governance of the Security Sector in Societies in                 
      Transition in West Africa  
 
Security sector reform and governance processes in West Africa have been ongoing for 
close to two decades, following the quest for good democratic governance in the region after 
several years of one party system, authoritarian rule and conflicts in the region. Security reforms 
and governance of the sector have taken place at varied levels within the Anglophone, 
Francophone and Lusophone states (Bryden et al 2008: 1-341). Notwithstanding, security 
challenges in the region still remain, including transnational or cross-border crimes, terrorism, 
kidnapping, cyber-crimes, piracy and terrorism. Civil wars which were very much in vogue 
between the 1990s and 2000s, like coups d’état which predates them, are however almost a thing 
of the past now.  Security sector reform and governance efforts have laid much emphasis on the 
‘hardware’ reforms with regard to capacity-building of security personnel, providing resources 
and equipment, and restructuring within relevant security institution. On the other hand, ‘soft’ 
reforms which entail reorientation of actors on agreed values, norms, principles and practices, as 
well as accommodating or effectively integrating endogenous security arrangements within the 
sector have been totally neglected. Hence, SSR/SSG efforts have not achieved a genuine and 
intrinsic change or transformation required to make the sector more vibrant and responsive to 
both state and human security needs. 
In drawing lessons for the future, specifically in societies in transition in West Africa, 
security sector reform and governance approaches to statebuilding require a rethink, and the need 
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to adopt and mainstream transformative approaches based on appropriate security cultures in 
response to evolving security challenges and needs. Doing this will require circumventing 
challenges posed by complex hybrid security cultures and dynamics by exploring and promoting 
progressive traditional and modern values and security practices which must inform theories and 
policies going forward (Mac Ginty 2008: 139 -163; and Podder 2013: 353-380). 
7.3 Findings of Security Culture Influences on Security Sector Governance in Ghana                 
     and Nigeria 
 
 The data gathered in the field was mainly in response to the research question “how has 
security culture affected the complexity of, and facilitated the acceptance and effectiveness of 
security sector governance in the comparative cases of Ghana and Nigeria?” This was done 
through reviewing major security challenges faced by both countries with specific consideration 
of security decision-making processes and the contribution of different actors – state, sub-state 
and international partners – in resolving identified security challenges. The security contexts and 
shared beliefs in this area informed responses, performances and outcomes of interventions. 
7.3.1 Security Definitions in Ghana and Nigeria  
Responses from interviews and focus group discussions in the field on definition of 
security have been quite varied and sometimes reflective of all endeavours that human beings 
engage in. While there is no denying the fact that security means different things to different 
people, it is however construed as easy to explain. In essence, it relates mostly to human beings, 
institutions and the state (interviews with a Rtd. Brig Gen of the Nigerian Armed Forces, 05 
January 2018 and Mr. K. Bentum Quantson, retired Director of the Bureau of National 
Investigations (BNI) and the Criminal Investigations Divisions (CID) of the Ghana Police 
Service, Accra, Ghana, 18 April 2019). It entails notions of safety, stability, well-being, 
protection, survival, endurance, anti-corruption, inclusivity in governance, self-preservation and 
satisfaction among others.  
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It equally has narrow, broad or holistic definitions where it focuses on individuals or 
groups, given its human dimension, as well as that of institutions and the state given its 
traditional or regime dimension. In all field interviews conducted, it was generally agreed that 
security must be contextualised within the environment under consideration, draw linkages to 
development as it may not necessarily be an end in itself but a means to an end, and finally that 
the human aspect or dimension of security predominates in all security considerations.  
In both countries, there was no consensus established on a particular definition of 
security, except in their respective constitutions. In Ghana, for example, the preamble of the 1992 
Constitution of the Republic of Ghana placed emphasis on the protection and preservation of the 
fundamental human rights and freedoms, unity and stability of the nation whereas the 1999 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Article 14(2b) declares that the security and 
welfare of the Nigerian people shall be the primary purpose of the government.  
7.3.2 Security Types/Concept   
Regime security traits manifest all over the continent of Africa, and West Africa has been 
noted for its rampant coups d’état, military rule and dictatorships or authoritarianism, particularly 
in the 1980s and 1990s (Decalo 1973: 105-127; Mwakikagile 2002; 124-125; Hendricks and 
Keita 2017: 1-12).  This entails the concentration of power mainly in an individual or a few in 
leadership positions with a major interest of keeping them in power.  Some have argued that the 
“Colonial Police Model”, designed to advance and protect the colonial interest as against the 
rights of those colonised have largely influenced this system of governance on the continent 
(CHRI 2007: 10; Appiagyei-Atua 2006: 8). This Model entailed the prioritisation of the needs of 
the imperial powers through subjugation of the colony in order to exploit, control and profit from 
resources on the continent and this, largely, gave rise to dictatorial governance trends in Africa 
(Alemazung 2010). Ghana and Nigeria, as discussed in earlier chapters of this study, have 
253 
 
witnessed regime security trends since achieving their independence from one-party rule to 
military governments where decisions were only made by the military executives in the absence 
of a national legislature and a legitimate judiciary.   
Changes overtime, particularly after the end of the Cold War, ushered in democracy with 
its accompanying principles, standards and demands. This led to a gradual evolution from the 
traditional or regime security to that of human security which shifted emphasis from preserving 
the security needs of only the state to also that of the people, but with more emphasis on freedom 
from fear, want and freedom to inherit a healthy natural environment (Buzan, B 1991; Booth 
1999; Annan 2000). Interviews and data gathered from the field in Ghana and Nigeria revealed a 
significant level of human security trends in these countries, demonstrated by the existence of 
separate arms of government comprising the executive, legislature and the judiciary and a vibrant 
civil society enjoying freedom of speech and expression, but varying levels of good democratic 
governance.   
The frequency in change of government from one democratically elected one to another 
may not be necessarily termed as very free and fair but remains quite credible, which speaks 
volume of democratic advancement in these countries. This does not, however, detract from the 
fact that semblance of regime security traits still exist in diverse forms, exhibited in the weak 
systems of transparency and accountability, weak oversight functions, human rights abuses, as 
well as corruption and neo-patrimonial tendencies among other things. 
7.3.3 Security Threats and Challenges   
The variations in terms of security challenges and threats for both countries manifest in 
the population size and intensity of crime, of which Nigeria appears to bear the greater burden for 
obvious reasons. A population of 197 million people, and years of terrorist activities in the 
country and higher crime rate define the degree of challenges confronting the country, but the 
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nature of security threats are quite similar except for terrorist activities in north-eastern Nigeria 
and the environmental pollution crisis in the Niger Delta area.  
7.3.4 Security Systems and Security Culture Dynamics  
In undertaking this research, it was observed as indicated in Chapters 5 and 6 that Ghana 
and Nigeria have common security systems with that of the formal security system structured 
after the British system and with similar security institutions and agencies derived from colonial 
legacies. The same also applies to the informal security sectors and arrangements based on its 
pre-colonial historical traditions and customs, and derived from resurgent heritage. The 
respective security sectors comprise the core security agencies and paramilitary forces, 
management and oversight bodies, those within the Justice and Rule of Law sector, as well as the 
external security actors representing the donor community and other international partners. This 




Table 7.1  
General Categorisation of Security Actors in Ghana and Nigeria 
 
Actors in the Security Sector 
 
Core Security Actors  Armed Forces, Police Service, Paramilitary Forces, Presidential Guards, Customs  
Authorities, and reserve or local security units (including Civil Defence Forces,  
National Guards etc.)  
Management and  
Oversight Bodies  
The Executive, National Security Advisory Bodies, Legislative and Legislative Select 
Committees, Ministries of Defence, Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs,  
Customary and Traditional Authorities, Financial Management Bodies (Finance  
 Ministries, Budget Officers, Financial Audit and Planning Units), and Civil Society  
Organisations (Civilian Review Boards and Public Complaints Commissions)  
Justice and Rule of Law  Judiciary and Justice Ministries, Prisons, Criminal Investigation and Prosecution  
Services, Human Rights Commissions and Ombudsmen, and Customary and  
Traditional Justice Systems, Traditional/Sharia Courts    
Non-Statutory Security  
Forces  
Private Security Companies, Political Party Militias, Vigilante Groups  
 
External Security  
Actors  
Development Partners - DFID, SIDA, CIDA, USAID, UNDP, GTZ, DANIDA etc  
Military Experts – IMET, MPRI, BMAT, BDAT  
Regional Bodies - Regional Economic Communities (RECs), African Union,             
European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), WACSOF,  
ECOSSOC, ASSN, WANEP etc.  
Global - United Nations, Global Consortium on Security Transformation (GCST)    
Source: Adapted from OECD DAC Handbook, 2007 p.22, and author’s own research. 
These actors possess their respective security cultures expressed in "particular ways of 
thinking that are shared locally and across the sub-region" in response to transnational security 
challenges (Williams and Haacke 2008: 128-129). They interpret the meaning of symbols, 
artifacts, and behaviours in the same or in similar ways within their respective groups and 
subgroups (Banks, Banks and McGee 2010: 8). This interpretation however differ, in some 
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instances, between and across the different security groups who are guided mainly by their 
respective constitutions, code of conduct, common and customary laws based on either western 
values, norms and customs or indigenous traditions and cultures, and which guide the 
formulation of policies and strategies for responses to security threats or needs. The values, 
norms and principles, among others, underscore the “soft” part of culture, which is more or less 
invisible, but which influences behavioural patterns or the way of life of the security actors in the 
security system (Murray 2009). 
 Engagement with most of these actors during the field research revealed that cultural 
differences manifest in the different understanding of roles and responsibilities which result in 
turf battles and serve as a hindrance to good governance practices. Those with similar security 
cultures or within same cultural groups usually understand each other and agree on expectations 
while those with different cultural leanings disagree in decision-making or responses to security 
challenges. As witnessed in the Nigerian case study, for example, despite prominent roles played 
by chiefs and other traditional leaders, their functions are still perceived as unconstitutional and 
only given recognition and legitimacy by the people or even officials of government in an 
informal setting (Tonwe & Osemwota 2013:133-137; Vanguard Newspaper 2012: 13). This 
differs from the situation in Ghana where comprehensive constitutional provisions have been 
made with regard to structure, hierarchy, functions and responsibilities among others (Article 
270-277 of the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana). This is not to depict a perfect 
relationship between formal and informal actors in Ghana, but to indicate minimal standards 
required as basis for recognition, collaboration and partnerships. It also gave the chance for 
understanding and imbibing both formal and informal progressive security cultures and traditions 
as these actors meet and learn about each other’s cultures thereby discarding obsolete or 
regressive stereotypes or cultures towards effective governance.  
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 Similarly at the regional level, mainly within ECOWAS, distinct security cultures, as 
observed in Chapter 4 of this study, informed the establishment of the regional security 
frameworks for security responses based on norms and values of equality, territorial integrity, 
solidarity and collective self-reliance, non-aggression and good neighbourliness, and peaceful 
settlement of disputes in respective member states. Though these values are generally 
acknowledged and recognised, behavioural patterns differ through different interpretations of 
regional and international norms. Member States would, therefore, interpret transnational security 
threats or humanitarian challenges, for example, differently and adopt different interventions 
measures to these challenges (Acharya 2004; and Ladnier 2003 cited in Williams and Haacke 
2008: 129). 
 It becomes clear from the above illustrations that cultural norms and values are brought to 
bear in the performance of roles, functions or responsibilities of the numerous actors in the SSG 
process.  Thus, the fusion of different cultures of security actors, both external and internal, and 
even among core security sector actors and their counterparts in the civilian management and 
oversight bodies, makes it rather complex and difficult in the oversight, management and 
governance of the security sector. This reinforces the need for demystifying and minimising the 
complexities for effective governance towards required change and transformation needed. 
 Based on these general observations and findings in both countries, a comparison is 
undertaken to highlight specific areas of influences in order to guide common, standard and 
holistic practice of SSR/SSG agenda going forward. 
 7.4 Security Culture Influences on Security Sector Governance: Ghana and Nigeria 
       Compared 
  
Three major categories of security actors engage in securitisation of threats and devise 
strategies to respond or intervene in the prevention, management and resolution of these security 
challenges. These are the state, sub-state and international (governmental and non-governmental) 
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actors. These actors are aligned with both western/colonial and indigenous forms of security 
culture and tradition. Their relations or interactions are sometimes characterised by cases of 
contention, disagreements, misunderstandings, manipulations and corruption based, especially, on 
cultural differences, while there are equally opportunities, despite differences in cultures, for 
working together (Gusfiled 1968: 1-8; Chinsinga 2006: 255-274; Galland & Lemel 2008: 153-
186). Indeed, there were also instances where some who possessed similar security cultures still 
differed in opinions and actions as a result of issues of corruption which remained one of the 
major challenges in attempts at addressing security threats in both countries.  
In undertaking the comparisons between the two countries, the identified issues of 
complexity, acceptance and enhanced security sector governance are used as indicators to help 
identify progressive security culture influences in governance of the security sector as a basis for 
change and transformation. 
7.4.1 Complexity 
Given varied security cultures of numerous state and sub-state actors as well as 
international partners in the security sector, achieving successful SSG continues to remain 
complex. The complexity stems basically from the colonial influences within a post-colonial 
African context, through the imposition of ‘liberal’ or ‘western’ peace tendencies within a 
traditional or informal setting of Africa (Aning et al 2018: 121). This concept of SSG, despite its 
positive attributes, is sometimes perceived as facilitating ‘neo-imperialist tendencies’, thereby 
minimising the space or opportunity for traditional and indigenous approaches to peacebuilding 
or statebuilding processes (Mac Ginty 2008: 140). The confluence or congruence of modernity 
and tradition perceived by some scholars as antithetical in approach would thus require prudent 
calibration for successful implementation of a concept considered largely as foreign with varied 
259 
 
forms of legitimacy and acceptability (Hoehne 2011:29; Molutsi 2004; Mattes 1997; Logan 
2008: 1-23).  
 These cultural differences emanate from a hybrid and multi-layered group of actors 
working in different institutions with their own cultural dynamics, vision, mission and mandate 
on issues of security. They relate at horizontal and vertical levels, while equally traversing in 
partnerships on issues of common interest. While the general assumption is made that people 
within similar cultures easily find areas of commonality and acceptability in handling security-
related issues, it also not usually the case as issues of legitimacy, loyalty and alliances, in 
addition to corrupt ideals, affect these efforts. Thus the introduction of security sector reform and 
governance as a concept linked to western ideology and foreign within the African setting require 
some level of understanding and clarity amidst all the security complexes for acceptance. 
This takes us to the findings in the field in Ghana and Nigeria with regard to the existing 
hybridism outlined above in the security sector of both countries, and with its underlying 
complexities based on which options were identified to circumvent challenges posed, while 
strengthening prospects within this setting. 
The complexity of SSG in Ghana stems from actors and their different cultures, including 
ministries, the House of Parliament, intelligence and security agencies, and CSOs. The issue is 
further complicated by issues of confidentiality and secrecy as against subjecting security 
agencies to oversight and control within the sector. This is not, however, peculiar to Ghana but 
generally reflective of security sectors in the region and beyond. A clear example has to do with 
the vital importance of policing in the maintenance of law and order in Ghana but to which 
“…society has often not looked upon the policeman with the expected admiration and reverence” 
(Mr. Sam Awortwi, ASDR Roundtable on Police and Policing 2001: 2). This is partly 
attributable to the “…instinctive desire of human beings to be free while the maintenance of law 
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and order entails curtailing certain action[s] of members of society… [while on the contrary] the 
manner in which some policemen carry out their work could evoke resentment from society” 
(Mr. Sam Awortwi, ASDR Roundtable on Police and Policing 2001: 2). 
Another example relates to the specific requirement spelt out in the 1996 Security and 
Intelligence Agencies Act of Parliament (Act 526) for the Minister of National Security, who is 
assigned ministerial responsibility by the President for intelligence agencies, to annually submit a 
report to parliament on activities of the ministry. This is hardly done as part of transparency and 
accountability requirements, and parliamentarians, until recently, were either unaware of this 
requirement or never really bothered to demand that it is done given the culture of confidentiality 
and the waving of the band of ‘state secret’ by security institutions and agencies.    
The security systems and different cultures, therefore, make the governance of the sector 
rather complex. But though complex, there must be a conscious effort to ensure that the oversight 
bodies are working. Hence in the case of parliament, for instance, because of the high turnover of 
parliamentarians, training has to be always provided to facilitate effectiveness in terms of 
knowing the issues given that after every four years, some parliamentarians are replaced 
(Thomas Jaye, KAIPTC, 09 May 2015). Also, any complex concept must be clearly explained 
and placed in its proper context for acceptance and effectiveness.  
Endogenous security culture is not too different from that of the western world when it 
comes to ensuring security of the state and its people. Notions of transparency, accountability 
and upholding human rights and the rule of law, however, become an issue given the status of a 
chief or a king and his discretionary powers usually based on the traditions of a people rather 
than western conceptions of human rights. A new concept, therefore, requires time to be properly 
understood and implemented, and change is also sometimes difficult and does take time. Hence 
some level of education is required to make a difference. In a similar vein, government and the 
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people also need to determine the kind of security they need, its affordability, and if the country 
still requires donor support to afford it. (Ernest Lartey, KAIPTC, Accra, 08 May 2015).  
Minimising complexity within security institutions in the country would thus require 
partnerships between government and its civil society counterparts in terms of understanding the 
concept of SSR/SSG, the security culture of the actors and clarification of roles. This must, 
however, be done by being cognizant of the fact that people have played various roles in their 
institutions for a long time and are, therefore, accustomed to these roles or cultures, and, thus, the 
required change cannot take place overnight but must be seen as a process that will take time. 
This is because these institutions have emerged over the years and have become laws onto 
themselves, and to say they need oversight would not be accepted easily. Hence there is the need 
to dialogue with them in order to provide prudent alternatives (Thomas Jaye, KAIPTC, Accra, 09 
May 2015).  
Clarification of roles will require clearly defined security legislations to spell them out so 
as to avoid, for instance, turf battles between the police and the customs and excise services 
which occur very often, though they are part of the core professional security agencies. We also 
need a policy dialogue forum for all these actors to meet and dialogue as some actors do not 
know the security sector properly; e.g. civilians cannot provide adequate oversight without 
adequate knowledge of security referents and their roles. With this knowledge, actors could 
operate, optimally, within their boundaries. The parliament should have a right to demand 
accountability from an intelligence agency, for example, and the refusal of this request from the 
intelligence agency must be an issue that borders on undermining state interest or security with 
an option, in certain cases, for the matter to be determined by the Supreme Court. These are ways 
of resolving institutional culture clashes etc. (Thomas Jaye, Deputy Director FAAR, KAIPTC, 
Accra, 09 May 2015). Demystification of the security sector is equally necessary to make 
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everyone conscious of the sector and afford them the opportunity to understand it beyond the 
traditional or regime type of security (Mr. Justice Agbezuge, Peace Analyst, UNDP, 19 May 
2015). 
Taking a look at the Dagbon and Hohoe conflict case studies, as well as the electoral 
disputes reviewed in chapter 5 on Ghana, the laudable partnerships between the state and sub-
state actor groups in the resolution of the crises gained a lot of recognition and commendation 
from Ghanaians and other international observers, given the lax in responses and the potential 
spill-over effects of some of the crises at their initial stages. Progress, however, only came amidst 
the complexities when the actors agreed to work together. This partnership underscores the 
essential attributes of knowledge of the actors and familiarity with their cultures, in addition to 
the recognition of both state and sub-state actors and the resultant positive impact of their 
intervention in the resolution of conflict. The clarity of roles and the collective interests of both 
state and sub-state actors involved, their acceptance in the mediation processes based on the trust 
and confidence reposed in them as neutral actors of integrity, and the willingness of the 
community residents and disputing factions to submit to their intervention equally facilitated the 
peace process (Aning et al 2018: 125-128; Zounmenou 2009:1-7). This holds the potential for 
efficiency and effectiveness in the governance of the security sector. These positive interventions 
reflect the ‘bottom-up’ rather than the ‘top-bottom’ approach to security governance in which 
both state and sub-state actors are inclusive in decision-making and interventions towards the 
prevention, management and resolution of conflicts and mitigation of security threats when they 
happen.  
In the case of Nigeria, the complexities are made manifest in the very diverse and varied 
formal and informal settings, reflected in the federal and state governance arrangements and 
architecture, many ethnic and religious groups, social groups, and local and international 
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organisations. In this scenario, commonalities and decision-making becomes very difficult 
(interview with Chinedu Nwagu, Project Director, Trust Africa-Nigeria, Abuja, 05 January 
2018). This calls for dialogue in bridging gaps to arrive at a holistic or national sense of security 
culture in order to guide security sector reform and governance processes (British High 
Commission Official, Abuja, 05 January 2018).  
Donors or international partners have introduced or rather seek to support the 
implementation of a concept which seems quite foreign but could be applicable to the Nigerian 
context with some adjustments. This will require a basic understanding and contextualisation of 
the concept which provides the option for its recognition, acceptance and adoption. Doing this, 
however, would necessitate an integration of both formal and informal positive security cultural 
traits as the basis for transforming the governance of the security sector. As Ajetunmobi & Ojo 
(2015: 14) stated, “… the political elite should stop humiliating the traditional rulers and usurp 
[sic] the traditional functions of the kings”. That hybrid context which is already in existence but 
not formalised thus needs reconsideration. Achieving desired results through changes in mindset 
and embracing positive formal and indigenous behavioral traits based on agreed values, norms 
and practices would be required.  
Major security challenges still confront the country in areas of terrorism, the Niger Delta 
Oil Crisis and farmer-herder disputes, reviewed in chapter 6, and which continue to claim 
thousands of lives and property. This reflects an intricate set of challenges within the security 
sector or governance system with multiple security actors who perform different roles and 
functions, and require ‘software’ changes as a result of entrenched negative behaviours, attitudes, 
norms, values and principles, in order to complement that of the ‘hardware’ changes related to 
security institutions and agencies, capacity-building and resources for enhanced and effective 
security service delivery. Responses to these crises have focused largely on ‘top-bottom’ 
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approaches which, in many cases, are non-inclusive and have ignored the essential role of 
traditional leaders and cultural considerations. Civil society actors have called for the adoption of 
the human security approach which is more inclusive and consultative rather than the regime 
security approach to issues, as well as the need for collaboration and partnerships between the 
Nigerian Government, non-governmental organisations and civil society organisations (Aghedo 
and Osumah 2012: 856 -869; Akinbi 2015: 43; Abimbola and Adesote 2012: 16-28).   
Involvement of traditional actors has, thus, been on their own initiative and ceremonial 
basis rather than on any legal basis as compared to local government structures which also 
depend on partnerships with these leaders for success. This obviously substantiates Englebert’s 
(2000: 97-98; also in Logan 2011:2) assertion of African States being historically in competition 
with traditional authorities for popular legitimacy, but more importantly that the authority of 
traditional leaders is not only independent of the state but also resilient and rooted in the 
historical continuity of the traditional institutions and having a moral claim to rule.   
Revisiting Mortiz (2010:145) and Pelican’s (2006: 237) argument that culture serves as 
the central but missing element in the resolution of farmer-herder and, by extension, other  
conflicts in West Africa resonates with the attempts to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in 
Nigeria. This hinges on having adequate knowledge of history, customs and tradition of actors, 
while exploring partnerships between formal and informal institutions in the management and 
resolution of disputes. The prevention of farmer-herder crisis in the Ijebu-Itele district of Ogun 
State by His Royal Highness Dr. (engr.) M.A. Kasali, the Moyegeso of Ijebu-Itele Kingdom, 
speaks volumes in this regard as he was able to peacefully settle the dispute and get reparation 
for affected farmers as detailed in chapter 6 of the study. 
The above scenarios in Ghana and Nigeria clearly indicate security challenges in both 
countries characterised by security complexes. However, the challenges that were addressed 
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effectively in both countries were based mainly on a good comprehension of security culture 
considerations. Hence, what remains significant from these findings relates to mapping or 
knowing the actors; ensuring clarity and recognition of their roles and functions, particularly of 
traditional actors, in the legislative frameworks as pertains in Ghana compared to Nigeria; good 
knowledge and understanding of the security dynamics; circumventing the hybrid security 
culture differences through dialogue, consultation and inclusivity; as well as adopting inclusive 
bottom-up approaches in responses to security challenges.  
7.4.2 Acceptance 
 The issue of acceptance came up very strongly in the discussions, interviews and desk 
research in the security sector reform and governance process. It came up at two basic levels 
which are accepting the SSR/SSG concept, and the leadership to the process. There is the basic 
assumption in the SSR/SSG discourse that it is the standard way of ensuring sanitising the security 
sector towards peace, stability and sustainable development in the West African region and the 
continent at large. Be that as it may, the SSR process has evolved through many stages for over 
two decades, and the process was largely guided by security experts, professionals, technocrats 
and international partners. All these actors shaped the conception, design, development and 
implementation of the programme, but those at the grassroots hardly ever know of the existence of 
this concept or what it entails.  
Traditional leaders, based on interviews in Ghana and Nigeria, have their own systems 
and conceptions about security and the need to discard obsolete traditional practices and imbibe 
new values as their indigenous ways of reform and vice versa, but an introduction of an alternate 
concept perceived as foreign and a western agenda in a translational manner makes it difficult to 
accept and implement. This is where the essence of culture or security culture becomes 
prominent in contextualising this concept as cultural awareness and sensitivity becomes very 
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crucial, especially as shared beliefs, values, norms, customs and tradition vary and differ within 
and outside of both countries. 
On the issue of leadership to the process, issues of power and authority must be expressed 
based on legitimate governance as this becomes crucial in ensuring appropriate guidance and 
success of the programme. Recognition also underpins the issue of legitimacy which hinges 
mainly on formal and informal recognition of leaders in the security sector governance process. 
Effective leadership as observed in the field goes with trust in addition to other equally important 
values such as courage, service, respect, recognition, honesty, integrity and truth. These values 
were highlighted in specific details by traditional leaders in focus group discussions conducted 
during the field research in Abutia Kloe and Sunyani in Ghana (September 2015), as well as in 
interviews with chiefs in Ogun State in Nigeria, (March 2018).  
Similar views were equally expressed by security experts in both countries. For example, 
leadership is construed as servitude and if understood properly, responsibility would be assumed 
to address the needs of the people and that of the state (interview with a Rtd. Brig Gen/State 
Official in the All People’s Congress Government, Abuja, 05 January 2018). Again, the notion of 
legitimacy and for that matter ‘acceptance’ was considered as dependent on the contextualisation 
and understanding of the SSR/SSG concept and the belief in leadership’s capabilities to 
implement the concept based on above-mentioned values. That said, acceptance of the SSR/SSG 
concept did not come up during the regime or traditional security era marked by military 
dictatorships, but within the democratic dispensation with emphasis on human security. The issue 
of acceptance, therefore, remained mainly in the domain of the security agencies under 
authoritarianism rather than within civil society. But given the highly political nature of SSR, the 
required change and transformation only hold a great potential in this current dispensation of 
democracy and good governance (Ernest Lartey, Research Fellow, KAIPTC, Accra, 8 May 2015)  
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It also came to light that leaders with close affinity to their people were easily trusted, 
recognised and given the needed support towards the successful implementation of programmes, 
while those not in close contact were either perceived as not accountable, corrupt or agents of 
imperialists. Leaders who were recognised to have close affinity with their people were mainly 
religious, traditional and charismatic leaders. There are, however, exceptions to the rule in which 
some of these leaders, for example traditional and religious leaders, who resided with people in 
communities and had close affinity were found to be corrupt and were either removed or lost the 
trust, recognition and legitimacy of the people. These progressive, invincible and ‘soft’ traits 
manifest in cultural values, and any security reform or governance initiative must mainstream 
them in its processes as it facilitates (re)orientation towards eliminating negative and obsolete 
attitudes and behaviours, not only for the leadership but also for all actors engaged in the process, 
be it state, sub-state or international partners. 
The Yendi Chieftaincy dispute reviewed in chapter 5 of this study unveils a classic 
contention between formal and traditional governance systems, reflected in the European 
intrusion into the traditional political system of the Dagbon Kingdom which has been in 
existence for five decades, and the partitioning and subsequent replacement of the traditional 
rotational system with that of a modern Selection Committee. As Hoehne (2011: 7) and others 
would argue, “…traditional authority usually features gerontocracy, patriarchy and undemocratic 
procedures (e.g. consensus instead of vote) and therefore interferes with modern democracy” 
(Fanthorpe 2005: 27-49; Ntsebetza 2005: 71-89), hence the interference, by colonialists, in the 
established traditional system of selection of chiefs.  
Notwithstanding, the new Selection Committee was allegedly introduced during the 1948 
Conference of Dagbon Chiefs which was later perceived by some indigenes as an illegal and 
unjustifiable conference as records of the conference could not be traced and the day of the 
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meeting, 12 May 1948, remained questionable given ongoing funeral rites of a royal of the 
kingdom which outlawed such meetings at the time (Mahama and Noble 2005). This 
development had negative influence on the subsequent post-independence selection of chiefs in 
the kingdom as the chieftaincy institution became politicised, leading to the murder of Ya Na 
Yakubu Andani II in March 2002. All these raised issues of suspicion and lack of recognition 
which eventually led to the non-acceptance of the Ya Na and the major differences between the 
gates of the same family.  
In a related development, again captured in chapter 5, it took eminent chiefs, led by 
Asantehene Otumfuo Osei Tutu II, the Ashanti King, to resolve the longstanding Yendi dispute 
which successive governments of the NDC and NPP failed to do. The revered, recognised and 
respected chiefs succeeded in brokering peace between the two gates after a lost decade of 
intervention. The acceptance of the leadership of the Asantehene as a credible mediator, together 
with other eminent chiefs, did not only attest to his legitimacy as a traditional leader, but his 
knowledge of the values, norms, customs and tradition of the people, to a large extent, facilitated 
the successful resolution of the dispute (Ghanaweb.com, Thursday, 13 December 2018). 
In his response to finding a solution to the farmer-herder dispute in his community, His 
Royal Highness Alaiyeluwa Oba Dr. (engr.) M.A. Kasali, the Moyegeso of Ijebu-Itele Kingdom 
in Ogun State, Nigeria, (30 March 2018) emphasised the need for recognition and involvement of 
traditional leaders in addressing security problems in the country. He called for the bottom-up 
approach in which he emphasised the importance of the knowledge of the terrain and the 
identification of non-residents or foreigners by the indigenes who are better placed in gathering 
intelligence and working with the traditional leaders and local government authorities. This he 
considered as the most effective means of partnership with security agencies in fighting crime. 
His success in mediating the dispute was attributable to knowing the people in the community, 
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their tradition, customs and culture, as well as his acceptance by his subjects as their leader. He 
did this without the intervention of the local government authorities. The Nigeria Police Force, 
recognising these attributes, have consistently collaborated with the local security actors, 
particularly registered vigilante groups to arrest criminals for prosecution. 
This brings to the fore the urgent need to restore the roles and functions of traditional 
leaders left out of the 1999 Constitution of the Republic of Nigeria in order to accord them 
appropriate recognition and effectiveness of decision-making in the peace and development of 
the country as in the case of Ghana. And as reflected in previous chapters and this current one, a 
section of the current Ghanaian Constitution detailed the institutional structure, roles – including 
security and non-political activities – to engage in, as well as functions and adjudication 
processes of chieftaincy institutions. It also protected the institution from political interferences 
in order to avoid the age-old misunderstanding between tradition and modernity. This gives 
legitimacy and recognition to traditional leaders in addition to their complementary role in 
governance and development of the country. 
To conclude, therefore, on the findings and analysis undertaken on security culture 
influences on effective governance of the security sector, the two case studies revealed some 
interesting findings with respect to enhancing security sector governance in both countries based 
on integrated or hybrid progressive security culture practices. The focus was not on which 
scenario is better than the other but which practices worked in both countries to serves as useful 
lessons in seeking the adoption of progressive security cultures in security governance. Indeed 
there were many cases of similarities in terms of values, tradition and culture; colonial lineage 
reflected in the formal institutions, structures and organisations; political systems; security culture; 
and common security challenges in both countries and across the region. Both countries have also 
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experienced stable democracies, economic growth and development over the years and have 
attained middle income status.  
There are, however, differences with regard to issues of recognition and legitimacy of 
traditional institutions and the roles expected of them in the security sector governance in both 
countries. While Ghana accords status, recognition as well as roles and responsibilities to 
traditional leaders in the Ghanaian constitution, that of Nigeria did not do that in its 1999 
Constitution. Hence despite the existence of hybrid formal and informal institutions, only the 
formal is recognised and with the requisite legitimacy to respond to security challenges in the 
country, leading mainly to top-bottom approaches to issues. Notwithstanding, the indigenes accord 
the needed legitimacy to their traditional leaders and institutions, including those within the formal 
sectors, based on common heritage and resilience of these traditional institutions and, thus, 
security interventions undertaken by these traditional institutions are usually ceremonial though 
effective. This situation needs to be rectified. 
The governance arrangements, though republican in nature, differ in terms of Nigeria’s 
federal system of governance. Nigeria’s Boko Haram crisis also remains a major challenge to the 
security sector, compared to Ghana, as well as its Niger Delta oil crisis. Issues of the farmer-
herder disputes are, nevertheless, common in both countries though the rate of mortality is far 
higher in Nigeria to that of Ghana. 
This comparative analysis, thus, highlights security cultural influences, in terms of shared 
values, norms and practices, that helps to minimise or demystify the complexity of security sector 
reform and governance processes, based on cultural awareness, sensitivities and imbibing 
progressive security culture traits in the bid to address security challenges and provide security 
needs of the state and the people. This offers the opportunity for the acceptance of the SSR/SSG 
concept and leadership to the process towards effective governance of the sector.   
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7.4.3 Effective/Enhanced Security Sector Governance 
The main objective of this study is to meet the security needs of both the state and its 
people as a way of facilitating statebuilding processes particularly in states in transition. Meeting 
the desired security needs will, however, be achieved if or when there is an optimal sense of 
freedom from fear and meeting basic needs within the context of human security. Leadership 
must guide the process and define roles, strategies and mobilise resources to address security 
challenges. Leadership, as already mentioned in chapter 2 of this study and previous sections 
above, remains crucial to the success of SSG as effective governance of the security sector 
requires effective organisation and management of the structures, processes and actors in the 
sector. It also requires drafting and implementing laws, policies and strategies towards meeting 
needs of the state and its people, as well as facilitating dialogue through consultation and 
encouraging freedom of expression. Above all, leaders in this sector must promote enhanced 
governance through the transformation of behaviour and attitudes, which must be based on 
imbibing or observing specific principles, standards or norms and values.   
The sector must be properly streamlined with actors performing the functions within 
agreed formal and informal hybrid context. Security agencies must be well equipped to deliver on 
core security needs of the people, which include prevention of crime, ensuring public safety and 
observation of human rights, enforcing the rule of law, and generally ensuring adequate defence of 
the territory of the state, its sovereignty and integrity among other things. The missing element, 
however, is the softer part of security sector reform and governance initiative which embraces 
security culture. This must be considered in all the activities mentioned above and its deficits 
addressed to ensure the right security culture considerations in the areas of cultural awareness and 
sensitivities, and adopting the right values, norms and customs for effective and efficient 
governance. These will enhance SSG in West Africa and beyond, and in doing that the following 
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intervening factors inferred from the findings above must be observed: people-centred security; 
knowledge of the concepts; leadership and legitimacy; recognition of actors; defined roles and 
functions; circumventing hybrid security culture challenges; and the adoption and mainstreaming 
of positive or progressive security culture values for the desired impact. 
7.5 Triangulation of Findings 
Findings from Ghana and Nigeria in the comparative analysis undertaken above, present 
data on established patterns, uniformities and variations on security culture influences on 
governance of the security sector in both countries (Daly 2007: 212; Crotty, 1998). This, in 
essence, provided the option for making inferences and inductions based on discourse and 
ideation, which helped to provide the needed answer to the research question of this study on 
why culture matters, and how security culture has affected the complexity of, and facilitated the 
acceptance and effectiveness of security sector governance in the comparative cases of Ghana 
and Nigeria.   
In effect, cultural differences or lack of cultural awareness and sensitivity makes it 
difficult to accept the SSR/SSG concept or promote effective governance in the sector, while 
respect for values, norms and practices, be it formal or informal, facilitates positive security 
culture influences in accepting or implementing these concepts. This was evident in solutions 
found to long-standing disputes in Ghana and Nigeria based on partnerships between formal and 
informal security arrangements with regard to the Dagbon Chieftaincy disputes, Hohoe ethnic 
crisis, electoral disputes, resolution of the farmer-herder dispute in Ijebu-Itele district of Ogun 
State, and the effective collaboration between the Nigeria Police Force and the Vigilante Groups 
in fighting crimes in the communities. Those of the Boko Haram terrorist attacks in North-




This observation is reinforced in Chapter 2 of this study on SSR in Afghanistan where 
obvious cultural differences and loyalty to tribe and village proved much stronger than that of 
national government, as security personnel identified more with local social structures, customs 
and loyalties than national laws and institutions despite proposed reforms (Murray 2009: 188). 
Hence the superimposition of new ideas on what is still a tribal society was only temporal and 
was reversed with the withdrawal of international support from the country (Murray 2009:193). 
Similar dispositions are highlighted by Wood (2004) and Hills (2012) on taking sensibilities of 
other nodes (actors and processes) towards cultural transformation within institutions and 
delivering effective security needs by imbibing a globalised security culture.  
A globalised security culture entails the adoption of positive norms and values, and the 
inclusion of both formal and informal security institutions in the governance of the security 
sector. This hybrid context with mixed cultures would require credible leadership to ensure the 
change and transformation needed in the sector. This will, however, necessitate prudent 
calibration for successful implementation of a concept perceived largely as foreign with varied 
forms of legitimacy and acceptability. Contextual hybridism must therefore take pre-eminence 
over translational hybridism. This would require significant levels of security culture influences 
which must be genuine enough and based on positive values, standards and norms, for intrinsic 
rather than instrumental or cosmetic change, as great possibilities exist for discarding or rejecting 
such values based on differences, ignorance, inexperience or corrupt morals and values (Wood 
2004:31–48). And in cases where cultural differences prevail, respect, co-existence and dialogue 
must be employed to facilitate the process rather than an event. 
The complexity of the security terrain, therefore, requires the adoption of the basic 
intervening factors, identified above, to facilitate the needed change or transformation in the 
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sector towards its minimisation and promoting acceptability of the SSR/SSG concept and its 
effectiveness.  
7.5.1 People-Centred Security   
An effective security system, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, would require the 
various components of the entire security system working together to deliver security needs of 
the state and its people. In this regard, the data gathered from the field in Ghana and Nigeria 
attests to the fact that effective governance of the security sector would essentially depend on a 
government-people partnership within a multi-party democracy, rather than a dictatorial or 
authoritarian regime setting, where human security preferences remain the most credible 
alternative compared to traditional, regime or governmental security preferences.   
A security system focused more on individual, community or national security 
preferences would afford the opportunity for all actors to contribute towards the identification of 
security threats to both the state and its people, with accompanying security policies and 
strategies to address these threats (interview with retired Snr. Military Officer in Abuja, FCT, 
Nigeria, 5 January 2018; Aghedo and Osumah 2012: 856 -869; Akinbi 2015: 43; Abimbola and 
Adesote 2012: 16-28). This will facilitate a "[shift] from state-centred to a plural or nodal 
conception[s] of governance" as well as “pay[ing] more attention to the opportunities for 
transformation within the broader field of security governance" (Wood 2004: 32).   
Thus in essence, human beings must be at the centre of security considerations which 
affords collective identification and securitisation of issues based on either similar or diverse 
positive security cultural traits. This is reflected in the Ghana case where national security 
apparatus watches citizen’s dissatisfaction above anything else, as any citizen dissatisfaction 
becomes a national security concern (interview with Raymond Atuguba, Executive Secretary of 
former President John Mahama and Law Lecturer, University of Ghana, Legon, Monrovia, 15 
275 
 
September 2015). This is predicated on citizen’s dissatisfaction posing real threats to losing 
legitimacy and for that matter elections in future polls. This reinforces the initial assertion in 
chapter 2 that the security of the state and the human being is of prime importance by way of 
ensuring not only the absence of violence, but upholding human rights, good governance, access 
to education and healthcare, and making opportunities and choices available for the individual to 
fulfill his or her potential (UNDP Human Development Report 1994: 3, 22-40; Annan 2000; and 
Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007).  
Notwithstanding, cultural differences, sub-cultures, counter-cultures, and dominant 
cultures in the security sector make governance of the security sector complex and challenging, 
and thus necessitates  dialogue, coexistence, mediation and other related roles by security actors 
in the field in order to facilitate national dispute resolution, peace, security and stability in the 
country (interview with Ernest Lartey, Researcher, KAIPTC, 8 May 2015).  
With these basic arrangements in place, the needed transformation within the sector 
would, thus, require essential elements of changing negative behavioural or attitudinal practices 
through dropping the negative security cultural traits and adopting positive ones in both the 
formal and informal security terrain. This will require a basic mapping and recognition of the 
actors, respect for their mandates, roles and functions, security dialogue towards coordination 
and informing policy decisions and strategies, as well as promoting a hybrid engagement of 
issues within the formal and informal settings towards acceptance and transformation. 
7.5.2 Knowledge of Concept  
 SSR/SSG concept emerged from the security-development nexus in which policy-makers 
saw security and development as linked and mutually reinforcing of each other (Schievels 2019). 
Hence one needs a secure and stable environment for development t to take place, while 
development also consolidates peace, security and stability. The evolution and implementation of 
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the concept was mainly undertaken within the epistemic community comprising academics, 
policy-makers and security professionals or securocrats among others. Hence to introduce and 
implement a concept that impacts grassroots, partnerships between both formal and informal 
sectors would be of utmost importance and this must be based on a major sensitisation 
programme as part of the SSR/SSG agenda for success and sustainability. The assumption, 
therefore, held that a prescriptive approach based on top-bottom efforts would facilitate the 
successful implementation of this concept has and continues to be erroneous.  
 Any SSR/SSG agenda must incorporate a strong element of sensitisation and massive 
outreach within grassroots in order to complement training and capacity-building within and 
among security professionals and policy-makers for the needed impact. This initiates the buy-in 
and also creates the opportunity for those supporting and implementing the programme to learn 
more about the culture, opportunities and concerns of the masses in order to help in effective 
programme implementation. Popularisation of the concept would improve and enhance 
knowledge about content and how to contexualise the SSR problematique and engagement among 
both formal and informal security actors. This will aid the acceptance and involvement of actors 
in rolling out the SSR/SSG agenda, as it creates the opportunity for local ownership, resilience 
and sustainability of projects (Donais 2008; Schirch and Mancini-Griffoli 2015).  
7.5.3 Recognised Security Actors  
The broad range of security actors within the formal and informal sectors, undoubtedly, 
have varied and distinct roles to play in the governance of the security sector. Their actions and 
inactions are informed mainly by their respective security cultures which are expressed either in 
similar or diverse ways between their various groups or sub-groups in the country, as well as 
across the region and beyond, in response to both domestic and transnational security challenges. 
An interpretation of meanings of symbols, artifacts, and behaviours in the same or in similar 
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ways within respective groups and sub-groups facilitate easy decision-making and 
implementation of strategies, while differences in this regard complicate same (Banks, Banks and 
McGee 2010: 8). Cultural differences exhibit complexities of relations between individuals or 
groups thereby hindering effective relations or governance, as the higher the differences, the 
more complex the relationship and reaching common goals (House et al 2002: 1).   
This necessitates recognition or acceptance of actors, even with different cultures, in 
order to facilitate easy decision-making, oversight responsibilities, upholding the rule of law and 
engendering the potential of hybrid cultures for the collective good. And this can only stem from 
subjecting one’s views or perspectives to positive or progressive cultural attributes based on 
traditional, national and universal standards. One area to find commonality in the face of 
complex and diverse security cultures is the organic law of the country, that is the Constitution of 
the Republic, which serves as the principal guiding standard for regulating policies, behaviour 
and best practices (Frank Oduro, CDD, Ghana, May 2015).  
Hence influences of culture and the need for cultural change within the broad field of 
security governance, must be expressed through the enhancement of democratic values within, 
across and outside of the state sphere, rather than limiting the discourse to an institutional context 
(Wood 2004:31–48).  But this must equally be contextualised to the extent that notions of 
tradition and modernity must gain traction and acceptable balance where indigenous security 
actors are not only involved in security reforms but made to comprehend positive foreign 
concepts and cultural values, while equally adopting the positive indigenous cultural values to 
facilitate the desired change and transformation in the sector. An understanding and recognition 
of respective cultures of the actors in the sector, including the leaders and their followers, have 
proven to be the determining factor in successfully governing the sector and this holds true even 
for international partners in the implementation of programmes and agendas.   
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7.5.4 Leadership and Legitimacy   
Leadership within the security sector remains crucial in steering security sector reforms 
and transformation. Max Weber’s classification of authority, legitimacy or leadership into the 
three categories of formal or rational-bureaucratic, traditional or informal and charismatic or 
personal provides a generic framework for assessing relationships between leadership of the 
sector and beneficiaries, as well as leadership styles required to facilitate transformation or 
change in the security sector (Weber 1958: 1-11; Burns 1978; Hoehne 2011: 6-7; Keulder 2010: 
150-154). Leadership is, however, most effective when accorded the needed legitimacy to 
function. Legitimacy in this context connotes “voluntary compliance of subjects to the authority 
of the ruler(s)” (Hoehne 2011: 6; Weber 1956:157; Oomen 2005b: 82). These dynamics are 
influenced by cultures or security culture traits, though sometimes paradoxically, as dictatorships 
within a seemingly democratic setting lack the needed legitimacy, while a so-called benevolent 
dictator who is pro-human security gains legitimacy. 
 Be that as it may, credible elections facilitate legitimacy and are determined by the 
people within the formal settings, but in the case of the informal system, traditional legitimacy is 
accorded based on issues of hereditary, traditions and customs, as well as critical roles and 
functions played in communities by chiefs and other traditional or opinion leaders. Hence if 
traditional leaders are not consulted by their formal counterparts, their opinions may not count, 
particularly in the case of Nigeria (interview with British High Commission Official, Abuja, 05 
January 2018). Additionally, opposition political parties are always known to question legitimacy 
within formal governance settings, while within the traditional indigenous settings, ethnic 
differences, for example, undermine legitimacy of traditional leaders. However a blend of both 
formal and informal legitimacies, as observed in the case studies in both countries, is needed for 
effective and efficient pursuit of functions in the security sector (Akingbolahan Adeniran, 05 
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January 2018, Abuja). Legitimacy is equally considered as legal and is conferred in the formal 
system or attracted by personalities, while corruption on the other hand undermines the 
legitimacy of actors involved in it (interview with Chinedu Nwagu, Project Director, Trust 
Africa-Nigeria, Abuja, 05 January 2018).   
These dynamics, however, raise issues of “mixed or multiple legitimacies” which gives 
authority to both formal and traditional rulers in their leadership roles and functions in hybrid 
contexts (William 2010: 26 in Logan 2011: 2). In the case of traditional leaders, indirect rule 
through colonialism have in certain respects undermined the authority of traditional institutions 
in fundamental ways (Mamdani 1996). Interestingly, however, the authority of traditional leaders 
is not only independent of the state but also resilient and rooted in the historical continuity of the 
traditional institutions with a moral claim to rule (Englebert 2000: 97-98; also in Logan 2011:2). 
This has facilitated continuous connection between chiefs and their communities or subjects. 
These historical, moral and performance legitimacies grant chiefs the authority to adjudicate and 
resolve disputes, promote development in the communities, oversee the maintenance of law and 
order, allocate land and above all bring discipline, dignity and respect to the institution which 
make his subjects dwell in communal harmony and unity (William 2010: 26). 
Mixed legitimacies, based on hybridity, further complicate allegiance and acceptance of 
leadership in which ethnic differences undermine loyalty to traditional leaders, as well as 
politicisation of the institution. This has brought about lots of chieftaincy disputes in Ghana and 
Nigeria. This, in turn, affects credible governance, particularly, within the security sector as was 
clearly manifested in the Yendi conflict where the politicisation of the selection of chiefs in the 
kingdom, based on colonial influences, brought about differences between same families 
belonging to different gates which subsequently led to the murder of the Ya Na Yakubu Andani II. 
Similarly, the Regional Minister who represented the President in that region but also a subject of 
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the Ya Na, heeded the request or directive from his traditional leader, his royal, by lifting a ban 
and curfew imposed by the regional security council over which he presided and which cost the 
life of the Ya Na. This perhaps substantiates Englebert’s (2000: 97-98; also in Logan 2011:2) 
assertion of African States being historically in competition with traditional authorities for popular 
legitimacy, but more importantly that the authority of traditional leaders is not only independent of 
the state but also resilient and rooted in the historical continuity of the traditional institutions and 
having a moral claim to rule. 
Hence relations between formal, informal and charismatic leaders, as well as their 
followers, hinge not only on integrity or upright moral standards like trust, respect and loyalty, 
but equally on legitimacy which facilitates the readiness to accept proposals for change and 
transformation. These attributes or qualities are value-laden and endear followers to their leaders. 
It facilitates the readiness to listen to such leaders as well as trust their decisions and judgment in 
embracing progressive foreign cultures, while dropping the obsolete or outmoded indigenous 
ones. This is in major contrast to self-centred, corrupt, exclusive and neo-patrimonial tendencies 
among other things.  
Leaders’ actions or inactions are partly informed by their personal, societal or 
organisational cultural traits which they bring to bear on the position they occupy and their 
influence on their followers and vice versa.  Additionally, direct relations or interactions between 
leaders and their followers reinforce their recognition, acceptance, authority and legitimacy, 
based mainly on the positive cultural dimensions and universally-accepted leadership styles 
which, in turn, facilitate governance in the quest to deliver security needs. This is clearly evident 
in the informal governance sectors, while an alternative ‘indirect’ relations project the leader as 
an agent of imperial powers or the self-serving and self-seeking type, thereby complicating 
attempts at desired change and transformation of the sector.   
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  The acceptance of the leadership of the Asantehene as a credible mediator, together with 
other eminent chiefs, did not only attest to his legitimacy as a traditional leader, but his 
knowledge of the values, norms, customs and tradition of the people which, to a large extent, 
facilitated the successful resolution of the dispute in the Dagbon crisis in northern Ghana 
(Ghanaweb.com, Thursday, 13 December 2018). The same also apply to the roles of formal and 
informal leaders in dispute or conflict resolution in the Hohoe and Ijebu-Itele districts of the 
Volta Region of Ghana and Ogun State in Nigeria respectively. Therefore, the dynamics of 
hybridism of the formal and informal contexts contribute largely to the successful governance of 
this sector based on altruistic and legitimate leadership qualities exhibited.  
7.5.5 Circumventing Complex Hybrid Security Challenges and Structures   
  In the context of security sector reform and governance, particularly in Africa, colonial 
influences permeate all aspects of life including the existing security institutions, actors, practices 
and strategies adopted in response to security challenges. In many respects, however, this 
approach to security is considered by some scholars and indigenes as imposition of ‘liberal’ or 
‘western’ peace tendencies within a traditional or informal African setting (Fukuyama 2004: 17). 
This, to a large extent, minimises the space or opportunity for traditional and indigenous 
approaches to peacebuilding or statebuilding processes (Mac Ginty 2008: 140). Hence, the 
tendency of a clash of two or more cultures, which either lean towards modernity or tradition, 
calls for prudent calibrations for successful implementation of a concept perceived largely as 
foreign with varied forms of legitimacies and acceptability (Hoehne 2011:29; Molutsi 2004; 
Mattes 1997; Logan 2008: 1-23).   
         This hybrid context is characterised by diverse and competing modern and traditional 
authorities, where power co-exist, overlap, interact and intertwine. In reality, the state’s 
privileged monopoly over power in minimised, while authority, legitimacy and capacities are 
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shared in the governance of the security sector (Boege et al 2009: 13-21, Ekeh 1975: 91- 112). 
Reforms would, therefore, not imply the transfer of resources, people, technology and strong 
institutions from the western world to developing countries, but shifting emphasis towards the 
endogenous context with focus on positive or progressive attributes of social order and resilience 
within communities and complementary institutions on the ground (Boege et al 2009: 14; Podder 
2013: 353-380). In this regard, the need would arise for the adoption and mainstreaming of 
transformative approaches in which hybrid forms of progressive traditional and modern practices 
would inform theories and policies (Mac Ginty 2008: 139 -163; and Podder 2013: 353-380), 
while eschewing the negatives of gerontocracy, authoritarianism, chauvinism and obsolete 
traditional practices (Bagayoko et al 2016: 7; Meagher 2012: 1073-1101; Logan 2008:1).   
Country case studies in Ghana and Nigeria revealed the importance and influence of 
culture in addressing conflicts, crime and disputes within a hybrid context, while the non-
recognition of same have undermined conflict prevention and resolution efforts. The intensity 
and complexity of crimes in contemporary times such as rape, abortion, armed robbery and 
murder require important partnerships between the indigenous and modern security arrangements 
to combat them (Focus Group Discussion, 18 September 2015, BA/R). Similarly, traditional 
councils have the skill and know-how to deal effectively with spiritual issues in the communities 
as compared to the law courts that have absolutely no jurisdiction or physical means of 
adjudication. Also, in their relations with the police, vigilante groups pass on sophisticated cases 
of crimes to the police with the consent of their chiefs, while cases of spiritual nature are handled 
at the traditional level. The group, as indicated in chapter 6, also gains expertise in the training 
academy where recruits are trained on issues of public relations, upholding and respecting human 
rights, handling of arms, and apprehension of suspects among other things (interview with a 
leader of a community Vigilante Group, 28 March 2018).   
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7.5.6 Acceptable Values as Cross-Cutting Issues  
        In the governance of the security sector, good values and morals serve as enablers or 
attributes of good leadership which remains essential for effective governance. Accepting or 
imbibing these values promote integrity, honesty, trustworthiness and anti-corruption among 
others. Some of these values mentioned and discussed by interviewees and within focus group 
discussions include moral uprightness, servitude, trust, togetherness or unity, truth and courage 
captured in sections above. These values promote recognition and inclusivity, and enhance 
leadership qualities which remain central to achieving security goals and objectives.  
    Hence, in the bid to establish the influence of security culture on governance of the 
security sector, these values must be assessed as they enhance performance and facilitate 
acceptance and collaboration in security reform and effective governance, while undermining 
same if ignored. These issues featured prominently in the findings in Ghana and Nigeria in either 
promoting or undermining the prevention, management or resolution of conflicts, crimes and 
terrorist activities. In the case of Nigeria for instance, perceived imperialist strategies to exploit 
and keep the Niger Delta polluted and underdeveloped led to resistance of any government 
intervention as state and government officials in general were seen as collaborating with oil 
companies to exploit the residents of Niger Delta. Similarly in the Yendi crisis in the Dagbon 
traditional area of Ghana, trust and confidence issues came up between and among traditional 
leaders and their followers, as well as government officials, given the politicisation of the 
conflict. It took integrity, trust and confidence reposed in the Ashanti king and his colleagues, as 
mentioned above, to get the issue eventually resolved, though with the support of government.  
That said, trust-related issues are not necessarily definite but remain quite mixed and 
complex between formal and informal institutions. A classic example relates to the 
Afrobarometre round two Studies conducted on people’s trust in traditional leaders, the 
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President, parliament, local government, the army, police and the courts in 2008 for selected 
African countries. Interestingly in that report, Ghana, which recognised its traditional leaders by 
making provision for them in the 1992 Ghanaian Constitution, had more trust for the President 
(65%) than their traditional leaders (54%), and the same level of trust for army (54%) and a little 
less for the police (51%). On the other hand, Nigeria which made no provision for their 
traditional leaders in the 1999 Nigerian Constitution had more trust for their traditional leaders 
(31%) than the President (18%) and the other formal institutions including the army (21%) and 
police (11%) (Logan 2008: 20).  
This brings up the issue of corruption that undermines the level of trust and confidence of 
the populace about formal and informal institutions, and for that matter security culture practices. 
Thus an institution, be it formal or informal, will only gain the required credibility, acceptance 
and legitimacy when seen to be less corrupt. This feeds into the leadership qualities of these 
institutions and their readiness and willingness to work with the people particularly at the 
grassroots.   
Thus, an inclusive, ‘bottom-up’ approach to issues endear the leadership and institution to 
the people and their reciprocate readiness and willingness to follow their leaders in reforms and 
implementation of decisions in the governance process. All these, as observed and analysed, are 
largely based on positive security culture influences in which people share in and identify with. 
In all these, however, change and transformation in relation to culture remains a process rather 
than an event and may take time for a successful outcome.  
The diagram below captures the triangulated findings on a complex security sector having 
several security actors with varied security cultures, and with the goal of enhancing reform and 
governance of the security sector. To achieve this objective, which would require changes in 
certain security cultures and adopting new ones towards the transformation of the sector, the key 
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intervening factors reviewed above must be taken into consideration as labelled below. In doing 
this also, uniqueness and variability of individual behaviour counts (Daly 2007:212). 
Figure 7.1 
Conceptual Framework Depicting Security Culture Influences towards the Enhancement of 







Source: Author, 2019 
 
 
7.6 Conclusion  
This chapter sought to establish the centrality of security culture influences in the 
improvement of the governance of the security sector in countries in transition in West Africa 
and beyond. Two country case studies, specifically of Ghana and Nigeria, were used to indicate 
the significance of security culture in security sector reform efforts and governance of the sector 
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and why culture matters, rather than a demonstration of which country is better than the other. 
The approach was to embark on field research to collect data through primary and secondary 
sources, while also conducting interviews and focus group discussions. Based on data gathered, a 
comparative analysis was made between the two countries on the influences of their security 
culture on governance of their respective security sectors, which revealed similarities, differences 
and, to an extent, paradoxes.   
The findings in this chapter revealed a basic contention, competition and 
complementarity between issues of modernity and tradition brought about by colonialism and its 
influences on the security culture in the security sector. These varied and equally complex 
security cultures influence decision-making processes within the West African region and its 
member states. Actors within the sector, ranging from state to sub-state actors and international 
or external partners, bring their different cultures to bear in facilitating responses to security 
threats, while seeking to maintain peace and stability in the region and in ECOWAS member 
states.  
 Within Ghana and Nigeria, we have a mixture of regime and human security in which the 
state occasionally, if not often, focuses more on maintaining the regime in power with less 
consideration on the security of individuals in the areas of food, health, education, environment 
and upholding human rights. Both countries have, however, improved quite significantly based 
on the human security demands as a result of a vibrant and vigilant media and vociferous civil 
society.  Notwithstanding, security complexes and challenges still exist, and reforms and 
governance within the sector require improvement in order to enhance effective and efficient 
governance and delivery of security goods in these countries.  
In achieving this, changes would not only require structural and organisational reforms 
(hard changes) but complementary changes in behaviour and attitudes (soft changes). This will 
287 
 
entail dropping negative security practices or customs while adopting positive ones from within 
the formal and informal security sectors to facilitate the ‘soft’ changes required for effectiveness.  
The changes therefore must stem from the ‘human beings’ or security actors, taking on positive 
security culture practices. For this to succeed, some key intervening factors would have to be 
taken into consideration.   
These include knowledge of the SSR/SSG concept and embracing the people-centred 
security approach; a recognition of the different security actors in both the formal and informal 
security sectors and their complementary roles; ensure high quality leadership and legitimacy of 
actors in order to facilitate the understanding and acceptance of the security concepts and the 
needed changes required to embrace them; circumventing the challenges posed by the complex 
hybrid security terrain within which these changes must occur and the need for complementarity; 
and imbibing the needed and necessary positive and cross-cutting cultural values to ensure 
appropriate changes and sustainability. An attempt to fulfill these requirements would, largely, 
minimize complexities, induce acceptance and enhance effective governance of the security 
sector. These essential or influential  security culture factors align with the social democracy 
ideology in which people are not only recognised in decision-making processes but also 
considered as those with whom power resides, and with oversight responsibilities for ensuring 
transparency and accountability towards meeting their security needs in addition to that of the 
state. 
As reflected in the Ghana and Nigeria case studies, both countries have fared either 
positively or negatively against these intervening factors in responses to similar or different 
security challenges confronting them in their respective countries. But success within their 
respective sectors and in the ECOWAS region at large would require adopting proposed 
progressive security cultures for impact. This will require encouraging contextual hybridism in 
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policy implementation in which case the local content is not glossed over for resilience and 
sustainability, rather than the translational hybrid approach of transferring or insisting only on 
western or foreign approach to issues even when they do not fit.  Additionally, direct relations or 
interactions between leaders and their followers reinforce their recognition, acceptance, authority 
and legitimacy. This, in turn, facilitates governance in the quest to deliver community needs. 
Thus, inclusivity and ‘bottom-up’ approaches, endear leadership and institutions to citizens or 
community residents with effective collaboration and partnerships. Again, despite the existence 
of similarities and differences in security cultures in the formal and informal security sectors of 
both countries, the adoption and practice of similar security cultures minimise complexity based 
on an acceptance of positive values, customs and tradition, while different security culture 
practices undermine security governance efforts to a large extent.  
All these findings culminate in response to the central question as to why culture matters 
in demystifying the complexities within the security sector, which then makes it possible for the 
needed recognition and acceptance for change or transformation through security sector reform 
and enhanced governance of the sector. This observed fact, therefore, reinforces the theoretical 
proposition at the beginning of the study in chapter 3 that shared norms and values on safety, 
protection and freedom from fear, influence the acceptance and commitment towards security 
sector reform  and governance efforts. Hence imbibing the appropriate security cultural values, 
norms and practices by both state and sub-state actor groups, would ensure the needed change 
and transformation towards successful statebuilding processes in West Africa.  
7. 6.1 Summary 
Security sector reform and governance initiatives have contributed to statebuilding 
processes in periods of transition and post-conflict situations. This is necessitated by long periods 
of authoritarianism and conflicts which are reflected in dictatorships and destabilisation of 
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political and socio-economic activities in countries under consideration. To correct these security 
and governance deficits, reforms and governance processes are undertaken in accordance with 
democratic norms, good governance, and the call for civilian control of the sector, accountability, 
transparency and observance of the rule of law (Schroeder et al 2013: 382).   
Transformation of the security sector does not only require structural or institutional 
changes in terms of capacity-building, provision of adequate equipment, resources and logistics 
or materiel, but also requires complementary changes in attitudes and behavioural norms and 
practices reflected in “cultural change in terms of how people relate to [the] state as well as how 
people conduct everyday business” (Jackson 2009: 4). All these changes would help facilitate 
effective and enhanced security sector, made possible by an appropriate governance mechanism 
or system.  
It is, therefore, in response to the needed transformation of the sector that this study 
explored the research question as to why culture matters in demystifying the complexity of the 
sector, facilitating an understanding and acceptance of security sector reform and governance 
concepts, and their effectiveness in ensuring enhanced governance, peace, stability and 
development in the case study countries considered and beyond. The thesis focused on SSG in 
transitional societies that are post-authoritarian in nature, and that are working towards 
embracing and consolidating democratic tenets, though it could equally provide useful lessons 
for post-conflict peacebuilding context of reconstruction and recovery.  
The thesis looked at possible ways of engendering an appropriate mix of indigenous and 
acquired security cultures in security sector governance in Ghana and Nigeria, and by extension 
the ECOWAS region. This needs a radical shift in both structural conditions and behaviours or 
security cultures as it makes security governance largely irrelevant in some African societies 
(Nathan, 2004: 2; Bryden and Olonisakin 2010: 4).  
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The thesis, therefore, advocated for more cultural-related practices that effectively 
combine African traditional security cultural practices with that of the Western-acquired or 
accommodated ones rather than the "cosmetic" or “instrumental” security culture-related 
practices in order to enhance transformation in security governance in West Africa and elsewhere 
(Hill 2012: 93). This suggestion was arrived at based on the major influence of colonialism in 
political, economic, social and security systems of governance in these countries (Ajayi 
1968:196-197; Adu Boahene 1985: 44). Colonial practices and culture handed over or 
transmitted to the post-colonial era created major security culture differences between modern 
(formal) and traditional (informal) approaches to security governance in the continent. This made 
it difficult in accepting security sector reforms considered largely as a foreign dominated and 
imposed concept in the region, given its multiplicity of actors with varied security cultures and 
complex security governance arrangements.  
The hybridity generated from these complex arrays of security actors with different 
security culture beliefs, customs, norms and values posed challenges which required appropriate 
responses in ensuring the safety of the state and its people. Some of the challenges included 
gerontocracy, authoritarianism, chauvinism, obsolete, dated or unacceptable traditional beliefs 
and practices with human rights implications, imposition of foreign concepts and values which 
are unacceptable within the endogenous context, and corruption among others which have 
undermined security reform efforts and governance processes (Bagayoko et al 2016: 7; Meagher 
2012: 1073-1101; Logan 2008:1; Scott 2007: 6; Ake 2012: 3; Fukuyama 2004: 17). An 
interrogation of the ‘software’ aspects of behavioural and attitudinal changes which are less 
tangible and difficult to achieve was thus embarked upon, which required more imagination, 
patience and sensitivity (Murray 2009: 205). To achieve this, a qualitative approach to the 
research was adopted, given the social dimensions of issues to be explored with major tendencies 
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for bias, as well as the need for inductive reasoning to arrive at a triangulated conclusion 
summarised in the 7 chapters of this thesis as presented below.  
Chapter 1 of this study introduced the subject matter of the research on the need to focus 
on security culture and its influences on security governance which was captured in the 
background to the study, the aims and scope of the research, overall objectives and rationale of 
the study. This provided the basis for understanding the background issues and why this research 
was undertaken. Chapter 2 on literature review and analytical framework delved into the analysis 
and synthesis of the existing literature on security culture and its influences on governance of the 
security sector. It did this with the view to identifying existing gaps for the research, while 
framing an appropriate research question and enabling objectives to guide the proposed research 
towards making an original contribution to knowledge in the selected field of study.  
The literature review and analytical framework considered the broader context of 
statebuilding within which security sector reforms take place, but in this instance, going beyond 
the creation and strengthening of required structures and institutions to looking at complementary 
cultural changes which facilitate the effective functioning of these structures and institutions 
within the state (Fukuyama 2004: 17; Chandler 2010: 6; Jackson 2009: 4). This provided 
opportunities for Ghana and Nigeria to make use of their potential resources and human capital in 
the context of security reforms for improved governance and development in their state building 
processes.  
The human security concept was highlighted as the prudent security model to embrace in 
security sector governance, given that it caters for both the freedom from fear and want, as well 
as threat to the state and its people, compared to that of traditional/regime security ((Buzan 1991; 
Booth 1999; UNDP Human Development Report 1994: 3, 22-40; Annan 2000; and Tadjbakhsh 
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and Chenoy 2007). This should be complemented by good democratic governance informed by 
the contribution of all stakeholders, including both state and sub-state actors.   
The differences observed between the modern and indigenous systems of governance are 
the common standards for governance in a modern globalised world as against a more localised 
one in the indigenous context that is only expanded where issues of commonality exist 
(Hlawnching 2006: 4). Notwithstanding, both systems adopt a participatory and inclusive 
decision-making process based on consensus-building, except that the indigenous approach opts 
mainly for bottom-up approaches rather than the top-bottom.  
These findings revealed, therefrom, that in drawing lessons for the future, statebuilding, 
security and governance arrangements require not only a rethink, but the need to adopt and 
mainstream transformative approaches in which hybrid forms of progressive traditional and 
modern practices would inform theories and policies (Mac Ginty 2008: 139 -163; and Podder 
2013: 353-380). The element of transformation brought out the issue of culture, but more 
specifically security culture as the “soft” part of the reform which is more or less invisible, but 
which influences behavioural patterns or the way of life of a group of people (Murray 2009).  
The literature review finally explored security culture and the notion of complexity, 
acceptance and effectiveness in enhancing SSR/SSG in both countries of Ghana and Nigeria. In 
this context, it came to light that cultural differences exhibit complexities of relations between 
individuals or groups, as the higher the differences, the more complex the relationship. Cultural 
similarities, however, helped to understand the evolutionary process of cultural development 
(House et al 2002: 1). This review set the stage for the subsequent identification and exploration 
of the research question “Why culture matters? An Analysis of Complexity, Acceptance and 
Effectiveness in Security Sector Governance in Ghana and Nigeria”,  
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Chapter 3 of the study catered for the research design and methodology which provided 
the philosophical framework for undertaking the research through the adoption of the right 
research methodology, the collection and analysis of relevant data, and the justification of the 
research methodology. Chapter 4 on security culture and security governance in West Africa 
provided the regional frameworks for undertaking the two-country case studies in Ghana and 
Nigeria. Its focus was mainly on tracing the evolution of security culture in West Africa by 
looking at the changing regional context of security culture based on colonial influences. The 
argument focused specifically on the non-static nature of traditional societies which have evolved 
over time from its pre-colonial through colonial to post-colonial times (Afigbo 1985: 487).  
The demographic and evolutionary processes indicate a dynamic and changing cultural 
values and norms as these changes have either been voluntary or forcefully imbibed. These 
voluntary or imbibed modern cultural values have their positive and negative attributes in 
addition to the already existing indigenous ones, but equally present hybrid cultures experienced 
currently in African societies across the continent. This indicates the potential for acculturation, 
while equally maintaining indigenous traditional norms and values. Challenges, progress and 
prospects are then explored towards facilitating effective changes in the transformation of the 
security sector and its governance in West Africa.  
Chapters 5 and 6 of the study reviewed cultural influences on security practices in both 
Ghana and Nigeria by looking at actors within both formal and informal security sectors, as well 
as cumulative effects of their practices in the effective and efficient governance towards 
responses to threats and ensuring freedom from fear in communities, regions and the countries at 
large. In these countries, it was discovered that security cultures existed in both the formal and 
informal sectors, though some considered it as emerging in specific contexts. Actors in the 
sector, nevertheless, had their varied forms of security cultures with some aligned to the western 
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realist and idealist conceptions of security while others conform to the traditional pre-colonial 
ones or both. These cultures have their similarities, usually influenced by altruistic values, as 
well as major differences which makes it difficult and complex in decision-making, prioritisation 
of threats, and whose security to cater for among other things.  
In taking the issue forward, the research revealed contentious modern and traditional 
security cultures with both positive and negative attributes that required some harmonization in 
order to facilitate a successful transformation of the sector and effective governance in both 
countries. It did this within the social democracy ideology of preserving the security of both the 
state and the individual, but with major emphasis on integrating progressive informal and formal 
cultures and tradition in the security governance process. This, as a result, led to the proposition 
for a rethink of the SSR concept in both approach and delivery, taking issues of its complexity 
and acceptance into consideration for required changes. This must equally be complemented by a 
basic reorientation of attitudes or behavioural changes for prudent outcomes through the grasping 
of security objectives and dividends.  
In Ghana, security sector reform has taken place with emphasis on restructuring of 
security institutions and agencies towards effective and efficient security service delivery. This 
was done with the view to subject security agencies to proper governance through civilian 
control of the armed forces and the police by ensuring the upholding of the rule of law and 
observing human rights standards, as a result of past abuses of people’s rights under successive 
authoritarian regimes. Transparency and accountability was equally given emphasis in 
parliament, while judicial reforms were undertaken to enforce the laws. Capacities of civil 
society or sub-state actors were equally built to facilitate effective oversight and governance of 
the sector.    
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The country also presents an ideational hybrid context in which security culture 
preferences in both the formal and informal contexts have been established. There is also a 
legitimate recognition of informal security actors in the 1992 Ghanaian Constitution. It was 
equally observed that security culture in Ghana has had and could have more influences on 
security sector governance in Ghana which has brought about some level of changes which 
appear a bit more ‘intrinsic’ than cosmetic or ‘instrumental’ in security governance and responses 
to security threats and needs (Hill 2012: 93).   
Be that as it may, challenges also continue to exist as security reforms were not 
undertaken necessarily in a holistic manner. It focused more on the institutions and equipping the 
security agencies without complementary reforms with regard to change and transformation 
based on shared behavioural norms, values and practices. The country also has no national 
security policy to guide its national security goals, objectives, interests and reform agenda, 
though it has a national defence policy and other security legislations to guide its roles and 
functions.  
In the Nigeria case, the 1999 Constitution mandates the Federal and State Governments to 
make security and welfare their primary purpose. Its security reform efforts focused largely on 
the professionalisation of the military from 1999 and subjecting the armed forces to civilian 
control, as in the case of Ghana, by adjusting from military rule and supremacy to observing 
democratic tenets. Hence issues of civil-military relations have been a major focus. Police reform 
efforts have focused on reversals of questionable promotions, training and increase in numbers of 
policemen in response to high levels of crime. Ongoing reform and restructuring efforts are 
currently underway under the Nigerian Police Reform and Restructuring Plan 2015-2020, and 
support by donors towards management reform, accountability reforms, capacity-
building/training reform and equipment/infrastructure support (ISSAT-DCAF 2016: 5-75).  
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The huge Nigerian population with multiple and diverse security actors, compared to 
Ghana, further complicates its security challenges amidst complexities and legitimacy issues. Its 
traditional leaders are not recognised by their political counterparts as major or legitimate 
security actors in the pursuit of security and its related development activities in the country. 
Rather, these indigenous actors derive their legitimacy directly from the people in the 
communities they reside in. The country equally continues to struggle with trust and credibility 
issues owing to high levels of corruption. Nigeria, however, came up recently in 2019 with a 
reviewed national security strategy, reviewed every five years, that encapsulates the security 
aspirations of its citizens, thus presenting a holistic and bottom-up strategy to address the 
ongoing security challenges, including terrorism, in the country.  
The hybrid governance and security sector arrangements thus bring both formal and 
informal security actors together in their pursuit of governance and policy decisions but without 
the necessary recognition in the case of traditional leaders. This requires immediate redress to 
give more leverage and enhance coordination and collaboration towards security, peace and 
stability in Nigeria. Security sector reform efforts are equally more ‘hardware’ oriented rather 
than focusing on the total transformation of the sector.   
So based on the observations made, it is inferred that security culture influences exist but 
also require significant levels of legitimacy for the needed impact to be felt. The mixed 
legitimacies observed within the formal and informal security sector arrangements reinforce the 
need for inclusivity and collaboration in the effective and successful governance of the sector.  
Chapter 7 did a comparative case study analysis of security culture influences on effective 
security sector governance in Ghana and Nigeria by seeking to establish the centrality of security 
culture influences in the improvement of the governance of the security sector in countries in 
transition in West Africa and beyond. Findings revealed a basic contention, competition and 
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complementarity between issues of modernity and tradition brought about by colonialism and its 
influences on the security culture in the security sector. These varied and equally complex 
security cultures influence decision-making processes within the West African region and 
beyond.   
These security culture influences are however based on certain key factors derived from 
previous sections above, including people-centred security; knowledge of the SSR/SSG concept; 
recognised security actors; acceptable or legitimate leadership; circumventing the complex 
hybrid security cultures or dynamism; and imbibing acceptable cultural values that could 
enhance security sector governance if observed properly, and which led to triangulate 
observations made. This helped to establish the importance of security culture in demystifying 
the complexity of the security concept and its reform prerogatives, as well as facilitating its 
acceptance towards improving governance in the sector. A directly proportionate relationship 
was also observed between similar security cultures facilitating easy collaboration and 
cooperation in governance of the security sector, while different security cultures make 
collaboration and cooperation difficult. This speaks to using bottom-up approaches through 
consultation and dialogue to facilitate imbibing or adopting acceptable cultural values, norms and 
practices towards effective governance in the sector.  
All these, inductively, informed the theoretical proposition that shared norms and values 
on safety, protection and freedom from fear, influence the acceptance and commitment towards 
security sector reform and governance efforts, hence imbibing the appropriate security cultural 
values, norms and practices by both state and sub-state actor groups, would ensure the needed 
change and transformation towards successful SSR/SSG processes in West Africa.  
This study, thus, helped in confirming why culture matters in SSR/SSG efforts in 
societies in transition in West Africa and beyond. It also indicates the novelty of the research 
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undertaken in two prospective transitional societies in West Africa with their respective 
successes and challenges. It makes a significant contribution to enhancing governance of the 
security sector in West Africa and beyond, and provides options for transformation within the 
sector. It further provides options for undertaking further academic and policy research in related 
areas to consolidate these findings as the research could not exhaustively cover the entire 
countries in which research was undertaken as a result of minimal resources, limited duration of 
the research and security risks in some parts of the countries under consideration.  
7.6.2 Meeting Enabling and Overall Objectives of the Study  
The enabling objectives for undertaking this research were met in the course of the study. 
These include promoting the recognition, appreciation and respect for the cultural context based 
on existing norms and values, as these have the tendency to facilitate the acceptance and 
commitment towards sustainable democratic governance of the security sector. It also helped to 
establish the inter-connectedness as well as clarify the dynamics between the major concepts of 
culture, security and governance, and contextualise the interplay of these concepts in security 
reform efforts towards eventual resilience and sustainability in the statebuilding process.   
In both security sector reform contexts of Ghana and Nigeria, it was realised that the 
interplay of security cultures – specifically between the formal and informal sectors, and at the 
local, national and international levels – brought about major diversities, complexities, and 
differences which further complicated effective implementation of the concept and governance of 
the sector. A case in point in Nigeria is the traditional expertise at the community levels in 
resolving farmer-herder crisis or disputes in the Ijebu-Itele District of Ogun State, while the 
Federal and State Governments struggle to contain the crises at the middle belt and other areas 
across the country for the lack of recognition of indigenous capacities and collaboration with 
traditional authorities, as well as the top-bottom approach to the crises. A recognition and 
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involvement of these traditional actors, with the requisite cultural sensitivities in mind, would go 
a long way to facilitate appropriate intervention and responses.  
A similar example can also be cited of the effective collaboration between the 
Government of Ghana and traditional leaders in the amicable resolution of the long-standing 
Dagbon Crisis, the 2012 conflict at Hohoe in the Volta Region between the indigenous Ewes and 
the settler Zongo (Muslim) community, and that of the 2008 electoral dispute between the two 
major parties of NDC and NPP. The hybrid context, thus, requires recognition, appreciation and 
cultural awareness and sensitivities based on existing norms and values in order to facilitate the 
acceptance of foreign or different but positive cultural practices while eschewing native harmful 
ones towards sustainable democratic governance of the security sector.  
With regard to the clarification, contexualisation and establishment of interconnectedness 
and dynamics between the three major concepts of culture, security and governance in security 
reform efforts, it revealed the imposition of colonial and imperialist policies and influences 
aligned with Western liberal peace approach to development in both countries and developing 
countries at large. This, as a result, calls for the need to overcome its detriment by focusing on 
positive or progressive endogenous security cultures which have sustained development activities 
over centuries towards eventual resilience and sustainability in the statebuilding process.  
This reinforces another objective of highlighting appropriate security cultural practices 
that promote good governance practices in undertaking SSG in societies in transition. In this 
regard, research findings in both countries revealed some positive and negative, complex or 
unfamiliar behavioural practices, as well as differences in norms, values and cultures. A 
transformation would, however, take place depending on the promotion of identified intervening 
factors or the adoption of positive cultural values mentioned above.   
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Governance and leadership must be people-centred or aligned with pro-human security 
ideals which in the long run translate into the protection of the state rather than the regime in 
power; mapping of actors in the formal and informal security sectors and the recognition of their 
complementary roles in the sector in crucial; and ensuring a credible leadership that is legitimate 
enough to facilitate the understanding and acceptance of the security concepts and the needed 
changes required to embrace them. Others also include an acknowledgment and understanding of 
the hybrid security context within which these changes must occur and the need for 
complementarity and imbibing the needed and necessary positive and cross-cutting cultural 
values to ensure appropriate changes and sustainability.  
Above all, the critical role of dialogue among local/national actors and partners in 
undertaking SSR and SSG as a way of promoting synergy, and enhancing coordination and 
coherence between indigenous forms of security cultural practices and the modern liberal peace 
approach towards development came to light. This underscores the positive correlation or a 
directly proportionate relationship between adopting similar or standard security cultures and 
effective governance of the security sector. In all the case studies undertaken in Ghana and 
Nigeria, success in prevention, management and resolution of conflicts or disputes had to do with 
adopting ‘bottom up’ approaches based on inclusive dialogue and shared values. This promotes 
cooperation, ownership and commitment to guaranteed peace and security in the respective 
countries and the region at large.  
Finally, change and transformation remains an ongoing process as a means to an end and 
not an end in itself, and does take time. Hence this will require patience, diligence, commitment 
and dedication to achieve the desired change and transformation towards peace and stability in 
transitional societies in West Africa and beyond.  
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These enabling objectives derive from the overall objectives of exploring ways to enhance 
SSG for effective SSR processes in transitional societies in West Africa; identify ways of 
promoting effective and efficient security institutions and agencies in delivering services that 
meet the needs of the people; promoting collective decision-making processes by recognising 
inclusive identification of threats to state and sub-state actor groups; highlighting the importance 
of  addressing the needs of both state and sub-state actors as a conflict prevention measure 
towards consolidation of peace and security; and contextualising the SSR concept within 
transitional societies. 
7.6.3 Recommendations  
From the case studies undertaken in Ghana and Nigeria, it becomes very clear that some 
measures need to be considered, going forward, in addressing lingering security challenges; 
among them, the exploration of oil in the Niger Delta. In responding to this conflict, the plight of 
the people in the area must be of major concern to decision-makers, especially with regard to 
their health and the environment. The actors at local, national and international levels must reach 
basic understanding on key challenges and responses in this regard. Same goes for issues of 
terrorism and farmer-herder disputes in communities across the country. An understanding of the 
different cultures of actors in the sector provides an added opportunity to respond appropriately 
and adequately to the challenges.   
Similarly in Ghana, ways must be explored to consolidate security sector reform and 
governance efforts through the drafting of a national security policy to guide security reforms 
and intervention in a holistic and focused manner, having in mind the need to balance traditional 
and human security considerations. A careful and proper understanding of the security reform 
and governance concepts, and a good knowledge of actors involved and their security cultures 
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would facilitate inclusive dialogue and mitigation efforts in order to enhance governance of the 
sector and provision of security needs of both the state and its people.   
There is also the need to revisit and find common grounds for complementing or 
integrating external SSR/SSG support with internally driven reforms in both formal and informal 
security sectors of Ghana and Nigeria. This is important given the immense contribution from the 
informal security sector to peace and stability of both countries, demonstrated in chapters 5 and 6 
in the country case studies. People generally identify with the informal sector, despite its peculiar 
challenges, respect and recognise traditional leaders, and accept as well as patronise its services. 
Hence any SSR or SSG programmes implemented in these and other countries without security 
culture considerations, influences and focus on transformation of the sector would be an effort in 
futility as observed elsewhere.  
In all these scenarios, however, principles, norms and values must be inculcated and 
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Appendix I  
Interview Questions for Field Work  
➢ How would you define security, security culture and governance?  
➢ Do you know about SSR and SSG programmes and what it entails?  
➢ What is (are) your notion(s) about complexity of the concepts and the security 
sector?  
➢ Do you consider the existence of security culture in this country, and if so what is it? 
➢What is the nature of crime or security threats and challenges in the country?   
➢ Does the community work with local government, officials of government and 
security agencies in addressing security challenges, and if so, how?  
➢ What security challenges are faced in the community level and how are they 
addressed?  
➢ What roles do traditional leaders play in their communities or constituents to 
improve security governance?  
➢ Are traditional leaders considered as legitimate security actors and why?  
➢ What tensions exist between the traditional and modern or formal security and 
governance arrangements? Any possibilities of addressing them?  
➢ Are there any negative attributes or values that undermine the effective functioning 
of the security sector?  
➢ Are there ongoing efforts to address the issue of corruption and other negative 
security culture values and practices in the system?   






Appendix II  
List and Dates of Interviews Conducted in the Field (Ghana &Nigeria)  
No.  Name  Status  Date  Institution/Location  
1  Adeniran, Akingbolahan  Civilian  05 January  
2018  
Govt. – Abuja   
2  Agbezuge, Justice   Civilian  19 May 2015  Int. Org. – Accra    
3  Agbodza, Kwame   Civilian  18 May 2015  Govt. – Accra   
4  Aning, Emmanuel Kwesi  Expert  11 May 2015  Academic – Accra   
5  Amankwah, Samuel   Civilian  10 May 2015  Govt. - Accra  
6  Atuguba, Raymond   Expert  15 September  
2015  
Academic - Accra  
7  Baffour, Fritz  Civilian  18 May 2015  Govt. – Accra   
8  Chief Alhaji Abdulfatai A.  
Adesanya  
Civilian  28 March  
2018  
Traditional – Ogun  
State  
9  Coleman, Nii Carl   Military,  
Expert  
20 April 20-19  NGO - Accra  
10  His Royal Highness Alaiyeluwa  
Oba Dr. (engr.) M.A. Kasali  
Civilian  30 March  
2018  
Traditional – Ogun  
State  
11  Jaye, Thomas   Expert  08 May 2015  Academic - Accra  
12  Kanyog, Jerome    Police  19 May 2015  Govt. - Accra  
13  Lartey, Ernest  Expert  08 May 2015  Academic - Accra  
14  Nwangu, Chinedu  Civilian  05 January  INGO - Abuja  
342 
 
   2018   
15  Oduro, Franklin  Civilian  09 May 2015  NGO - Accra  
16  Quantson, Kofi Bentum   Police,  
Expert  
18 April 2019  Private Capacity -  
Accra  
 
Appendix III  
Focus Group Discussion (1)  
List of Traditional Leaders of Abutia Kloe, Volta Region, Ghana  
No.  Name  Title  Date  Location  
1  Togbe Nelson Klu  Stool Father  15 September  
2015  
Abutia Kloe,  
V/R  
2  Togbe Daniel Gotu  Zikpuitor  





3  Rtd. Police Inspector  
Newton K. Nyanyo  












5  Mama Rejoice Darke  Mama  Ayipe  












7  Mama Enyonam Gu   (Gblevi Rep)  “  “  
8  Togbe Kwami Ayi   Linguist   “  
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9  Mr. Albert Nukpeta   (Secretary of 






10  Madam Grace Kpe    Resident  “  “  
11  Lance Corporal Richard Osei   Ghana Police  







Focus Group Discussions (2) 
Members of the Traditional Council (Regional House of Chiefs) of Brong Ahafo Region   
No.  Name  Title  Date  Location  
1  Nana Bofotia Boa  
Amponsem   
 Krontihene,  
(Chair)  
 









3  Nana Fosu Gyeabour    Domserehene  “  “  
4  Nana Kusi Boadum    Penkwasehene  “  “  
5  Nana Kofi Poku   Opinion Leader  “  “  
6  Nana Abena Boaboahemaa    Dwantoahemaa  “  “  
7  Madam Akua Manu   Sunyanima  
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8  Stephen Owusu (SO)   Sunyani  Regional  







Appendix IV  
Old Political Map of Ghana  
 
Source: https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/ghana_map.htmMap 
based on a UN map from UN Cartographic Section.   
